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Abstract
Testing using manually generated test cases is the primary technique used in industry to improve
reliability of software—in fact, such ad hoc testing accounts for over half of the typical cost of
software development. We propose new methods for systematically and automatically testing
sequential and concurrent programs. The methods are based on three new techniques: concolic
testing, race-detection and flipping, and predictive monitoring. Concolic testing combines concrete
and symbolic testing to avoid redundant test cases as well as false warnings. Concolic testing can
catch generic errors such as assertion violations, uncaught exceptions, and segmentation faults.
Large real-world programs are almost always concurrent. Because of the inherent non-
determinism of such programs, testing is notoriously hard. We extend concolic testing with a
method called race-detection and flipping, which provides ways of reducing, often exponentially,
the exploration space for concolic testing. This combined method provides the first technique to
effectively test concurrent programs with complex data inputs.
Concolic testing may also be combined with formal specifications by using runtime monitors.
Runtime monitors are small software units which are synthesized automatically from the formal
specification for the software and weaved into the code to dynamically check if the specification is
violated. For multi-threaded concurrent programs, we developed a novel technique which allows
efficient predictive monitoring to enable the detection of a violation by observing some related, but
possibly bug-free execution of a concurrent program. Predictive monitoring dramatically improves
the efficiency of testing.
Based on the above methods we have developed tools for testing both C and Java programs. We
have used the tools to find bugs in several real-world software systems including SGLIB, a popular
C data structure library used in a commercial tool, implementations of the Needham-Schroeder
protocol and the TMN protocol, the scheduler of Honeywell’s DEOS real-time operating system,
and the Sun Microsystems’ JDK 1.4 collection framework.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Software pervades every aspect of our life: businesses, financial services, medical services, com-
munication systems, entertainment, and education are invariably dependent on software. With
this increasing dependency on software, we expect software to be reliable, robust, safe, and secure.
Unfortunately, at the present time the reliability of day-to-day software is questionable. In fact,
NIST estimated in 2002 that software failures cost the US economy alone about $59.5 billion every
year, and that improvements in software testing infrastructure might save one-third of this cost.
Testing remains the primary way to improve reliability of software. Billions of dollars are spent
on testing in the software industry, as testing usually accounts for more than half the cost of
software development. In spite of its success in both commercial and open-source software, testing
suffers from at least four limitations. First, the primary method of generating test inputs is manual.
Automated test input generation techniques, which are less widely-used, have limitations: random
testing can only detect a few bugs; symbolic execution based testing, which is more exhaustive,
depends on automated theorem proving techniques and hence limited by the power of underlying
theorem prover. Second, testing becomes notoriously hard for large concurrent programs due to
the inherent non-determinism in such programs. Third, testing is ad hoc: the translation of the
specification into program assertions is mostly done manually. Finally, testing can find bugs in a
program; however, it cannot prove a program correct.
In this dissertation, we partly address these problems by developing systematic and automated
testing methods for sequential and concurrent programs.
We first focus on sequential programs that can get data inputs from their environments. We
assume that the behavior of such a program depends solely on the input that it gets from its external
environment—for a given input the behavior of the program is deterministic. We have developed a
novel method to systematically and automatically test sequential programs. The method is called
1
concolic testing. Concolic testing combines concrete and symbolic execution to generate test inputs
that enable a program to explore all the distinct feasible execution paths of a programs at most
once, while avoiding redundant test inputs as well as false warnings. Since concolic testing tries
to explore all possible execution paths of a program, it can catch generic errors such as assertion
violations, uncaught exceptions, segmentation faults, and so on.
Large real-world programs are almost invariably concurrent. In concurrent programs, several
threads or actors or processes execute concurrently communicating with each other either through
shared memory or message passing. Testing concurrent programs is notoriously hard because of the
exponentially large number of possible interleavings of concurrent events that the execution of such
programs generate. We have extended concolic testing with a new technique called race-detection
and flipping which provides ways of dramatically reducing the exploration space for shared memory
concurrent programs. In particular, the extended method uses the concrete execution of concolic
testing to compute the causality relation, an abstract relation, between the events in a concurrent
execution. Two executions of a concurrent program are said to be equivalent if they exhibit the
same events and the events are related by the same causality relation. We use the computed
causality relation to provide a novel technique for exploring non-equivalent (with respect to the
causality relation) execution paths of a concurrent program. The extended testing method can
catch concurrency related generic errors such as data races and deadlocks, in addition to generic
errors such as assertion violations, uncaught exceptions, and segmentation faults. This extension
provides the first technique to effectively and systematically test concurrent programs with complex
data inputs. Because our testing method is designed to explore execution paths of a concurrent
program, we term the method Explicit Path Model Checking.
Errors in a program may not be always generic: they may be due to the violation of the
functional requirement of the program, for example, requirements that are provided in a formal
functional specification of the program. To test a program against its formal specification, we
combine concolic testing with runtime monitoring. Runtime monitors are small software units
which are synthesized automatically from a formal specification for the program and weaved into
the code to dynamically check if the specification is violated.
While applying concolic testing combined with runtime monitoring to concurrent multi-threaded
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programs, we observed that exploring only non-equivalent execution paths is not sufficient for
catching violations of temporal properties—a temporal property may be simultaneously satisfied
and violated by two different equivalent execution paths. Therefore, to test a temporal specification
against a program, we need to explore and monitor all possible execution paths of the program.
Unfortunately, it has been shown that the number of possible execution paths of a concurrent
program can be exponentially larger than the number of non-equivalent paths. This makes runtime
monitoring of all execution paths of even a relatively simple concurrent program impractical.
To address this difficulty, we have developed a novel technique for predictive monitoring of
concurrent programs. In this technique we generate, from an observed execution path, all its
equivalent execution paths and represent them compactly as an abstract model called a computation
lattice. We show that monitoring of temporal properties on this model can be done efficiently. Since
this technique enables us to predict violations of properties in non-observed execution paths without
re-executing the program, we call the technique predictive monitoring. Observe that predictive
monitoring can predict and monitor all execution paths equivalent to a given execution path; we
still need concolic testing extended with race-detection and flipping to explore all non-equivalent
execution paths.
Based on the above methods we have developed tools for testing both C and Java programs.
The testing tool for C is called CUTE; CUTE can only handle sequential C programs. The testing
tool for Java is called jCUTE; jCUTE can test multi-threaded Java programs. Both CUTE and
jCUTE can find generic errors. For Java, we have also implemented the predictive monitoring
method in jCUTE. We have used CUTE and jCUTE to find bugs in several real-world software
systems. CUTE found two previously unknown errors—a segmentation fault and an infinite loop—
in SGLIB, a popular C data structure library used in a commercial software. Using jCUTE, we
tested the thread-safe Java Collection framework provided with the Sun Microsystems’ Java 1.4.
Surprisingly, we discovered several data races, deadlocks, uncaught exceptions, and an infinite
loop in this widely used library. All of these are concurrency related potential bugs. In addition,
jCUTE found a previously known subtle time-partitioning error in the Honeywell’s DEOS real-time
operating system developed for use in small business aircraft. jCUTE detected well-known security
attacks in a concurrent implementation of the Needham-Schroeder and the TMN protocols.
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Figure 1.1: The ‘Big Picture’
1.1 Background
We describe the ‘big picture’ and how this dissertation fits in the big picture. A large fraction
of the research in software engineering and programming languages is devoted to the problem of
building reliable software. The research can be broadly classified into five overlapping categories
(see Figure 1.1) as follows.
• Safe Programming Languages and Type Systems: The goal of research in this area is to develop
programs using programming constructs and type systems that ensure that the developed
programs are free from certain classes of bugs such as memory errors, information leaks,
data races, deadlocks, etc. The limitations of these approaches is that they cannot guarantee
that a program is free from all kinds of bugs. Moreover, sophisticated type systems make
programming a harder task.
• Static Analysis: The methods developed by research in this area help to find bugs in programs
by statically analyzing the source code of a program. Methods in this area include automated
theorem proving, pointer analysis, software model checking based on predicate abstraction
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and refinement, and so on. Software reliability methods based on static analyses are often
conservative, resulting in false notification of errors.
• Dynamic Analysis: Dynamic analysis relies on the runtime information obtained from an
actual execution of a program. Various techniques based on dynamic program analyses in-
clude automated testing, runtime verification, explicit state model checking, and so on. Since
dynamic analysis based methods detect bugs by observing the actual execution of a program,
the bugs inferred are often real bugs. Unfortunately, since dynamic program analyses based
methods analyze a single execution of program, they cannot discover all bugs.
• Model Checking: Model checking methods aim to prove that a program meets it formal
specification. They include methods based on both static analyses and dynamic analyses.
The main limitation of model checking methods is that they do not scale for large programs
as the state space to be explored in such methods becomes enormous.
• Model Based Software Development and Analysis: The research in this area is based on
the philosophy that the development of software should begin with the design of a formal
model. Although this is a rigorous and systematic method of developing software, the cost
and expertise required for developing software using this paradigm is often large. This often
limits the applicability of the paradigm to safety critical systems.
The work presented in this dissertation falls under the category of dynamic program analysis.
We believe in the philosophy that we can catch real bugs by actually executing a program. However,
dynamic analysis means that we are restricted to information that is observed in an execution. We
try to remove this limitation in a scalable way by directing a program to execute in all possible
ways. Moreover, we develop methods that can, by observing a successful execution, predict bugs
with certainty in other unobserved executions. In a broader sense, this thesis makes dynamic
program analysis more systematic and rigorous; in other words, the thesis bridges some of the gap
between model checking and testing.
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1.2 Outline
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we give an overview of our testing
algorithms using simple examples. We use three different examples to introduce concolic testing,
race-detection and flipping, and predictive monitoring.
In Chapter 3, to simplify the description of our testing algorithms, we introduce a simple
imperative shared-memory multi-threaded programming language, called Scil. Most features of
common high level imperative programming languages such as C and Java can be translated into
Scil. We then formalize the execution paths of a program written in Scil in terms of a partial
order relation called the causality relation and show how the causality relation can be tracked at
runtime using dynamic vector clocks.
In Chapters 4, we describe our testing algorithm for the sequential fragment of Scil. The
method is called concolic testing. We discuss the various advantages of concolic testing over tradi-
tional symbolic testing.
In Chapter 5, we extend concolic testing with race-detection and flipping to test a concurrent
program written in Scil. We first describe a simple inefficient testing algorithm in which we use bi-
nary semaphores to effectively control the execution of threads. Then we modify the algorithm with
the race-detection and flipping technique to improve the efficiency of testing concurrent programs.
Finally, we suggest a further optimization of the testing algorithm.
In Chapter 6, we introduce predictive monitoring. We start this chapter by briefly introducing
non-deterministic finite automata as monitors for temporal specifications. We then describe an
algorithm for constructing an abstract computation model, called computation lattice, by observing
a concurrent execution path. We show that monitoring of a non-deterministic finite automata on a
computation lattice can be done efficiently and on-the-fly. Finally, we propose a heuristics, called
causality cone heuristics, to make predictive monitoring more effective.
In Chapter 7, we describe the implementation of the testing methods in two tools CUTE and
jCUTE for testing C and Java programs, respectively. We then report our experience on applying
these tools on some real-world programs. In Chapter 8, we briefly review the literature related to
the work in this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Overview
We give an overview of concolic testing, the race-detection and flipping algorithm, and predictive
monitoring through a sequence of simple examples. The examples used to describe each of the
three methods are different from each other. This is done to keep the examples simple and relevant
to the methods they illustrate. We introduce concolic testing through a simple sequential program
containing an error statement which may be executed for some input. The example is used to show
how concolic testing generates test inputs one by one so that the program is directed to execute
the error statement. The second example is a simple shared-memory multi-threaded program also
containing an error statement. We use this example to describe how concolic testing is extended
with the race-detection and flipping algorithm. The third example is another simple shared-memory
multi-threaded program, which is required to obey a given temporal specification. The example
illustrate the use of predictive monitoring to catch temporal specification violations.
2.1 Concolic Testing through an Example
In concolic testing, our goal is to generate data inputs that would exercise all the feasible execution
paths of a sequential program. We first describe the essential idea behind concolic testing and then
use an example to illustrate it.
Our algorithm for concolic testing uses concrete values as well as symbolic values for the inputs,
and executes a program both concretely and symbolically. The symbolic execution is similar to the
traditional symbolic execution [55], except that the algorithm follows the path that the concrete
execution takes. During the course of the execution, it collects the constraints over the symbolic
values at each branch point (i.e., the symbolic constraints). At the end of the execution, the
algorithm has computed a sequence of symbolic constraints corresponding to each branch point.
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We call the conjunction of these constraints a path constraint. Observe that all input values that
satisfy a given path constraint will explore the same execution path.
The algorithm first generates a random input. Then the algorithm does the following in a
loop: it executes the code with the generated input. At the same time the algorithm computes the
symbolic constraints. It backtracks and generates a new input and executes the program again.
The algorithm repeats these steps until it has explored all possible distinct execution paths using
a depth first search strategy. The choice of a new input is made as follows: The algorithm picks a
constraint from the symbolic constraints that were collected along the execution path and negates
the constraint to define a new path constraint. The algorithm then finds, if possible, some concrete
values that satisfy the new path constraint. These values are used as input for the next execution.
A complication arises from the fact that for some symbolic constraints, our constraint solver
may not be powerful enough to compute concrete values that satisfy the constraints. To address
this difficulty, such symbolic constraints are simplified by replacing some of the symbolic values with
concrete values. 1
We use a simple example to illustrate how our tool CUTE performs concolic testing. Consider
the C function testme shown in Figure 2.1. The variables p and x in this function receive input
from the external environment. (A program gets input using the expression input(). Observe
that input() captures the various functions through which a program may receive data from its
external environment.) Note that, p is a pointer, and thus the input includes the memory graph
reachable from that pointer. In this example, the graph is a list of cell allocation units. The
function testme has an error that can be reached given some specific values of the input.
For the example function testme, CUTE first non-randomly generates NULL for p and randomly
generates 236 for x, respectively. Figure 2.1 shows this input to testme. As a result, the first
execution of testme takes the then branch of the first if statement and the else branch of the
second if. Let p0 and x0 be the symbolic values of p and x, respectively, at the beginning of the
execution. CUTE collects the constraints from the predicates of the branches executed in this path:
x0 > 0 (for the then branch of the first if) and p0 = NULL (for the else branch of the second if).
1Because of this, our algorithm is complete only if given an oracle that can solve all constraints in a program, and
the length and the number of paths is finite. Note that because the algorithm does concrete executions, it is sound,
i.e. all bugs it infers are real.
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typedef struct cell {
int v;
struct cell *next;
} cell;
int
f(int v) {
return 2*v + 1;
}
int testme() {
cell * p = input();
int x = input();
if (x > 0)
if (p != NULL)
if (f(x) == p->v)
if (p->next == p)
ERROR;
return 0;
}
Input 1:
p
x
236NULL
Input 3:
p
x
  3
  1
NULL
Input 4:
p
x
 3
  1
Input 2:
p
x
634 236
NULL
Figure 2.1: A Simple Sequential Program and the Inputs that CUTE Generates
The constraint sequence 〈x0 > 0, p0 = NULL〉 is called a path constraint.
CUTE next solves the path constraint 〈x0 > 0, p0 6= NULL〉, obtained by negating the last
constraint, to drive the next execution along an alternative path. The solution that CUTE proposes
is {p0 7→ non-NULL, x0 7→ 236} which requires that CUTE make p point to an allocated cell that
introduces two new components, p->v and p->next, to the reachable graph. Accordingly, CUTE
randomly generates 634 for p->v and non-randomly generates NULL for p->next, respectively, for
the next execution. In the second execution, testme takes the then branch of the first and the
second if statement and the else branch of the third if statement. For this execution, CUTE
generates the path constraint 〈x0 > 0, p0 6= NULL, 2 · x0 + 1 6= v0〉, where p0, v0, n0, and x0 are the
symbolic values of p, p->v, p->next, and x, respectively. Note that CUTE computes the expression
2 · x0 + 1 (corresponding to the execution of f) through an inter-procedural, dynamic tracking of
symbolic expressions.
CUTE next solves the path constraint 〈x0 > 0, p0 6= NULL, 2 ·x0+1 = v0〉, obtained by negating
the last constraint and generates Input 3 from Figure 2.1 for the next execution. Note that the
specific value of x0 has changed, but the value remains in the same equivalence class with respect
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to the predicate where it appears, namely x0 > 0. On Input 3, testme takes the then branch of
the first three if statements and the else branch of the fourth if statement. CUTE generates
the path constraint 〈x0 > 0, p0 6= NULL, 2 · x0 + 1 = v0, p0 6= n0〉. This path constraint includes
dynamically obtained constraints on pointers. CUTE handles constraints on pointers, but requires
no static alias analysis. To drive the program along an alternative path in the next execution,
CUTE solves the constraints 〈x0 > 0, p0 6= NULL, 2 · x0 + 1 = v0, p0 = n0〉 and generates Input 4
from Figure 2.1. On this input, the fourth execution of testme reveals the error in the code.
2.2 The Race-Detection and Flipping Algorithm through an
Example
For shared-memory multi-threaded programs, we extend concolic testing with the race-detection
and flipping algorithm. In the extension, our goal is to generate thread schedules as well as data
inputs that would exercise all non-equivalent executions paths of a shared-memory multi-threaded
program. Apart from collecting symbolic constraints, the algorithm computes the race condition
between various events in the execution of a program, where, informally, an event represents the
execution of a statement in the program by a thread. We say that two events are in a race if they
are the events of different threads, they access (i.e. read, write, lock, or unlock) the same memory
location without holding a common lock, and the order of the happening of the events can be
permuted by changing the schedule of the threads. The race conditions are computed by analyzing
the concrete execution of the program with the help of dynamic vector clocks for multi-threaded
programs introduced in Chapter 3.
The extended algorithm first generates a random input and a schedule which specifies the order
of the execution of threads. Then the algorithm does the following in a loop: it executes the code
with the generated input and the schedule. At the same time the algorithm computes the race
conditions between various events as well as the symbolic constraints. It backtracks and generates
a new schedule or a new input and executes the program again. It continues until it has explored
all possible distinct execution paths using a depth-first search strategy. The choice of new inputs
and schedules is made in one of the following two ways:
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x is a shared variable
z = input();
Thread t1
1: x = 3;
Thread t2
1: x = 2;
2: if (2*z + 1 == x)
3: ERROR;
Figure 2.2: A Simple Shared-Memory Multi-Threaded Program
1. The algorithm picks a constraint from the symbolic constraints that were collected along the
execution path and negates the constraint to define a new path constraint. The algorithm
then finds, if possible, some concrete values that satisfy the new path constraint. These values
are used as input for the next execution.
2. The algorithm picks two events which are in a race and generates a new schedule that at the
point where the first event happened, the execution of the thread involved in the first event
is postponed or delayed as much as possible. This ensures that the events involved in the
race get flipped or re-ordered when the program is executed with the new schedule. The new
schedule is used for the next execution.
We illustrate how jCUTE performs concolic testing along with race-detection and flipping using
the sample program P in Figure 2.2. The program has two threads t1 and t2, a shared integer
variable x, and an integer variable z which receives an input from the external environment at the
beginning of the program. Each statement in the program is labeled. The program reaches the
ERROR statement in thread t2 if the input to the program is 1 (i.e., z gets the value 1) and if the
program executes the statements in the following order: (t2, 1)(t1, 1)(t2, 2)(t2, 3), where each event,
represented by a tuple of the form (t, l), in the sequence denotes that the thread t executes the
statement labeled l.
jCUTE first generates a random input for z and executes P with a default schedule. Without
loss of generality, the default schedule always picks the thread which is enabled and which has
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the lowest index. Thus, the first execution of P is (t1, 1)(t2, 1)(t2, 2). Let z0 be the symbolic
value of z at the beginning of the execution. jCUTE collects the constraints from the predicates
of the branches executed in this path. For this execution, jCUTE generates the path constraint
〈2∗z0+1! = 2〉. jCUTE also decides that there is a race condition between the first and the second
event because both the events access the same variable x in different threads without holding a
common lock and one of the accesses is a write of x.
Following the depth-first search strategy, jCUTE picks the only constraint 2∗z0+1! = 2, negates
it, and tries to solve the negated constraint 2 ∗ z0+1 = 2. This has no solution. Therefore, jCUTE
backtracks and generates a schedule such that the next execution becomes (t2, 1)(t2, 2)(t1, 1) (here
the thread involved in the first event of the race in the previous execution is delayed as much as
possible). This execution re-orders the events involved in the race in the previous execution.
During the above execution, jCUTE generates the path constraint 〈2∗z0+1! = 2〉 and computes
that there is a race between the second and the third events. Since the negated constraint 2∗z0+1 =
2 cannot be solved, jCUTE backtracks and generates a schedule such that the next execution
becomes (t2, 1)(t1, 1)(t2, 2). This execution re-orders the events involved in the race in the previous
execution.
In the above execution, jCUTE generates the path constraint 〈2 ∗ z0 + 1! = 3〉. jCUTE solves
the negated constraint 2 ∗ z0 + 1 = 3 to obtain z0 = 1. In the next execution, it follows the same
schedule as the previous execution. However, jCUTE starts the execution with the input variable
z set to 1 which is the value of z that jCUTE computed by solving the constraint. The resultant
execution becomes (t2, 1)(t1, 1)(t2, 2)(t2, 3) which hits the ERROR statement of the program.
2.3 Predictive Monitoring through an Example
Concolic testing extended with the race-detection and flipping algorithm tries to explore all non-
equivalent execution paths of a program. As such this method can catch generic errors such
as assertion violations, uncaught exceptions, data races, and deadlocks. However, sometime we
may also want to test a program against a formal specification, rather than hunting for generic
errors. A trivial way to enable concolic testing to test a program against a formal specification
would be to combine it with runtime monitoring. Unfortunately, if our program is a shared-
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Initially x = 0 and y = 0
z = input();
Thread t1
1: if (z == 100) {
2: x = 4;
3: } else {
4: x = 5;}
Thread t2
1: y = 2;
Figure 2.3: Another Simple Shared-Memory Multi-Threaded Program
memory multi-threaded program, and if our specification is some safety formula in a temporal
logic, then the combination of concolic testing and runtime monitoring might miss violations of
the specification. This is because a temporal safety property may be simultaneously satisfied and
violated by two different execution paths that are equivalent. Since concolic testing extended with
the race-detection and flipping algorithm explores non-equivalent execution paths, the combined
method may miss violations of a temporal property.
To illustrate the above mentioned limitation, consider the simple multi-threaded program in
Figure 2.3. The method of concolic testing extended with the race-detection and flipping algorithm
would explore two non-equivalent execution paths of the program, namely (t1, 1)(t1, 3)(t1, 4)(t2, 1)
and (t1, 1)(t1, 2)(t2, 1). Since the program cannot exhibit any other non-equivalent execution path,
concolic testing will stop after exploring the two paths.
Suppose we want to test the program against the temporal property ‘‘Always x is greater
than equal to y,’’ also written as (x ≥ y) in linear temporal logic. Both the executions
explored by concolic testing do not violate the property because none of the executions reach
a state where x is less than y. However, there exists two other execution paths, namely
(t2, 1)(t1, 1)(t1, 3)(t1, 4) and (t2, 1)(t1, 1)(t1, 2) each of which violates the property. Unfortunately,
concolic testing would not explore these paths as each one of them is equivalent to some already
explored path.
One way to address this problem is to generate a runtime monitor which simply checks if x
is greater than y. The monitor is then inserted into the code through instrumentation so that
whenever x or y is updated the monitor check is invoked. The instrumented program is given in
Figure 2.4.
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Initially x = 0 and y = 0
z = input();
Thread t1
1: if (z == 100){
2: x = 4;
3: assert(x >= y);
4: } else {
5: x = 5;
6: assert(x >= y);}
Thread t2
1: y = 2;
2: assert(x >= y);
Figure 2.4: Instrumented Program
If we apply concolic testing to the instrumented program in Figure 2.4, eight distinct execution
paths of the program will be explored and a violation of the property will be reported. Note that
this simple solution results in the exploration of considerably large number of execution paths
compared to the number of paths explored by concolic testing of the original program.
We have developed predictive monitoring to test shared-memory multi-threaded programs ef-
ficiently. In predictive monitoring for each execution path explored by concolic testing, we infer
other equivalent execution paths statically without re-executing the program for each such equiv-
alent path. All the equivalent execution paths corresponding to an observed execution path are
then monitored against the temporal property efficiently.
For example, consider the execution path (t1, 1)(t1, 3)(t1, 4)(t2, 1) explored by concolic testing
of the original program. Since there is no causal connection between any event of the thread t1
and the event of the thread t2, we can permute the event from the thread t2 with any event from
thread t1. This allows us to construct an alternate feasible execution path (t2, 1)(t1, 1)(t1, 3)(t1, 4)
equivalent to the observed execution path. This alternate path violates the temporal property.
Thus by combining concolic testing with predictive monitoring, we have detected the violation of
the temporal property by executing the program exactly twice.
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Chapter 3
Programming and Execution Model
We introduce a simple shared-memory multi-threaded programming language called Scil. In the
subsequent chapters, we use this programming language to describe our testing algorithms. To
simplify the description of our testing algorithms, we keep Scil free from function calls, function
definitions, and other high-level programming features. In Chapter 7, we briefly discuss how we
handle function calls found in general imperative languages. In the multi-threaded fragment of
Scil, we do not include concurrency primitives such as wait, notify, or join. This is again done to
simplify the exposition. Our implementation for Java handles all these primitives. In Section 3.2,
we define a partial order relation, called the causality relation, to abstract the concurrent execution
of a program. We describe a novel dynamic vector clock algorithm that keeps track of this causality
relation at runtime. We use the partial order abstraction of a concurrent execution to describe the
race-flipping and detection algorithm in Chapter 5 and the predictive monitoring algorithm in
Chapter 6. Finally, in Section 3.3, we use the execution model to formally state the problems that
we solve in the subsequent chapters.
3.1 Programming Model
In order to simplify the description of our testing methods, we define a simple shared-memory
multi-threaded imperative language, Scil (Figure 3.1). A Scil program is a set of threads that
are executed concurrently, where each thread executes a sequence of statements. Note that each
statement in a program is labeled. Threads in a program communicate by acquiring and releasing
locks and by accessing (i.e., by reading or writing) shared memory locations.
A Scil program may receive data inputs from its environment. Observe that the availability of
an input earlier than its use does not affect an execution. Without loss of generality, we assume that
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P ::=Stmt∗
Stmt ::= l : S
S ::= v ← lv | ∗lv ← lv | lv ← e | if p goto l′
| fork(l) | lock(&v) | unlock(&v) | START | HALT | ERROR
e ::= v | &v | ∗lv | c | lv | lv op lv | input()
where op ∈ {+,−, /, ∗,%, . . .}, v is a shared variable,
lv is a variable local to a thread, c is a constant
p ::= lv = lv | lv 6= lv | lv < lv | lv ≤ lv | lv ≥ lv | lv > lv
Figure 3.1: Syntax of Scil
all such inputs are available from the beginning of an execution; again this assumption simplifies
the description of our algorithm.
We now informally describe the semantics of Scil. Consider a Scil program P . The execution
of a thread terminates when it executes a HALT or an ERROR statement. START represents the first
statement of a program under test. CUTE uses the CIL framework [68] to convert more complex
statements (with no function calls) into this simplified form by introducing temporary variables.
Some examples of converting complex code snippets into Scil code1 is given in Table 3.1. Details
of handling of function calls using a symbolic stack are discussed in Section 7.1.
During the execution of a Scil program, a single thread, namely tmain, starts by executing the
first statement of the program. This thread tmain is comparable to the main thread in Java. The
initial thread tmain or any subsequently created thread in the program can create new threads by
calling the statement fork(l), where l is the label of the statement to be executed by the newly
created thread of the program.
A Scil program gets input using the expression input(). Observe that input() captures the
various functions through which a program in Java may receive data from its external environment.
A program may have two kinds of variables: variables local to a thread (denoted by lv) and
variables shared among threads (denoted by v). The expression &v denotes the address of the
variable v, and ∗v denotes the value of the address stored in v. Note that associated with each
address is a value that is either a primitive value or another memory address (i.e., pointer) and a
1In the converted code, we do not label every statement as required by Scil. This is done to keep the converted
code relatively clean.
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Original Code Transformed Code
**v = 3;
t1 = *v; //t1 is a new variable
*t1 = 3;
p[i] = q[j];
t1 = p + i; //t1 is a new variable
t2 = q + j; //t2 is a new variable
*t2 = *t1;
assert(x > 0);
x = 10;
if (x > 10) goto L;
ERROR;
L: x = 10;
if (x > 0) {
x = 1;
} else {
x = -1;
}
y = x + y;
if (x <= 0) goto L1;
x = 1;
if (true) goto L2;
L1: x = -1;
L2: y = x + y;
switch (c) {
case 1:
x = x + 1;
break;
case 2:
x = x - 1;
break;
default:
x = 0;
break;
}
x = x + c;
if (c != 1) goto L1;
x = x + 1;
if (true) goto L3;
L1: if (c != 2) goto L2;
x = x - 1;
if (true) goto L3;
L2: x =0;
L3: x = x + c;
sum = i = 0;
while (i < 10) {
sum = sum + i;
i++;
}
i = sum;
sum = 0;
i = 0;
L1: if (i >= 10) goto L2;
sum = sum + i;
i = i + 1;
if (true) goto L1;
L2: i = sum;
Table 3.1: Examples of Converting Code Snippets Involving High-Level Programming Constructs
to Scil
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execute program(P )
while there is an enabled thread
tcurrent = Non-deterministically pick a thread from the set of enabled threads;
execute the next statement of thread tcurrent;
if there is an active thread
print “Found deadlock”;
Figure 3.2: Default Scheduler for Scil
given statement can have at most one shared variable access (i.e. read, write, lock, or unlock).
A program supports mutual exclusion by using locks: lock(&v) denotes the acquisition of the
lock on the shared variable v and unlock(&v) denotes the release of the same. A thread suspends
its execution if it tries to acquire a lock which is already acquired by another thread. Normal
execution of the thread resumes when the lock is released by the other thread. We assume that
the acquire and release of locks take place in a nested fashion as in Java. Locks are assumed to be
re-entrant : if a thread already holds a lock on a shared variable, then an acquire of the lock on
the same variable by the same thread does not deadlock. When a thread executes HALT or ERROR,
all the locks held by the thread are released. For technical simplicity, we assume that the set of
memory locations that can be locked or unlocked is disjoint from the set of memory locations that
can be read or write.
The semantics of a program in the language is given using a scheduler. The scheduler runs in
a loop (see Figure 3.2). We use the term schedule to refer to the sequence of choices of threads
made by the scheduler during an execution. We assume that each execution of a program under
test terminates.
On executing a statement lock(&v), a thread waits if the lock v is already held by another
thread. Otherwise, the thread acquires the lock and continues its execution. A lock v already held
by a thread t is released when t executes a statement of the form unlock(&v). Initially, the thread
tmain is enabled. A thread is said to be active if it has been created and it has not already executed
a HALT or an ERROR statement. A thread is said to be enabled if it is active and it is not waiting to
acquire a lock.
The execution of a statement of the form fork(l) creates a new thread, makes it active, and sets
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the program counter of the newly created thread to l. The loop of the scheduler terminates when
the set of enabled threads is empty. The termination of the scheduler indicates either the normal
termination of a program execution when the set of active threads is empty, or a deadlock state
when the set of active threads is non-empty.
3.2 Execution Model
Let us consider a program P . The execution of each statement in P is an event. Note that a
statement may involve access to a shared memory location. We represent an event as (t, l, a),
where l is the label of the statement executed by thread t and a is the type of shared memory
access in the statement. If the execution of the statement accesses a shared memory location, then
a = r if the access is a read, a = w if the access is a write, a = l if the access is a lock, and a = u if
the access is an unlock; otherwise, a = ⊥. If the execution of a fork statement labeled l by a thread
t creates a new thread t′, then we get two events: (t, l,⊥) representing the fork event on the thread
t and (t′,⊥,⊥) representing the creation of the new thread. Thus the event (t′,⊥,⊥) represents
the first event of any newly created thread t′. We use the term access to represent a read, a write,
a lock, or an unlock of a shared memory location. We use the term update to represent a write, a
lock, or an unlock of a shared memory location. We call an event
• a fork event, if the event is of the form (t, l,⊥) and l is the label of a fork statement,
• a new thread event, if the event is of the form (t,⊥,⊥),
• a read, a write, a lock, an unlock, an access, or an update event, if the event reads, writes,
locks, unlocks, accesses, or updates a memory location, respectively,
• an internal event, if the event is not a fork event, a new thread event, or an access event.
An execution of P can be seen as a sequence of events. We call such a sequence an execution path.
Note that the execution of P on several inputs may result in the same execution path. Let Ex(P )
be the set of all feasible execution paths exhibited by the program P on all possible inputs and all
possible choices by the scheduler.
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Figure 3.3: Time increases from left to right. e3 ‖ e10, e9 l e4, e10 6le5, e3 l e12, e1 6le10, e1 4 e10,
e1 4 e12, e1 C e9, e3 C e4, e3 m e12, etc.
If we view each event in an execution path as a node, then Ex(P ) can be seen as a tree. Such
a tree is called the computation tree of a program. The goal of our testing method for concurrent
programs is to systematically explore a minimum possible subset of the execution paths of Ex(P )
such that if a statement of P is reachable by a thread for some input and some schedule, the
subset must contain an execution path in which that statement is executed. To achieve this, we
abstract an execution path in terms of a partial order relation called causal relation. Any partial
order represents a set of equivalent execution paths. In our testing algorithm, the goal is to exactly
explore one execution path corresponding to each partial order. However, in the actual algorithm,
we are able to guarantee that at least one—not at most one—execution path corresponding to each
partial order is explored if a program has no data input (see Chapter 5 for a discussion on the effect
of data input). We next define the various binary relations that we use to define a partial order.
In an execution path τ ∈ Ex(P ), any two events e = (ti, li, ai) and e′ = (tj , lj , aj) appearing in
τ are sequentially related (denoted by eC e′) iff:
1. e = e′, or
2. ti = tj and e appears before e
′ in τ , or
3. ti 6= tj , ti created the thread tj , and e appears before e′′ in τ , where e′′ is the fork event on
ti creating the thread tj , or
4. there exists an event e′′ in τ such that eC e′′ and e′′ C e′.
Thus C is a partial order relation. We say e m e′ iff e 6 e′ and e′ 6 e.
In an execution path τ ∈ Ex(P ), any two events e = (ti, li, ai) and e′ = (tj , lj , aj) appearing in
τ are shared-memory access precedence related (denoted by e <m e
′) iff:
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1. e appears before e′ in τ , and
2. e and e′ both access the same memory location m, and
3. one of them is an update of m.
In the above definition, it is worth remembering that the memory locations that can be locked or
unlocked are disjoint from the memory locations that can be read or write. Therefore, if e <m e
′
and e (or e′) is a lock or unlock of m, then the e′ (or e) is also a lock or unlock of m. Similarly, if
e <m e
′ and e (or e′) is a write of m, then the e′ (or e) is a read or write of m.
Given the definition of the sequential relation and the shared-memory access precedence relation,
we can define another relation, called causal relation, as follows. In an execution path τ ∈ Ex(P ),
any two events e = (ti, li, ai) and e
′ = (tj , lj , aj) appearing in τ are causally related (denoted by
e 4 e′) iff:
1. eC e′, or
2. e <m e
′ for some shared-memory location m, or
3. there exists e′′ such that e 4 e′′ and e′′ 4 e′.
The causal relation is a partial-order relation. We say that e ‖ e′ iff e 64 e′ and e′ 64 e. If e 4 e′,
then we say e causally precedes e′.
We next define a relation l, called race relation, that captures the race condition between two
events. We say that any two events e = (ti, li, ai) and e
′ = (tj , lj , aj) are race related (denoted by
e l e′) iff
1. e m e′,
2. if e is a lock event and e′′ is the corresponding unlock event, then e′′ <m e
′ and there exists
no e1 such that e1 6= e′′, e1 6= e′, e′′ 4 e1, and e1 4 e′, and
3. if e is a read or a write event, then e <m e
′ and there exists no e1 such that e1 6= e, e1 6= e′,
e 4 e1, and e1 4 e
′.
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If two events in an execution path are related by l, then there exists an immediate race (data race
or lock race) between the two events. Therefore, we call l a race relation.
Figure 3.3 gives an example of the various relations defined above.
Given two execution paths τ and τ ′ in Ex(P ), we say that τ and τ ′ are causally equivalent,
denoted by τ ≡4 τ ′, iff τ and τ ′ have the same set of events and they are linearizations of the same
4 relation. We use [τ ]≡4 to denote the set of all executions in Ex that are equivalent to τ .
We define a representative set of executions REx ⊆ Ex as the set that contains exactly one
candidate from each equivalence class [τ ]≡4 for all τ ∈ Ex. Formally, REx is a set such that
following properties hold:
1. REx ⊆ Ex,
2. Ex =
⋃
τ∈REx[τ ]≡4 , and
3. for all τ, τ ′ ∈ REx, it is the case that τ 6≡4 τ ′.
The following result shows that a systematic and automatic exploration of each element in REx
is sufficient for testing.
Proposition 1. If a statement is reachable in a program P for some input and schedule, then there
exists a τ ∈ REx such that the statement is executed in τ .
The proof of this proposition is straight-forward. If a statement is reachable then there exists
an execution τ in Ex such that the execution τ executes the statement. By the definition of ≡4,
any execution in [τ ]≡4 executes the statement. Hence, the execution in REx that is equivalent to τ
executes the statement.
Dynamic Vector Clock
The causal relation between the events in an execution can be tracked efficiently at runtime using
dynamic vector clocks (DVC). Dynamic vector clocks, which respect the fact that two reads can
be permuted, extend the standard vector clocks [30] found in message passing systems. A dynamic
vector clock V : T → N, where T is the set of threads that are present in the execution. We
call such a map a dynamic vector clock (DVC) because its partiality reflects the intuition that
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threads are dynamically created and destroyed. However, in order to simplify the exposition and
the implementation, we represent each DVC V as a total map, where V (t) = 0 whenever V is not
defined on thread t (i.e., if t has not been created).
We associate a DVC with every thread t and denote it by Vt. Moreover, we associate two
DVCs V am and V
w
m with every shared memory m; we call the former access DVC and the latter
update DVC. For any two maps V and V ′, we say that V ≤ V ′ if and only if V (t) ≤ V ′(t) for all
t ∈ T . We say that V 6= V ′ if and only if V 6≤ V ′ and V ′ 6≤ V . max{V, V ′} is the DVC with
max{V, V ′}(t) = max{V (t), V ′(t)} for each t ∈ T .
At the beginning of an execution, all vector clocks associated with threads and memory locations
are empty. Whenever a thread t with current DVC Vt generates an event e, the following algorithm
A is executed:
1. If e is not a fork event or a new thread event, then Vt(t)← Vt(t) + 1.
2. If e is a read of a shared memory location m then
Vt ← max{Vt, V wm }
V am ← max{V
a
m, Vt}
3. If e is a write, lock, or unlock of a shared memory location m then
V wm ← V
a
m ← Vt ← max{V
a
m, Vt}
4. If e is a fork event and if t′ is the newly created thread then
Vt′ ← Vt
Vt(t)← Vt(t) + 1
Vt′(t
′)← Vt′(t
′) + 1
We call the algorithm A the dynamic vector clock algorithm. If e is an event of thread t, then we
use V {e} to denote the DVC of t after the event e, V {e}wm to denote the DVC V
w
m after the event
e, and V {e}am to denote the DVC V
a
m after the event e. If e is an event of thread t, then the event
in thread t that happened immediately before e is denoted by prev(e). Similarly, if e is an event of
thread t, then the event in thread t that happened immediately after e is denoted by next(e).
In an execution, if we update the DVCs according to A, we want to show that the causality
relation is tracked by the dynamic vector clocks, i.e., For any two events e and e′, e 4 e′ iff
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V {e} ≤ V {e′}. In order to prove this result, we first introduce some definitions and then state and
prove the following four lemmas.
Let us fix an arbitrary but fixed execution path τ . Let Et be the set of events of t in τ . Let T
be the set of all threads created in τ . Let E = ∪t∈TEt. We use eit to denote the i
th event of the
thread t in C. Given an event e ∈ E, we define (e], (e]t, (e]am, (e]
w
m as follows.
• (e] = {e′ | e′ ∈ E and e′ 4 e},
• (e]t = Et ∩ (e],
• (e]am = {e
′′ | e′′ 4 e′and e′ is an access of m and e′ is equal to or appears before e in the sequence τ},
and
• (e]wm = {e
′′ | e′′ 4 e′and e′ is an update of m and e′ is equal to or appears before e in the sequence τ}.
For any E′ ⊆ E, we use |E′|t to denote |E′ ∩ Et|. We say that a set E′ ⊆ E is a monotonic set if
and only if the following fact holds: if ekt ∈ E
′, then eit ∈ E
′ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Lemma 2. Given an event e, (e], (e]wm, and (e]
a
m are monotonic sets.
Proof. Follows from the definition of (e], (e]wm, and (e]
a
m and the fact that e
i
t 4 e
k
t , for all 1 ≤ i ≤
k.
Lemma 3. Given any two monotonic sets E′ ⊆ E and E′′ ⊆ E and a thread t ∈ T , |E′ ∪ E′′|t =
max(|E′|t, |E′′|t).
Proof. Let
⋃
1≤i≤k′{e
i
t} be the set E
′∩Et and
⋃
1≤i≤k′′{e
i
t} be the set E
′′∩Et. Then (E′∪E′′)∩Et
is the set
⋃
1≤i≤k{e
i
t}, where k = max (k
′, k′′). Since |E′|t = k′, |E′′|t = k′′, and |E′ ∪ E′′|t = k, we
have |E′ ∪ E′′|t = max (|E′|t, |E′′|t).
Lemma 4. Let ekt be an event in τ and let e
l
t′ be the event that appears immediately before e
k
t in
τ . Then the following holds.
(1) If ekt is a read of a memory location m, then
(a) (ekt ] = (e
k−1
t ] ∪ {e
k
t } ∪ (e
l
t′ ]
w
m,
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(b) (ekt ]
a
m = (e
k
t ] ∪ (e
l
t′ ]
a
m,
(c) (ekt ]
a
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
a
m′, for m
′ 6= m,
(d) (ekt ]
w
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
w
m′, for any m
′.
(2) If ekt is a write, lock, or unlock of a memory location m, then
(a) (ekt ] = (e
k−1
t ] ∪ {e
k
t } ∪ (e
l
t′ ]
a
m,
(b) (ekt ]
a
m = (e
k
t ],
(c) (ekt ]
w
m = (e
k
t ],
(d) (ekt ]
a
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
a
m′, for m
′ 6= m,
(e) (ekt ]
w
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
w
m′, for m
′ 6= m.
(3) If ekt is an internal event, then
(a) (ekt ] = (e
k
t−1] ∪ {e
k
t },
(b) (ekt ]
a
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
a
m′, for any m
′,
(c) (ekt ]
w
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
w
m′, for any m
′.
(4) If ekt is a fork event, then
(a) (ekt ] = (e
k−1
t ] ∪ {e
k
t },
(b) (ekt ]
a
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
a
m′, for any m
′,
(c) (ekt ]
w
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
w
m′, for any m
′.
(5) If ekt is a new thread event, then
(a) (ekt ] = (e
k′−1
t′′
] ∪ {ekt }, where e
k′
t′′ is the fork event that created the thread t,
(b) (ekt ]
a
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
a
m′, for any m
′,
(c) (ekt ]
w
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
w
m′, for any m
′.
Proof. (1) (a) Let E′ = (ek−1t ] ∪ {e
k
t } ∪ (e
l
t′ ]
w
m. We want to prove (e
k
t ] ⊆ E
′. Let e ∈ (ekt ]. Since
ekt is read of m, by the definition of 4 one of the following must hold:
• e = ekt . In this case e ∈ {e
k
t } ⊆ E
′.
25
• e 4 ek−1t . In this case e ∈ (e
k−1
t ] ⊆ E
′.
• e 4 e′, where e′ <m ekt . By the definition of <m, e
′ is a write of m and e′ appears
before or equals to elt′ . This implies (e
′] ⊆ (elt′ ]
w
m. Therefore, e ∈ (e
l
t′ ]
w
m ⊆ E
′.
Hence, (ekt ] ⊆ E
′.
We want to prove E′ ⊆ (ekt ]. Let e ∈ E
′. Then one of the following must hold:
• e ∈ (ek−1t ]. Since e
k−1
t 4 e
k
t , (e
k−1
t ] ⊆ (e
k
t ]. Therefore, e ∈ (e
k
t ].
• e = ekt . In this case, e ∈ (e
k
t ].
• e ∈ (elt′ ]
w
m. Then by the definition of (e
l
t′ ]
w
m, there is a e
′ such that e′ is a write2 of m,
(e′] ⊆ (elt′ ]
w
m, and e 4 e
′. Since ekt is a read of m, e
′ <m e
k
t . This implies that e
′ 4 ekt
which implies e ∈ (ekt ].
Hence, E′ ⊆ (ekt ].
(b) Let E′ = (ekt ] ∪ (e
l
t′ ]
a
m. We want to prove that (e
k
t ]
a
m ⊆ E
′. Let e ∈ (ekt ]
a
m. Then there are
two cases:
• e 4 ekt , in this case e ∈ (e
k
t ], or
• e 4 e′, where e′ is an access of m and appears before ekt . This implies e
′ ∈ (elt′ ]
a
m.
Therefore, e ∈ (elt′ ]
a
m.
Hence, (ekt ]
a
m ⊆ E
′.
We want to prove that E′ ⊆ (ekt ]
a
m. Let e ∈ E
′. Then one of the following must hold:
• e ∈ (ekt ]. Since e
k
t is a read of m, (e
k
t ] ⊆ (e
k
t ]
a
m. Therefore, e ∈ (e
k
t ]
a
m.
• e ∈ (elt′ ]
a
m. Since e
l
t′ appears before e
k
t , (e
l
t′ ]
a
m ⊆ (e
k
t ]
a
m. Therefore, e ∈ (e
k
t ]
a
m.
Hence E′ ⊆ (ekt ]
a
m.
(c) Since ekt is not accessing m
′, (ekt ]
a
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
a
m′ follows from the definitions of (e
k
t ]
a
m′ and
(elt′ ]
a
m′ .
(d) Since ekt is not updating m
′, (ekt ]
w
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
w
m′ follows from the definitions of (e
k
t ]
w
m′ and
(elt′ ]
w
m′ .
2Since ekt reads m, m can only be read or write in τ . This is because we assume that the memory locations that
can be locked or unlocked are disjoint from the memory locations that can be read or write.
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(2) (a) Let E′ = (ek−1t ] ∪ {e
k
t } ∪ (e
l
t′ ]
a
m. We want to prove (e
k
t ] ⊆ E
′. Let e ∈ (ekt ]. Since e
k
t is an
update of m, by the definition of 4 one of the following must hold:
• e = ekt . In this case e ∈ {e
k
t } ⊆ E
′.
• e 4 ek−1t . In this case e ∈ (e
k−1
t ] ⊆ E
′.
• e 4 e′, where e′ <m ekt . By the definition of <m, e
′ is an access of m and e′ appears
before or equals to elt′ . This implies (e
′] ⊆ (elt′ ]
a
m. Therefore, e ∈ (e
l
t′ ]
a
m ⊆ E
′.
Hence, (ekt ] ⊆ E
′.
We want to prove E′ ⊆ (ekt ]. Let e ∈ E
′. Then one of the following must hold:
• e ∈ (ek−1t ]. Since e
k−1
t 4 e
k
t , (e
k−1
t ] ⊆ (e
k
t ]. Therefore, e ∈ (e
k
t ].
• e = ekt . In this case, e ∈ (e
k
t ].
• e ∈ (elt′ ]
a
m. Then by the definition of (e
l
t′ ]
a
m, there is a e
′ such that e′ is an access of
m, (e′] ⊆ (elt′ ]
a
m, and e 4 e
′. Since ekt is an update of m, e
′ <m e
k
t . This implies that
e′ 4 ekt which implies e ∈ (e
k
t ].
Hence, E′ ⊆ (ekt ].
(b) We want to prove (ekt ]
a
m = (e
k
t ]. Let e ∈ (e
k
t ]
a
m. Therefore, e 4 e
′ where e′ accesses m
and appears before or equals to ekt . Since e
k
t is an update of m, by the definition of <m,
e′ <m e
k
t . Therefore, e 4 e
k
t or e ∈ (e
k
t ].
Let e ∈ (ekt ]. Since e
k
t is an update ofm, by the definition of (e
k
t ]
a
t , (e
k
t ] ⊆ (e
k
t ]
a
m. Therefore,
e ∈ (ekt ].
(c) We want to prove (ekt ]
w
m = (e
k
t ]. Let e ∈ (e
k
t ]
w
m. Therefore, e 4 e
′ where e′ updates m
and appears before or equals to ekt . Since e
k
t is an update of m, by the definition of <m,
e′ <m e
k
t . Therefore, e 4 e
k
t or e ∈ (e
k
t ].
Let e ∈ (ekt ]. Since e
k
t is an update ofm, by the definition of (e
k
t ]
w
t , (e
k
t ] ⊆ (e
k
t ]
w
m. Therefore,
e ∈ (ekt ].
(d) Since ekt is not accessing m
′, (ekt ]
a
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
a
m′ follows from the definitions of (e
k
t ]
a
m′ and
(elt′ ]
a
m′ .
(e) Since ekt is not updating m
′, (ekt ]
w
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
w
m′ follows from the definitions of (e
k
t ]
w
m′ and
(elt′ ]
w
m′ .
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(3) (a) Since each (ekt−1] ⊆ (e
k
t ] and {e
k
t } ⊆ (e
k
t ], (e
k
t−1] ∪ {e
k
t } ⊆ (e
k
t ]. Let e ∈ (e
k
t ]. Since e
k
t
accesses no shared memory location, there are two cases to consider here: e = ekt or
e 4 ekt−1. In either case, e ∈ (e
k
t−1] ∪ {e
k
t }. Hence, (e
k
t ] ⊆ (e
k
t−1] ∪ {e
k
t }.
(b) Since ekt is not accessing m
′, (ekt ]
a
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
a
m′ follows from the definitions of (e
k
t ]
a
m′ and
(elt′ ]
a
m′ .
(c) Since ekt is not updating m
′, (ekt ]
w
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
w
m′ follows from the definitions of (e
k
t ]
w
m′ and
(elt′ ]
w
m′ .
(4) The proof is similar to the previous case.
(5) (a) Let E′ = (ek
′−1
t′′ ]∪ {e
k
t }. We want to prove (e
k
t ] ⊆ E
′. Let e ∈ (ekt ]. By the definition of 4
one of the following must hold:
• e = ekt . This implies that e ∈ {e
k
t } ⊆ E
′.
• e 4 e′, where e′ is any event of t′′ and e′ appears before ek
′
t′′ . Therefore, e
′ = eit′′ for
1 ≤ i ≤ k′ − 1. This implies that e 4 ek
′−1
t′′ or e ∈ (e
k′−1
t′′ ].
Hence, (ekt ] ⊆ (e
k′−1
t′′ ] ∪ {e
k
t }.
We want to prove E′ ⊆ (ekt ]. Let e ∈ E
′. Then one of the following must hold:
• e = ekt . Therefore, e ∈ (e
k
t ].
• e ∈ (ek
′−1
t′′
]. In this case (ek
′−1
t′′
]C ekt , e 4 (e
k
t ].
Hence, (ek
′−1
t′′ ] ∪ {e
k
t } ⊆ (e
k
t ].
(b) Since ekt is not accessing m
′, (ekt ]
a
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
a
m′ follows from the definitions of (e
k
t ]
a
m′ and
(elt′ ]
a
m′ .
(c) Since ekt is not updating m
′, (ekt ]
w
m′ = (e
l
t′ ]
w
m′ follows from the definitions of (e
k
t ]
w
m′ and
(elt′ ]
w
m′ .
Lemma 5. For any event e in τ , for any t ∈ T , and for any shared memory location m, the
following holds:
(1) V {e}(t) = |(e]|t,
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(2) V {e}wm(t) = |(e]
w
m|t, and
(3) V {e}am(t) = |(e]
a
m|t.
Proof. Let τ = e1e2 . . . en. We prove this by induction. The lemma clearly holds for e1. Let
us assume that the lemma holds for all ei, where 1 ≤ i ≤ p < n. We need to show that it
also holds for ep+1. The equalities (1), (2), and (3) follows from the various cases of Lemma 4
and the algorithm A. In the following we show it for one case. The equalities for the remaining
cases can be derived in a similar way. Let ep+1 = e
k
t and e
k
t be a read event of m. By (1)(a)
of Lemma 4, for any t′′ ∈ T , |(ekt ]|t′′ = |(e
k−1
t ] ∪ {e
k
t } ∪ (e
l
t′ ]
w
m|t′′ . Since e
k
t 6∈ (e
k−1
t ] and e
k
t 6∈
(elt′ ]
w
m, we have |(e
k
t ]|t′′ = |(e
k−1
t ] ∪ (e
l
t′ ]
w
m|t′′ + 1. Therefore, by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we have
|(ekt ]|t′′ = max (|(e
k−1
t ]|t′′ , |(e
l
t′ ]
w
m|t′′)+1 = max (V {e
k−1
t }(t
′′), V {elt′}
w
m(t
′′))+1. By the algorithm A,
V {ekt }(t
′′) = max (V {ek−1t }(t
′′), V {elt′}
w
m(t
′′)) + 1. Therefore, V {ekt }(t
′′) = |(ekt ]|t′′ .
Now we are ready to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6. For any two events e and e′, e 4 e′ iff V {e} ≤ V {e′}.
Proof. Let us assume that e 4 e′. This implies that (e] ⊆ (e′]. Since each of (e] and (e′] are
monotonic sets, for all t ∈ T , we have (e]t ⊆ (e′]t. This implies |(e]|t ≤ |(e′]|t. Therefore, by (1) of
Lemma 5, we have V {e}(t) ≤ V {e′}(t), for all t ∈ T . In other words, V {e} ≤ V {e′}.
Sequential Vector Clock
The sequential relation between the events in an execution can be tracked efficiently at runtime
using sequential vector clocks (SVC). A sequential vector clock VS : T → N, where T is the set of
threads that are present in the execution. We call such a map a sequential vector clock (SVC).
Such a map can be partial because threads are created dynamically at runtime. To simplify the
exposition and the implementation, we assume that each SVC VS is a total map, where VS (t) = 0
whenever VS is not defined on thread t.
We associate a SVC with every thread t and denote it by VS t. At the beginning of an execution,
all sequential vector clocks associated with threads are empty. Whenever a thread t with current
SVC VS t generates an event e, the following algorithm A∫ is executed:
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1. If e is not a fork event or a new thread event, then VS t(t)← VS t(t) + 1.
2. If e is a fork event and if t′ is the newly created thread then
VS t′ ← VS t
VS t(t)← VS t(t) + 1
VS t′(t
′)← VS t′(t
′) + 1
The algorithm A∫ is called the sequential vector clock algorithm. We can associate a SVC with
every event e, denoted by VS e as follows. If e is executed by t and if VS t is the vector clock of t
just after the event e, then VS e = VS t.
In an execution, if we update the SVCs according to A∫ , then the following theorem holds:
Theorem 7. For any two events e and e′, eC e′ iff VSe ≤ VSe′.
The proof of this theorem is a special case of the proof of Theorem 6, where we assume each
access event as an internal event.
Theorem 8. For any two event e and e′, if the following holds:
1. V {e} 6= V {prev(e′)} given that prev(e′) exists, and
2. V {next(e)} 6= V {e′} given that next(e) exists, and
3. V {e} ≤ V {e′}, and
4. VSe 6= VSe′.
then
• if each of e and e′ is a read or a write event, then e l e′,
• if e is an unlock event and e′ is a lock event, then e′′ l e′, where e′′ is the lock event corre-
sponding to e.
The proof follows from the definition of l, Theorem 6, and Theorem 7.
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3.3 Results in Terms of the Execution Model
In Chapter 4, we describe concolic testing which tries to explore all paths in Ex(P ) for a sequential
program P . Note that for a sequential program P , Ex(P ) = REx(P ). However, for shared-memory
multi-threaded programs, REx(P ) ⊆ Ex(P ). In Chapter 5, we extend concolic testing with the
race-detection and flipping algorithm. The extended method tries to explore all paths in a superset
of REx(P ) and a small subset of Ex(P ). As such the method would not explore all the paths
in an equivalence class [τ ]≡4 . However, if we have a formal temporal specification, then it is
possible that one path in [τ ]≡4 satisfies the specification and another path in [τ ]≡4 violates the
specification. Therefore, monitoring the execution paths explored by concolic testing extended with
race-detection and flipping may not be sufficient to find a violation of the formal specification. To
eliminate this limitation, we describe predictive monitoring in Chapter 6. Predictive monitoring
enables us to use an execution path τ to monitor all paths in [τ ]≡4 without re-executing each of
these paths.
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Chapter 4
Testing Sequential Programs
In this chapter, we present concolic testing,1 a novel automatic and systematic technique for testing
sequential programs. Concolic testing automates the exploration of feasible execution paths of
sequential programs. Our technique repeatedly generates inputs that make the code under test
execute different paths. The process continues until the code executes all different feasible paths
(up to a given length). Our technique uses a symbolic execution; unlike the traditional testing
techniques based on symbolic execution or static analysis [24, 118, 75, 115, 10, 14, 73, 22], our
technique tightly couples the concrete and symbolic executions of the code under test. Specifically,
our technique simultaneously runs both concrete and symbolic executions such that each of them
gets feedback from the other. We call this technique concolic testing, as it uses a cooperative
CONCrete and symbOLIC execution.
Our technique work as follows. Given a program to test, our technique generates concrete inputs
one by one. After generating each input, the program is executed on that input simultaneously
both concretely and symbolically. The symbolic execution follows the path taken by the concrete
execution and maintains a symbolic state and generates symbolic path constraints. The information
collected by the concrete-execution guided symbolic execution is then used to generate an input
for the next execution that will lead the program through an execution path that was not explored
before by the program. This process continues until all different feasible paths are executed exactly
once.
We have implemented our technique in two publicly available tools, called CUTE (concolic
Unit Testing Engine) and jCUTE, for testing C and Java programs respectively. jCUTE also
implements the race-detection and flipping algorithm described in Chapter 5. In the rest of the
1This work is done partly in collaboration with Gul Agha, Patrice Godefroid, Nils Klarlund, and Darko Marinov.
Part of this work appeared in [41, 87, 86].
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chapter we will only refer to C programs and CUTE. Note the same principles are also applicable
to sequential Java programs. For C programs, the basic testing unit can be either one function
or a small number of related functions or the whole program. Such testing units can have pointer
inputs, and thus the inputs consist not only of primitive values but of the whole memory graphs.
The symbolic execution in CUTE builds constraints on pointer variables (pointer constraints) and
primitive variables (arithmetic constraints), unlike some previous techniques that use only concrete
values for pointers [41, 115, 118]. We have developed a novel solver for both arithmetic constraints
and pointer constraints, which enables CUTE to generate memory graphs as inputs to the code
under test. Our solver exploits the domain of this particular problem to efficiently generate inputs
that are similar to the previous inputs. CUTE can also generate complex data structures, either
through function sequences or from the code for data structure invariants (Section 4.2).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we describe the various com-
ponents of concolic testing. We show how to apply concolic testing to test data structures in
Section 4.2. Finally, we conclude the chapter by discussing the advantages of concolic testing over
the existing methods.
4.1 Concolic Testing
We describe the details of concolic testing for sequential programs written in Scil. To restrict a
Scil program to be sequential, we disallow the use of the concurrency primitives fork(l), lock(v),
unlock(v). Because of this restriction, a Scil program is always single-threaded and all the variables
and memory locations are local to the initial thread tmain. The simplified syntax of a restricted
Scil program is given in Figure 4.1.
We first define the input logical input map that CUTE uses to represent inputs. We present
how CUTE instruments programs and performs concolic execution. We then describe how CUTE
solves the constraints after every execution. We finally discuss the approximations that CUTE
uses for pointer constraints. In the next section, we present how CUTE handles complex data
structures.
To explore execution paths, CUTE first instruments the code under test. CUTE then builds
a logical input map I for the code under test. Such a logical input map can represent a memory
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P ::=Stmt∗
Stmt ::= l : S
S ::= v ← e | ∗v ← e | if p goto l′
| START | HALT | ERROR
e ::= v | &v | ∗v | c | v op v | input()
where op ∈ {+,−, /, ∗,%, . . .}, v is a variable,
c is a constant
p ::= v = v | v 6= v | v < v | v ≤ v | v ≥ v | v > v
Figure 4.1: Syntax of Sequential Scil
graph in a symbolic way. CUTE then repeatedly runs the instrumented code as follows:
1. It uses the logical input map I to generate a concrete input memory graph for the program
and two symbolic states, one for pointer values and another for primitive values.
2. It runs the code on the concrete input graph, collecting constraints (in terms of the symbolic
values in the symbolic state) that characterize the set of inputs that would take the same
execution path as the current execution path.
3. It negates one of the collected constraints and solves the resulting constraint system to obtain
a new logical input map I ′ that is similar to I but (likely) leads the execution through a
different path. It then sets I = I ′ and repeats the process.
4.1.1 Logical Input Map
CUTE keeps track of input memory graphs as a logical input map I that maps logical addresses to
values that are either logical addresses or primitive values. This map symbolically represents the
input memory graph at the beginning of an execution. The reason that CUTE introduces logical
addresses is that actual concrete addresses of dynamically allocated cells may change in different
executions. Also, the concrete addresses themselves are not necessary to represent memory graphs;
it suffices to know how the cells are connected. Finally, CUTE attempts to make consecutive inputs
similar, and this can be done with logical addresses. If CUTE used the actual physical addresses, it
would depend on malloc and free (to return the same addresses) and more importantly, it would
need to handle destructive updates of the input by the code under test: after CUTE generates one
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input, the code changes it, and CUTE would need to know what changed to reconstruct the next
input.
Let N be the set of natural numbers and V be the set of all primitive values. Then, I : N →
N ∪ V. The values in the domain and the range of I belonging to the set N represents the logical
addresses. We also assume that each logical address l ∈ N has a type associated with it. A type
can be T * (a pointer of type T) (where T can be primitive type or struct type) or Tp (a primitive
type). The function typeOf (l) returns this type. Let the function sizeOf (T) returns the number of
memory cells that an object of type T uses. If typeOf (l) is T * and I(l) 6=NULL, then the sequence
I(v), . . . , I(v + n− 1) stores the value of the object pointed by the logical address l (each element
in the sequence represents the content of each cell of the object in order), where v = I(l) and
n =sizeOf (T). This representation of a logical input map essentially gives a simple way to serialize
a memory graph.
We illustrate logical inputs on an example. Recall the example Input 3 from Figure 2.1. CUTE
represents this input with the following logical input: 〈3, 1, 3, 0〉, where logical addresses range from
1 to 4. The first value 3 corresponds to the value of p: it points to the location with logical address
3. The second value 1 corresponds to x. The third value corresponds to p->v and the fourth to
p->next (0 represents NULL). This logical input encodes a set of concrete inputs that have the same
underlying graph but reside at different concrete addresses. Similarly, the logical input map for
Input 4 from Figure 2.1 is 〈3, 1, 3, 3〉.
4.1.2 Instrumentation
To test a program P , CUTE tries to explore all execution paths of P . To explore all paths, CUTE
first instruments the program under test. Then, it repeatedly runs the instrumented program P as
follows:
// input: P is the instrumented program to test
// depth is the depth of bounded DFS
run CUTE (P ,depth)
I = [ ]; h = (number of arguments in P ) + 1;
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Before Instrumentation After Instrumentation
// program start global vars A = P = path c =M = [ ];
l : START global vars i =inputNumber= 0;
l : START
// input l : inputNumber = inputNumber+1;
l : v ← input(); init input(&v, inputNumber);
// input l : inputNumber = inputNumber+1;
l : ∗v ← input(); init input(v, inputNumber);
// assignment l : execute symbolic(&v,“e”);
l : v ← e; v ← e;
// assignment l : execute symbolic(v,“e”);
l : ∗v ← e; ∗v ← e;
// conditional l : evaluate predicate(“p”, p);
l : if (p) goto l if (p) goto l
// normal termination l : compute next input();
l : HALT HALT;
// program error l : print “Found Error with Input ” . I ;
l : ERROR compute next input();
ERROR;
Table 4.1: Code that CUTE’s Instrumentation Adds
completed=false; branch hist=[ ];
while not completed
execute P
Before starting the execution loop, CUTE initializes the logical input map I to an empty map
and the variable h representing the next available logical address to the number of arguments
to the instrumented program plus one. (CUTE gives a logical address to each argument at the
very beginning.) The integer variable depth specifies the depth in the bounded DFS described in
Section 4.1.4.
Table 4.1 shows the code that CUTE adds during instrumentation. The expressions enclosed in
double quotes (“e”) represent syntactic objects. We describe the instrumentation for function calls
in Section 7.1. In the following section, we describe the various global variables and procedures
that CUTE inserts.
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4.1.3 Concolic Execution
Recall that a program instrumented by CUTE runs concretely and at the same time performs
symbolic computation through the instrumented function calls. The symbolic execution follows the
path taken by the concrete execution and replaces with the concrete value any symbolic expression
that cannot be handled by our constraint solver.
An instrumented program maintains at the runtime two symbolic states A and P, where Amaps
memory locations to symbolic arithmetic expressions, and P maps memory locations to symbolic
pointer expressions. The symbolic arithmetic expressions in CUTE are linear, i.e. of the form
a1x1 + . . .+ anxn + c, where n ≥ 1, each xi is a symbolic variable, each ai is an integer constant,
and c is an integer constant. Note that n must be greater than 0. Otherwise, the expression is
a constant, and CUTE does not keep constant expressions in A, because it keeps A small: if a
symbolic expression is constant, its value can be obtained from the concrete state. The arithmetic
constraints are of the form a1x1 + . . .+ anxn + c ./ 0, where ./ ∈ {<,>,≤,≥,=, 6=}. The pointer
expressions are simpler: each is of the form xp, where xp is a symbolic variable, or the constant
NULL. The pointer constraints are of the form x ∼= y or x ∼= NULL, where ∼= ∈ {=, 6=}.
Given any mapM (e.g., A or P), we useM′ =M[m 7→ v] to denote the map that is the same
as M except that M′(m) = v. We use M′ =M−m to denote the map that is the same as M
except thatM′(m) is undefined. We say m ∈domain(M) ifM(m) is defined.
Input Initialization using Logical Input Map
Figure 4.2 shows the procedure init input(m, l) that uses the logical input map I to initialize the
memory location m, to update the symbolic states A and P, and to update the input map I with
new mappings.
M maps logical addresses to physical addresses of memory cells already allocated in an execu-
tion, and malloc(n) allocates n fresh cells for an object of size n and returns the addresses of these
cells as a sequence. The global variable h keeps track of the next unused logical address available
for a newly allocated object.
For a logical address l passed as an argument to init input, I(l) can be undefined in two cases:
(1) in the first execution when I is the empty map, and (2) when l is some logical address that
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// input: m is the physical address to initialize
// l is the corresponding logical address
// modifies h, I,A,P
init input(m, l)
if l 6∈ domain(I)
if (typeOf (∗m) ==pointer to T) ∗m =NULL;
else ∗m =random();
I = I[l 7→ ∗m];
else
v′ = v = I(l);
if (typeOf (v) ==pointer to T)
if (v ∈ domain(M))
∗m =M(v);
else
n = sizeOf (T);
{m1, . . . ,mn} =malloc(n);
if (v ==non-NULL)
v′ = h; h = h+ n; // h is the next logical address
∗m = m1; I = I[l 7→ v′]; M =M [v 7→ m1];
for j = 1 to n
init input(mj , v
′ + j − 1);
else
∗m = v; I = I[l 7→ v];
// xl is a symbolic variable for logical address l
if (typeOf (m) ==pointer to T) P = P[m 7→ xl];
else A = A[m 7→ xl];
Figure 4.2: Input Initialization
got allocated in the process of initialization. If I(l) is undefined and if typeOf (l) is not a pointer,
then the content of the memory is initialized randomly ; otherwise, if the typeOf (l) is a pointer,
then the contents of l and m are both initialized to NULL. Note that CUTE does not attempt to
generate random pointer graphs but assigns all new pointers to NULL. If typeOf (I(l)) is a pointer
to T (i.e., T*) and M(l) is defined, then we know that the object pointed by the logical address
l is already allocated and we simply initialize the content of m by M(l). Otherwise, we allocate
sufficient physical memory for the object pointed by *m using malloc and initialize them recursively.
In the process, we also allocate logical addresses by incrementing h if necessary.
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Symbolic Execution
Figure 4.3 shows the pseudo-code for the symbolic manipulations done by the procedure exe-
cute symbolic which is inserted by CUTE in the program under test during instrumentation. The
procedure execute symbolic(m, e) evaluates the expression e symbolically and maps it to the mem-
ory location m in the appropriate symbolic state.
Recall that CUTE replaces a symbolic expression that the CUTE’s constraint solver cannot
handle with the concrete value from the execution. Assume, for instance, that the solver can
solve only linear constraints. In particular, when a symbolic expression becomes non-linear, as in
the multiplication of two non-constant sub-expressions, CUTE simplifies the symbolic expression
by replacing one of the sub-expressions by its current concrete value (see line L in Figure. 4.3).
Similarly, if the statement is for instance v′′ ← v/v′ (see line D in Figure. 4.3), and both v and v′
are symbolic, CUTE removes the memory location &v′′ from both A and P to reflect the fact that
the symbolic value for v′′ is undefined.
Figure 4.4 shows the function evaluate predicate(p, b) that symbolically evaluates p and updates
path c. In case of pointers, CUTE only considers predicates of the form x = y, x 6= y, x =NULL,
and x 6=NULL, where x and y are symbolic pointer variables. We discuss this in Section 4.1.6. If a
symbolic predicate expression is constant, then true or false is returned.
At the time symbolic evaluation of predicates in the procedure evaluate predicate, symbolic
predicate expressions from branching points are collected in the array path c. At the end of the
execution, path c[0 . . . i − 1], where i is the number of conditional statements of P that CUTE
executes, contains all predicates whose conjunction holds for the execution path.
Note that in both the procedures execute symbolic and evaluate predicate, we skip symbolic
execution if the number of predicates executed so far (recorded in the global variable i) becomes
greater than the parameter depth which gives the depth of bounded DFS described next.
4.1.4 Bounded Depth-First Search
To explore paths in the execution tree, CUTE implements a (bounded) depth-first strategy (bounded
DFS). In the bounded DFS, each run (except the first) is executed with the help of a record of
the conditional statements (which is the array branch hist) executed in the previous run. For
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// inputs: m is a memory location
// e is an expression to evaluate
// modifies A and P by symbolically executing ∗m← e
execute symbolic(m, e)
if (i ≤depth)
match e:
case “v1”:
m1 = &v1;
if (m1 ∈ domain(P))
A = A−m;P = P[m 7→ P(m1)]; // remove if A contains m
else if (m1 ∈ domain(A))
A = A[m 7→ A(m1)];P = P −m;
else P = P −m;A = A−m;
case “v1 ± v2”: // where ± ∈ {+,−}
m1 = &v1; m2 = &v2;
if (m1 ∈ domain(A) and m2 ∈ domain(A))
v = “A(m1)±A(m2)”; // symbolic addition or subtraction
else if (m1 ∈ domain(A))
v = “A(m1)± v2”; // symbolic addition or subtraction
else if (m2 ∈ domain(A))
v = “v1 ±A(m2)”; // symbolic addition or subtraction
else A = A−m;P = P −m; return;
A = A[m 7→ v];P = P −m;
case “v1 ∗ v2”:
m1 = &v1; m2 = &v2;
if (m1 ∈ domain(A) and m2 ∈ domain(A))
L: v = “v1 ∗ A(m2)”; // replace one with concrete value
else if (m1 ∈ domain(A))
v = “A(m1) ∗ v2”; // symbolic multiplication
else if (m2 ∈ domain(A))
v = “v1 ∗ A(m2)”; // symbolic multiplication
else A = A−m;P = P −m; return;
A = A[m 7→ v];P = P −m;
case “∗v1”:
m2 = v1;
if (m2 ∈ domain(P)) A = A−m;P = P[m 7→ P(m2)];
else if (m2 ∈ domain(A)) A = A[m 7→ A(m2)];P = P −m;
else A = A−m;P = P −m;
default:
D: A = A−m;P = P −m;
Figure 4.3: Symbolic Execution
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// inputs: p is a predicate to evaluate
// b is the concrete value of the predicate in S
// modifies path c, i
evaluate predicate(p, b)
if (i ≤depth)
match p:
case “v1 ./ v2”: // where ./ ∈ {<,≤,≥, >}
m1 = &v1;m2 = &v2;
if (m1 ∈ domain(A) and m2 ∈ domain(A))
c = “A(m1)−A(m2) ./ 0”;
else if (m1 ∈ domain(A))
c = “A(m1)− v2 ./ 0”;
else if (m2 ∈ domain(A))
c = “v1 −A(m2) ./ 0”;
else c = b;
case “v1 ∼= v2”: // where ∼= ∈ {=, 6=}
m1 = &v1;m2 = &v2;
if (m1 ∈ domain(P) and m2 ∈ domain(P))
c = “P(m1) ∼= P(m2)”;
else if (m1 ∈ domain(P) and v2 ==NULL)
c = “P(m1) ∼= NULL”;
else if (m2 ∈ domain(P) and v1 ==NULL)
c = “P(m2) ∼= NULL”;
else if (m1 ∈ domain(A) and m2 ∈ domain(A))
c = “A(m1)−A(m2) ∼= 0”;
else if (m1 ∈ domain(A)) c = “A(m1)− v2 ∼= 0”;
else if (m2 ∈ domain(A)) c = “v1 −A(m2) ∼= 0”;
else c = b;
if (b) path c[i] = c;
else path c[i] =neg(c);
cmp n set branch hist(b);
i = i+ 1;
Figure 4.4: Symbolic Evaluation of Predicates
each conditional, CUTE records a branch value which is either true (if the then branch is taken)
or false (if the else branch is taken), as well as a done value which is false when only one
branch of the conditional has executed in prior runs (with the same history up to the branch
point) and is true otherwise. The information associated with each conditional statement of the
last execution path is stored in the array branch hist, kept in a file between executions. For i,
0 ≤ i < |branch hist |, branch hist [i] = (branch hist [i].branch, branch hist [i].done) is the record
corresponding to the (i+ 1)th conditional executed.
The procedure cmp and set branch hist in Figure 4.5 checks whether the current execution path
matches the one predicted at the end of the previous execution and represented in branch hist passed
between runs. Specifically, our algorithm maintains the invariant that when run program is called,
branch hist [|branch hist | − 1].done=false holds. This value is changed to true if the execution
proceeds according to all the branches in branch hist as checked by cmp n set branch hist. Note
that we use the parameter depth to restrict the depth of search in the bounded DFS. We observed
in our experiments that the execution almost always follows a prediction of the outcome of a
conditional. However, it could happen that a prediction is not fulfilled because CUTE approximates,
when necessary, symbolic expressions with concrete values (as explained in Section 4.1.3), and
the constraint solver could then produce a solution that changes the outcome of some earlier
branch. (Note that even when there is an approximation, the solution does not necessary change
the outcome.) If it ever happens that a prediction is not fulfilled, an exception is raised to restart
run CUTE with a fresh random input.
Bounded depth-first search proves useful when the length of execution paths are infinite or long
enough to prevent exhaustively search the whole computation tree. Particularly, it is important for
generating finite sized data structures when using preconditions such as data structure invariants
(see section 4.2. For example, if we use an invariant to generate sorted binary trees, then a non-
bounded depth-first search would end up generating infinite number of trees whose every node has
at most one left children and no right children.
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// modifies branch hist
cmp n set branch hist(branch)
if (i < |branch hist |)
if (branch hist [i].branch 6=branch)
print “Prediction Failed”;
raise an exception; // restart run CUTE
else if (i == |branch hist | − 1)
branch hist [i].done =true;
else branch hist [i].branch = branch;
branch hist [i].done = false;
Figure 4.5: Prediction Checking
// modifies branch hist, I, completed
compute next input()
j = i− 1;
while (j ≥ 0)
if (branch hist [j].done == false)
branch hist [j].branch= ¬branch hist [j].branch;
if (∃I ′ that satisfies neg last(path c[0 . . . j]))
branch hist=branch hist [0 . . . j];
I = I ′;
return;
else j = j − 1;
else j = j − 1;
if (j < 0) completed=true;
Figure 4.6: Compute Next Input
4.1.5 Computing an Input
After the termination of the instrumented program execution, an input for the next execution is
computed using the procedure compute next input (see Figure 4.6). The procedure computes the
input that will direct the next program execution along an alternative execution path. To do so, it
loops over the elements of path c from the end until it has generated an input that would force the
program in the next execution to execute the last unexplored and feasible branch of a conditional
along the current execution. Specifically, the procedure finds the last constraint path c[j] such that
the following holds:
• path c[j] that has not been negated before, and
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• there exists a logical input map I ′ such that I ′ is a satisfying solution of
neg last(path c[0 . . . j]), where neg last(path c[0 . . . j]) denote the expression path c[0] ∧ . . .∧
path c[j − 1] ∧ ¬ path c[j], where only the last predicate is negated.
If such a constraint is found then I ′ is used as the input for the next execution. Otherwise, concolic
testing is terminated indicating the completion of a depth-first search.
We next present how CUTE solves path constraints. Given a path constraint
C=neg last(path c[0 . . . j]), CUTE checks if C is satisfiable, and if so, finds a satisfying solution I ′.
We have implemented an incremental constraint solver for CUTE to optimize solving of the path
constraints that arise in concolic execution. Our solver is built on top of lp solve [61], a constraint
solver for linear arithmetic constraints. Our solver provides three important optimizations for path
constraints:
(OPT 1) Fast unsatisfiability check: The solver checks if the last constraint is syntactically
the negation of any preceding constraint; if it is, the solver does not need to invoke the expensive
semantic check. (Experimental results show that this optimization reduces the number of semantic
checks by 60-95%.)
(OPT 2) Common sub-constraints elimination: The solver identifies and eliminates common
arithmetic sub-constraints before passing them to the lp solve. (This simple optimization, along
with the next one, is significant in practice as it can reduce the number of sub-constraints by 64%
to 90%.)
(OPT 3) Incremental solving: The solver identifies dependency between sub-constraints and
exploits it to solve the constraints faster and keep the solutions similar. We explain this optimization
in detail.
Given a predicate p in C, we define vars(p) to be the set of all symbolic variables that appear
in p. Given two predicates p and p′ in C, we say that p and p′ are dependent if one of the following
conditions holds:
1. vars(p)∩ vars(p′) 6= ∅, or
2. there exists a predicate p′′ in C such that p and p′′ are dependent and p′ and p′′ are dependent.
Two predicates are independent if they are not dependent.
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The following is an important observation about the path constraints C and C ′ from two
consecutive concolic executions: C and C ′ differ in the small number of predicates (more precisely,
only in the last predicate when there is no backtracking), and thus their respective solutions I and
I ′ must agree on many mappings. Our solver exploits this observation to provide more efficient,
incremental constraint solving. The solver collects all the predicates in C that are dependent
on ¬path c[j]. Let this set of predicates be D. Note that all predicates in D are either linear
arithmetic predicates or pointer predicates, because no predicate in C contains both arithmetic
symbolic variables and pointer symbolic variables. The solver then finds a solution I ′′ for the
conjunction of all predicates from D. The input for the next run is then I ′ = I[I ′′] which is the
same as I except that for every l for which I ′′(l) is defined, I ′(l) = I ′′(l). In practice, we have
found that the size of D is almost one-eighth the size of C on average.
If all predicates in D are linear arithmetic predicates, then CUTE uses integer linear program-
ming to compute I ′′. If all predicates in D are pointer predicates, then CUTE uses the following
procedure to compute I ′′.
Let us consider only pointer constraints which are either equalities or disequalities. The solver
first builds an equivalence graph based on (dis)equalities (similar to checking satisfiability in theory
of equality [12]) and then based on this graph, assigns values to pointers. The values assigned to the
pointers can be a logical address in the domain of I, the constant non-NULL (a special constant),
or the constant NULL (represented by 0). The solver views NULL as a symbolic variable. Thus, all
predicates in D are of the form x = y or x 6= y, where x and y are symbolic variables. Let D′ be
the subset of D that does not contain the predicate ¬path c[j]. The solver first checks if ¬path c[j]
is consistent with the predicates in D. For this, the solver constructs an undirected graph whose
nodes are the equivalence classes (with respect to the relation =) of all symbolic variables that
appear in D′. We use [x]= to denote the equivalence class of the symbolic variable x. Given two
nodes denoted by the equivalence classes [x]= and [y]=, the solver adds an edge between [x]= and
[y]= iff there exists symbolic variables u and v such that u 6= v exists in D′ and u ∈ [x]= and
v ∈ [y]=. Given the graph, the solver finds that ¬path c[j] is satisfiable if ¬path c[j] is of the form
x = y and there is no edge between [x]= and [y]= in the graph; otherwise, if ¬path c[j] is of the
form x 6= y, then ¬path c[j] is satisfiable if [x]= and [y]= are not the same equivalence class. If
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// inputs: p is a symbolic pointer predicate
// I is the previous solution
// returns: a new solution I ′′
solve pointer(p, I)
match p:
case “x 6=NULL”: I ′′ = {y 7→non-NULL| y ∈ [x]=};
case “x =NULL”: I ′′ = {y 7→NULL| y ∈ [x]=};
case “x = y”: I ′′ = {z 7→ v | z ∈ [y]= and I(x) = v};
case “x 6= y”: I ′′ = {z 7→ non-NULL| z ∈ [y]=};
return I ′′;
Figure 4.7: Assigning Values to Pointers
¬path c[j] is satisfiable, the solver computes I ′′ using the procedure solve pointer(¬path c[j], I)
shown in Figure 4.7.
Note that after solving the pointer constraints, we either add (by assigning a pointer to
non-NULL) or remove a node (by assigning a pointer NULL) from the current input graph, or alias or
non-alias two existing pointers. This keeps the consecutive solutions similar. Keeping consecutive
solutions for pointers similar is important because of the logical input map: if inputs were very
different, CUTE would need to rebuild parts of the logical input map.
4.1.6 Approximations for Scalable Symbolic Execution
CUTE uses simple symbolic expressions for pointers and builds only (dis)equality constraints for
pointers. We believe that these constraints, which approximate the exact path condition, are a
good trade-off. To exactly track the pointer constraints, it would be necessary to use the theory of
arrays/memory with updates and selections [66]. However, it would make the symbolic execution
more expensive and could result in constraints whose solution is intractable. Therefore, CUTE
does not use the theory of arrays but handles arrays by concretely instantiating them and making
each element of the array a scalar symbolic variable.
It is important to note that, although CUTE uses simple pointer constraints, it still keeps a
precise relationship between pointers: the logical input map (through types), maintains a relation-
ship between pointers to structs and their fields and between pointers to arrays and their elements.
For example, from the logical input map 〈3, 1, 3, 0〉 for Input 3 from Figure 2.1, CUTE knows that
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p->next is at the (logical) address 4 because p has value 3, and the field next is at the offset 1 in
the struct cell. Indeed, the logical input map allows CUTE to use only simple scalar symbolic
variables to represent the memory and still obtain fairly precise constraints.
Finally, we show that CUTE does not keep the exact pointer constraints. Consider for example
the code snippet *p=0; *q=1; if (*p == 1) ERROR (and assume that p and q are not NULL).
CUTE cannot generate the constraint p==q that would enable the program to take the “then”
branch. This is because the program contains no conditional that can generate the constraint.
Analogously, for the code snippet a[i]=0; a[j]=1; if (a[i]==0) ERROR, CUTE cannot generate
i==j.
4.2 Data Structure Testing
We next consider testing of functions that take data structures as inputs. More precisely, a function
has some pointer arguments, and the memory graph reachable from the pointers forms a data
structure. For instance, consider testing of a function that takes a list and removes an element
from it. We cannot simply test such function in isolation [115, 16, 118]—say generating random
memory graphs as inputs—because the function requires the input memory graph to satisfy the
data structure invariant.2 If an input is invalid (i.e., violates the invariant), the function provides
no guarantees and may even result in an error. For instance, a function that expects an acyclic list
may loop infinitely given a cyclic list, whereas a function that expects a cyclic list may dereference
NULL given an acyclic list. We want to test such functions with valid inputs only. There are two
main approaches to obtaining valid inputs: (1) generating inputs with call sequences [115, 118] and
(2) solving data structure invariants [16, 115]. CUTE supports both approaches.
4.2.1 Generating Inputs with Call Sequences
One approach to generating data structures is to use sequences of function calls. Each data structure
implements functions for several basic operations such as creating an empty structure, adding an
element to the structure, removing an element from the structure, and checking if an element is
2The functions may have additional preconditions, but we omit them for brevity of discussion; for more details,
see [16].
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in the structure. A sequence of these operations can be used to generate an instance of data
structure, e.g., we can create an empty list and add several elements to it. This approach has
two requirements [115]: (1) all functions must be available (and thus we cannot test each function
in isolation), and (2) all functions must be used in generation: for complex data structures, e.g.,
red-black trees, there are memory graphs that cannot be constructed through additions only but
require removals [115, 118].
4.2.2 Solving Data Structure Invariants
Another approach to generating data structures is to use the functions that check invariants.
Good programming practice suggests that data structures provide such functions. For example,
SGLIB [102] (see Section 7.2.2) is a popular C library for generic data structures that provides
such functions. We call these functions repOk [16]. (SGLIB calls them check consistency.) As
an illustration, SGLIB implements operations on doubly linked lists and provides a repOk function
that checks if a memory graph is a valid doubly linked list; each repOk function returns true or
false to indicate the validity of the input graph.
The main idea of using repOk functions for testing is to solve repOk functions, i.e., generate
only the input memory graphs for which repOk returns true [16, 115]. This approach allows mod-
ular testing of functions that implement data structure operations (i.e., does not require that all
operations be available): all we need for a function under test is a corresponding repOk function.
Previous techniques for solving repOk functions include a search that uses purely concrete exe-
cution [16] and a search that uses symbolic execution for primitive data but concrete values for
pointers [115]. CUTE, in contrast, uses symbolic execution for both primitive data and pointers.
The constraints that CUTE builds and solves for pointers allow it to solve repOk functions
asymptotically faster than the fastest previous techniques [16, 115]. Consider, for example, the
following check from the invariant for doubly linked list: for each node n, n.next.prev == n.
Assume that the solver is building a doubly linked list with N nodes reachable along the next
pointers. Assume also that the solver needs to set the values for the prev pointers. Executing the
check once, CUTE finds the exact value for each prev pointer and thus takes O(N) steps to find
the values for all N prev pointers. In contrast, the previous techniques [16, 115] take O(N2) steps
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as they search for the value for each pointer, trying first the value NULL, then a pointer to the head
of the list, then a pointer to the second element and so on.
4.3 Discussion
We next discuss the advantages of using CUTE over traditional symbolic execution based testing
approaches.
4.3.1 Pointer Casting and Arithmetic
CUTE often has an advantage over static analysis in reasoning about linked data. For example, to
determine if two pointers point to the same memory location, CUTE simply checks whether their
values are equal and does not require an alias analysis that may be inaccurate in the presence of
pointer casting and pointer arithmetic. For example, for the following C program:
struct foo {
int i;
char c; };
void * memset(void *s,char c,size_t n) {
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)
((char *)s)[i] = c; return s;
}
bar (struct foo *a) {
if (a && a->c == 1) {
memset(a,0,sizeof(struct foo));
if (a->c != 1)
ERROR;
}
}
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a fully sound static analysis should report that ERROR might be reachable. However, such a sound
static-analysis tool would be impractical as it would give too many false alarms. More practical
tools, such as BLAST [51], report that the code is safe because a standard alias analysis is not able
to see that a->c has been overwritten. In contrast, CUTE easily finds a precise execution leading
to the ERROR. This kind of code is often found in C where memset is widely used for fast memory
initialization.
4.3.2 Library Functions with Side-Effects
The concrete execution of CUTE helps to remove false alarms, especially in the presence of library
function calls that can have side-effects. In the above code, for example, if the function memset
is a library function with no source code available, static-analysis tools have no way to find out
how the function can affect the global heap. In such situations, they definitely give false alarms.
However, CUTE can tackle the situation as it can see the side-effect while executing the function
concretely.
4.3.3 Approximating Symbolic Values by Concrete Values
CUTE combines the concrete and symbolic executions to make them co-operate with each other,
which helps to handle situations where most symbolic executors would give uncertain results. For
example, consider testing the function f in the following C code:
g(int x) {
return x * x + (x % 2);
}
f(int x, int y) {
z = g(x);
if (y == z)
ERROR;
}
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A symbolic executor would generate the path constraint y = x * x + (x % 2) that is not
in a decidable theory. Thus, it cannot say that ERROR is reachable with guarantee. On the other
hand, suppose that CUTE starts with the initial inputs x = 3, y = 4. In the first execution, since
CUTE cannot handle the symbolic expression x * x + (x % 2), it approximates z by the concrete
value 3 * 3 + (3 % 2) = 10 and proceeds to generate the path constraint y != 10. Therefore,
by solving the path constraint CUTE will generate the inputs x = 3, y = 10 for the next run
which will reveal the ERROR.
4.3.4 Black-Box Library Functions
The same situation arises in the above code if g is a library function whose source code is not avail-
able. A symbolic executor would generate the path constraint y = g(x) involving uninterpreted
function and would give a possible warning. However, CUTE in the same way as before generates
an input leading to the ERROR.
4.3.5 Lazy Initialization
One can imagine combining symbolic execution with randomization in several ways. CUTE com-
mits to concrete values before the execution. Another approach would be to use full symbolic
execution and generate concrete values on demand [115]. However, this approach does not handle
black-box library functions, executes slower as it needs to always check if data is initialized, and
cannot “recover” from bad initialization as this example shows:
f(int x){
z = x * x + (x % 2);
if (z == 8) {
ERROR;
}
if (x == 10) {
ERROR;
}
}
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After executing the first if statement, a lazy initializer will initialize x to a random value in any
run since it cannot decide the path constraint x * x + (x % 2) = 8. Thus, it would not be able
to take the then branch of the second if. CUTE, however, would generate x = 10 for the second
run as it simultaneously executes both concretely and symbolically.
4.3.6 Random Initialization
Concolic testing uses random values to initialize the input values. This helps concolic testing to
mitigate the limitations of the constraint solver in many situations. To illustrate this, consider the
following C program:
f(int x, int y){
if (x*x*x > 0){
if (x>0 && y==10)
ERROR;
} else {
if (x>0 && y==20)
ERROR;
}
}
Given a theorem prover that cannot reason about non-linear arithmetic constraints, a static analysis
tool using predicate abstraction [11, 51] will report that both ERRORs in the above code may be
reachable; therefore, the tool will give one false alarm since the second ERROR is unreachable.
This would be true as well if the test (x*x*x > 0) is replaced by a black-box library call. On the
other hand, a test-generation tool based on symbolic execution [115] will not be able to generate
an input to detect any ERROR because its symbolic execution will be stuck at the condition of
the first if-then-else statement. In contrast, CUTE can randomly generate an input where x>0
and y!=10 with almost 0.5 probability; after the first execution with such an input, the depth-first
search of CUTE will generate another input with the same positive value of x but with y=10, which
will lead the program in its second run to the first ERROR. Note that if CUTE randomly generates
a negative value for x in the first run, then CUTE will generate an input where x>0 and y==20
to satisfy the then branch of the third if-then-else statement (it will do so because no constraint
is generated for the condition of the first if-then-else statement since it is non-linear); however,
due to the concrete execution, CUTE will then not take the else branch of the first if-then-else
statement in such a second run. In summary, our mixed strategy of random and directed search
along with simultaneous concrete and symbolic execution of the program will allow us to find the
only reachable ERROR statement in the above example with high probability.
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Chapter 5
Testing Concurrent Programs
In this chapter, we extend concolic testing with a new algorithm, called the race-detection and
flipping algorithm,1 to effectively test shared-memory multi-threaded programs.
We described concolic testing to systematically and automatically test sequential programs.
However, most of the real-world programs are concurrent where computation tasks are distributed
among several threads executing simultaneously and communicating either through shared memory
or message passing. Testing concurrent programs is notoriously harder than testing sequential pro-
grams because of the exponentially large number of possible interleavings of concurrent events [104].
Many of these interleavings share the same causal structure (also called the partial order), and are
thus equivalent with respect to finding bugs in a given program. Techniques for avoiding such
redundant executions are called partial order reduction [110, 76, 38].
Several approaches [39, 34, 19, 17] to testing concurrent programs assume that the data inputs
are from a small finite domain. These approaches rely on exhaustively executing the program for
all possible inputs and perform a partial order reduction to reduce the search space. The problem
with these approaches is that it is hard to scale them—the input set is often too large.
A second approach is to execute a program symbolically in a customized virtual machine which
supports partial order reduction [53, 115]. This requires checking satisfiability of complex con-
straints (corresponding to every branch point in a program). Unfortunately, checking such satis-
fiability may be undecidable or computationally intractable. Moreover, in concurrent programs,
partial order reduction for symbolic execution requires computing the dependency relations between
memory accesses in a program. Because it involves alias analysis, such a computation is often con-
servative resulting in extra dependencies. Therefore, large numbers of unreachable branches may
be explored, often causing many warnings for bugs that could never occur in an actual execution.
1This work is partly done in collaboration with Gul Agha. Part of this work appeared in [86, 85].
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Our approach is to extend concolic testing with a new technique called race-detection and
flipping. To use concolic testing for multi-threaded programs, we do the following. For a given
concrete execution, at runtime, we determine the causality relation or the exact race conditions
(both data race and lock race) between the various events in the execution path. Subsequently,
we systematically re-order or permute the events involved in these races by generating new thread
schedules as well as generate new test inputs. This way we explore at least one representative from
each partial order. The result is an efficient testing algorithm for concurrent programs which, at
the cost of missing some potential bugs, avoids the problem of false warnings.
We have implemented the algorithm in a publicly available tool, called jCUTE, for testing Java
programs. Apart from detecting assertion violations and uncaught exceptions, jCUTE reports all
data race conditions and deadlock states encountered during the process of testing.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we describe the race-detection and
flipping algorithm on programs having no data inputs and prove the correctness of the algorithm.
In Section 5.2, we describe a simple algorithm for extending concolic testing to shared-memory
multi-threaded programs. The goal of this section is to familiarize the readers with various data
structures used in the algorithms described in the subsequent sections. In Section 5.3, we show
how to combine concolic testing with the race-detection and flipping algorithm. We propose a
further optimization of the combined algorithm in Section 5.4. Finally, we conclude the chapter by
discussing some of the advantages of the techniques described in this chapter.
5.1 The Race-Detection and Flipping Algorithm
In the description of the race-detection and flipping algorithm, we assume that a program under
test has no data input. We make this simplification to keep the exposition concise and to keep the
proof of correctness of the race-detection and flipping algorithm simple. In the subsequent sections,
we show how we can combine the race-detection and flipping algorithm with concolic testing.
The race-detection and flipping algorithm is given in Figure 5.1. Recall that Ex(P ) is the set of
all feasible execution paths that can be exhibited by the program P on all possible values of inputs
and all possible schedules (see Section 3.2). Similarly, REx(P ) is the set that contains exactly one
candidate from each equivalence class of feasible execution paths of P . test program(P ) repeatedly
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global var τ = ; // the empty sequence
//input: P is the program to test
test program(P )
while testing not completed
execute program(P )
execute program(P )
execute prefix (P, τ);
while there is an enabled thread
execute the next statement of the lowest indexed enabled thread in P
to generate the event e;
race(τ) = false;
postponed(τ) = ∅;
append e to τ ;
if ∃e′ ∈ τ such that e′ l e
let τ = τ1e
′τ2 in race(τ1) = true;
// end of the while loop
if there is an active thread
print ‘‘Error: found deadlock’’;
generate next schedule();
// modifies τ
generate next schedule()
if ∃e such that τ == τ1eτ2 and backtrackable(τ1) and
there is no e′ such that τ == τ ′1e
′τ ′2 and |τ1| < |τ
′
1| and backtrackable(τ
′
1)
race(τ1) = false;
let (t, , ) = e in add t to postponed(τ1);
let t = smallest indexed thread in enabled(τ1)\ postponed(τ1) in τ = τ1(t, , );
else
testing completed;
backtrackable(τ1) =
race(τ1) ==true and |enabled(τ1)\postponed(τ1)| > 1
Figure 5.1: The Race-Detection and Flipping Algorithm
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executes the program P with different schedules until all paths in a REx(P ) have been explored.
Given two sequences of events τ and τ ′, we let ττ ′ to denote the concatenation of the two sequences.
Similarly, given a sequence of events τ and an event e, we let τe to denote the concatenation of
the sequence and the event. Let  be the empty sequence. A sequence of events is called a prefix,
if it is the prefix of a feasible execution path. The global variable τ keeps track of the execution
path for each execution of P . At the end of each execution, τ is appropriately truncated so that
a depth-first search of the computation tree takes place. execute prefix (P, τ) executes the program
from the beginning until the sequence of events generated by the execution is equal to the prefix τ .
Since an execution path is solely determined by the sequence of threads that are executed in the
path, from now onwards we will ignore the second and the third components of a tuple representing
an event. Thus (t, , ) represents an event on the thread t. With every prefix τ , we associate a
set, denoted by postponed(τ). Moreover, with every prefix τ , we associate a boolean flag, denoted
by race(τ). enabled(τ) returns the set of threads that are enabled after executing the prefix τ .
enabled(τ)\postponed(τ) represents the set of threads that are enabled but not postponed after
executing τ .
In each execution of P during the testing process, P is first partly executed so that it follows the
prefix τ computed in the previous execution. Then P is executed with the default schedule, where
the lowest indexed enabled thread is always chosen. If τ = τ ′e before the start of an execution,
then the execution path and the previous execution path has the same prefix τ ′. In an execution
path τ , for any prefix τ ′ of τ , we set race(τ ′) to true, if there exist e, τ1, e
′, and τ2 such that
τ = τ ′eτ1e
′τ2 and e l e
′. Setting race(τ ′) to true flags that in a subsequent execution, we must
postpone the execution of e after the prefix τ ′ so that we may explore a possibly non-equivalent
execution path. At the end of an execution, if τ1 is the longest prefix of the current execution path
τ such that race(τ1) is set to true and |enabled(τ1)\postponed(τ1)| > 1, we generate a new schedule
by truncating τ to τ1e, where e is an event of a thread t that has not been scheduled after τ1 in
any previous execution.
We next prove that the race-detection and flipping algorithm explores all execution paths in a
set REx(P ). To keep the proof simple, we assume that no execution path in P ends in a deadlock
state.
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Theorem 9. If Ex′(P ) is the set of the execution paths that are explored by the race-detection and
flipping algorithm, then there is a set REx(P ) such that REx(P ) ⊆ Ex′(P ) ⊆ Ex(P ).
Proof. Before we prove the theorem, we state and prove the following three lemmas.
Lemma 10. If e l e′ in an execution path τ , then e l e′ in any execution path τ ′ ∈ [τ ]≡4
The proof of the above lemma follows from the definition of 4.
Lemma 11. Given an event e and a prefix τ , if the following conditions hold:
1. e is enabled after the prefix τ ,
2. ττ ′eτ ′′ is a feasible execution path,
3. there is no event e1 in τ
′ such that e1 l e
′, and
4. there is an event e2 in τ
′′ such that e′ l e2,
then τeτ ′τ ′′ ≡4 ττ ′eτ ′′ and e l e2 in τeτ ′τ ′′.
Proof. τeτ ′τ ′′ ≡4 ττ ′eτ ′′ holds if there is no event e′ in τ ′ such that e′ 4 e. Let us assume that
there is an event e′ in τ ′ such that e′ 4 e. This is possible in three cases.
i) There is an e3 in τ
′ such that e′ 4 e3 and e3 C e. Because e is enabled after both τ and ττ
′,
for any e4 in τ , e4 m e. Therefore, there cannot be such an e3.
ii) e is a read or a write event and there is an e3 in τ
′ such that e′ 4 e3 and e3 be the latest event
such that e3 <m e. Then e3 l e. This contradicts condition (3).
iii) e is a lock acquire event, and there is an e3 in τ
′ such that e 4 e3 and e3 is the latest event
such that e3 <m e. Let e4 be the lock acquire event corresponding to the lock release event e3.
If e4 is in τ , then e cannot be enabled immediately after τ . Hence, we have a contradiction. If
e4 is in τ
′, then e4 l e. This contradicts condition (3).
Therefore, all the above three cases are impossible. This proves that τeτ ′τ ′′ ≡4 ττ ′eτ ′′.
e l e2 follows from Lemma 10.
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Lemma 12. If τeτ1e
′τ2 is a feasible execution path and if e l e
′, then e′ is enabled immediately
after τ .
Proof. Let e be generated by the thread t and e′ be generated by the thread t′. Let L be the set of
locks held by t immediately before e is generated and L′ be the set of locks held by t′ immediately
before e′ is generated. Then L∩L′ = ∅. If this is not the case, then let l ∈ L∩L′. There exist two
events e1 and e2 in τ1, such that e1 is an event of t, e2 is an event of t
′, e1 is the release of l, and
e2 is the acquire of l. Therefore, e1 4 e2. Moreover, e 4 e1 and e2 4 e
′. This violates the fact that
el e′. Therefore, L∩L′ = ∅. Moreover, el e′ implies that e m e′. Hence, e′ is enabled immediately
after τ .
Lemma 13. If τeτ1e
′τ2 is a feasible execution path and if ele
′, then there exists a feasible execution
path of the form τe′τ3eτ4 such that e
′ l e holds.
Proof. By Lemma 12, e′ is enabled after τ . Therefore, τe′ is a prefix. Because we assume that a
path never ends in a deadlock state, there must exist a feasible execution path whose prefix is τe′
and e is in the path. Let τe′τ3eτ4 be the feasible execution path in which after executing τe
′, we
execute e as soon as it gets enabled. In this path e′ l e.
We now get back to the proof of Theorem 9. The proof of Ex′(P ) ⊆ Ex(P ) is straightforward.
If we remove the check race(τ1) == true from the function backtrackable(τ1), then after each
prefix τ1, we explore the events of all enabled threads. Therefore, the algorithm explores the entire
computation tree, that is, the algorithm explores all execution paths in Ex(P ). Clearly, if we keep
the check race(τ1) == true in the function backtrackable(τ1), we may explore a smaller number of
execution paths. Therefore, Ex′(P ) ⊆ Ex(P ).
We next prove REx(P ) ⊆ Ex′(P ) by induction. Specifically, we prove that for any τ1 ∈ Ex(P ),
there is a τ2 ∈ Ex′(P ) such that τ1 ≡4 τ2. Let τ be a prefix explored by the algorithm. Let
us define Exτ (P ) = {τ ′ | τ ′ ∈ Ex(P ) and τ is a prefix of τ ′}. Similarly, let Ex′τ (P ) = {τ
′ |
τ ′ ∈ Ex′(P ) and τ is a prefix of τ ′}. By an argument similar to that in the previous paragraph,
Ex′τ (P ) ⊆ Exτ (P ).
Let Ten = {ti1 , . . . , til} be the set of threads that are enabled after executing τ , where ip < iq
if and only if p < q. Let ek be the event generated if we execute the thread tik after τ . If we
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remove the check race(τ1) == true from the function backtrackable(τ1), then after executing τ
our algorithm will execute all the threads in Ten in various executions. However, if we keep the
check race(τ1) = true in the function backtrackable(τ1), then after executing τ our algorithm may
only execute the threads ti1 , ti2 , . . . , tik in that order where k < l. This happens if after exploring
all paths in Ex′τek(P ), race(τ) is false. This happens if there exists no e in any of the paths in
Ex′τek(P ) such that ek l e. By the induction hypothesis, let us assume that for each τ
′ ∈ Exτek(P ),
there is a τ ′′ ∈ Ex′τek(P ) such that τ
′ ≡4 τ ′′. We want to prove that the same holds for τ , that is,
for each τ ′ ∈ Exτ (P ), there is a τ ′′ ∈ Ex′τ (P ) such that τ
′ ≡4 τ ′′. This holds if we can show that
for any k + 1 ≤ m ≤ l and any τ1 ∈ Exτem(P ), there is a τ2 ∈ Ex
′
τek
(P ) such that τ1 ≡4 τ2.
Consider τ1 ∈ Exτem(P ). Then τ1 must be of the form τemτ
′ekτ
′′. We consider three cases as
follows.
(i) If there exists no e in emτ
′ such that e l ek, and there exists no e
′ ∈ τ ′′ such that ek l e
′′,
then τekemτ
′τ ′′ ≡4 τemτ ′ekτ
′′ by Lemma 11. But τekemτ
′τ ′′ ∈ Exτek(P ). Therefore, by the
induction hypothesis there exists τ2 ∈ Ex′τek(P ) such that τekemτ
′τ ′′ ≡4 τ2. This implies that
τ2 ≡4 τemτ ′ekτ
′′. Therefore, the induction claim holds in this case.
(ii) Now we show the impossibility of the case that there exists no e in emτ
′ such that e l ek,
and there exists an e′ in τ ′′ such that ek l e
′. Then τekemτ
′τ ′′ ≡4 τemτ ′ekτ
′′ Lemma 11.
Note that in τekemτ
′τ ′′, the fact ek l e
′ still holds. By the induction hypothesis, there exists
τekτ4e
′τ5 ∈ Ex′τek(P ) such that τekτ4e
′τ5 ≡4 τekemτ
′τ ′′. By Lemma 10, in τekτ4e
′τ5, the
fact ek l e
′ holds. This contradicts the assumption that after executing tik after τ , race(τ) is
false.
(iii) Now we show the impossibility of the case that there exists an e in emτ
′ such that el ek. Let
us assume that there exists an e in emτ
′ such that e l ek. Then we show that this violates
the assumption that after executing tik after τ , race(τ) is false. Consider the following two
cases.
(a) The first case is e = em. Since em l ek and τemτ
′ekτ
′′ is a feasible execution path of
P , by Lemma 13, there is a feasible execution path of P of the form τekτ4emτ5 such
that in τekτ4emτ5, the fact ek l em holds. This implies that τekτ4emτ5 ∈ Exτek(P ). By
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the induction hypothesis, there exists τekτ6emτ7 ∈ Ex
′
τek
(P ) such that τekτ6emτ7 ≡4
τekτ4emτ5. By Lemma 10, in τekτ6emτ7, the fact ek l em holds. This violates the
assumption that after executing tik after τ , race(τ) is false.
(b) The second case is that e is present in τ ′. Let τ1 = τemτ8eτ9ekτ
′′. Since e l ek and τ1
is a feasible execution path of P , by Lemma 13, there is feasible execution path of P
of the form τemτ8ekτ4eτ5 such that in τemτ8ekτ4eτ5, the fact ek l em holds. Therefore,
τemτ8ekτ4eτ5 ∈ Exτem(P ). If there is no e
′ in emτ8 such that e
′ l ek, then by case (ii), we
have a contradiction. Otherwise, if there is a e′ in emτ8 such that e
′ l ek, then we get the
case (iii) with |τ8| < |τ ′|. We repeat the process until we get the case (iii)(a) or the case
(ii). The process is guaranteed to terminate as at each step the length of τ8 gets smaller
than the length of τ ′. On the termination of the process we get a contradiction.
5.2 Extending Concolic Testing to Test Concurrent Programs
We next describe a simple algorithm for testing shared-memory multi-threaded programs with
data inputs. The algorithm na¨ıvely extends concolic testing: the algorithm does not combine
concolic testing with the race-detection and flipping algorithm. Our goal in describing the simple
algorithm is to familiarize the readers with the various data structures that we consistently use in
our algorithms.
Given a program P in Scil, our simple algorithm explores a subset of the execution paths in
Ex(P ). This is done by repeatedly executing P both symbolically and concretely on different inputs
and schedules, each of which leads the program along a different execution path. At the end of
each execution of P , our algorithm either computes a new schedule or a new input, which is used
in the next execution of P . A new input is generated by solving constraints. To generate a new
schedule, our algorithm picks a scheduler choice recorded during the execution and generates a new
schedule where the particular thread chosen in the scheduler choice is postponed.
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5.2.1 Instrumentation
jCUTE first instruments the program P under test. Table 5.1 shows the code that jCUTE adds
during instrumentation. The code added by jCUTE during instrumentation includes the code
added by CUTE as in concolic testing. In addition, jCUTE also adds code so that it can control
the interleaving of the various threads at runtime. Specifically, jCUTE adds a call to the procedures
access event before any access to a potential shared memory, fork event after forking a new thread,
and end event after terminating a thread. After the START statement in a program, jCUTE adds
code to create a new thread and execute the procedure testing scheduler in the newly created
thread. This procedure controls the execution of the other threads at runtime. As such jCUTE
can execute a program according to a pre-determined schedule.
After instrumentation, jCUTE repeatedly runs the instrumented program P as follows:
// input: P is the instrumented program to test
// depth is the depth of bounded DFS
run jCUTE (P ,depth)
I = [ ]; h = (number of arguments in P ) + 1;
completed=false; branch hist=[ ]; event=[ ]; postponed=[ ];
while not completed
execute P
In an execution, the global shared variable i counts the number of shared memory accesses and
the number of conditional statement executions; i is incremented by 1 before any shared memory
access or before the execution of any conditional statement. The execution points at which i
is incremented denote choice points—the execution path of the program P can be changed at
these choice points either by generating a different schedule or a different input. At these choice
points we record the information required for generating new input in the arrays branch hist and
path c and in the maps I, A, P, and M . The use of these data structures is already described in
Chapter 4. In addition, we record information required for generating new schedules in the arrays
event, enabled, postponed, race. Since a choice point i can represent either a scheduler choice or
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Before Instrumentation After Instrumentation
// program start shared global vars A = P = path c = enabled =M = [ ];
l : START shared global vars i = inputNumber = 0;
global var tcurrent = NULL; // stores the scheduled thread
shared global var race = [ ]; // used in the efficient algorithm
sleep = delayed = { }; // used in the optimized algorithm
l : START
create a new thread and execute testing scheduler() in that thread
// input l : inputNumber = inputNumber+1;
l : lv ← input(); init input(&lv, inputNumber);
// new thread l : fork(l);
l : fork(l); fork event();
// lock l : access event(&v, l, l);
l : lock(&v); lock(&v);
// unlock l : unlock(&v);
l : unlock(&v); access event(&v, l,u);
// assignment l : access event(&v, l,w);
l : v ← lv; execute symbolic(&v,“lv”);
v ← lv;
// assignment l : access event(lv1, l,w);
l : ∗lv1 ← lv2; execute symbolic(lv1,“lv2”);
∗lv1 ← lv2;
// assignment l : access event(&v, l, r);
l : lv ← v; execute symbolic(&lv,“v”);
lv ← v;
// assignment l : access event(lv, l, r);
l : lv ← ∗lv; execute symbolic(&lv,“∗lv”);
lv ← ∗lv;
// assignment l : execute symbolic(&v,“e”);
l : lv ← e; lv ← e;
where e ∈ {&v, c, lv, lv op lv}
// conditional l : evaluate predicate(“p”, p);
l : if (p) goto l if (p) goto l
// normal termination l : HALT;
l : HALT end event();
// program error l : print “Found Error with Input ” . I ;
l : ERROR ERROR;
end event();
Table 5.1: Code that jCUTE’s Instrumentation Adds
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a branch choice, either the elements event [i], enabled [i], postponed [i], race[i] are defined or the
elements branch hist [i], path c[i] are defined.
The array event is used to keep track of the sequence of events generated by an execution of P .
Thus the array event serves the same purpose as the global variable τ in Figure 5.1. postponed [i],
if defined, contains a set of threads that cannot be executed in the next execution of P at the
choice point i. This array, like the event array, maintains information across executions. The other
two arrays enabled and race are not used across executions. enabled [i], if defined, contains a set of
threads that are not enabled at the choice point i. race[i] is set to true if the event stored in event [i]
has an immediate race with some other future event in the execution path. The simple algorithm
does not use this field; the field will be used in the efficient algorithm described in Section 5.3. If we
use event [0 . . . i] to represent the sequence of events event [0]event [1] . . .event [i], then postponed [i]
is the same as postponed(event [0 . . . i− 1]) defined in Section 5.1. Similarly, race[i] is the same as
race(event [0 . . . i− 1]) defined in Section 5.1.
The global variable tcurrent is used by the procedure testing scheduler to store the currently
scheduled thread. The global sets sleep and delayed are used by the further optimized algorithm
described in Section 5.4.
5.2.2 Controlling the Execution of Threads
At runtime, the execution of various threads is controlled by the thread executing the procedure
testing scheduler. This procedure, besides controlling the execution of various threads, ensures
that at any time only one thread is executing. This serialization of the execution of various
threads ensures that there is no uncontrolled concurrency in the system. We next describe how the
procedure testing scheduler controls the various threads so that it can systematically explore the
feasible interleavings.
Let us denote the thread running the procedure testing scheduler by schedulerThread . We
use the variable thisThread to denote the current thread (i.e. the thread accessing the variable
thisThread .) The execution of various threads is controlled using binary semaphores. The pseudo-
code of the implementation of a binary semaphore is given in Figure 5.2. A call to the procedure
wait on a semaphore s makes the calling thread wait until the value of s is 1. Once the value is
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// Semaphore s is passed by reference in the following procedures
init(Semaphore s){
s = 0 ;
}
// Also known as P ()
wait(Semaphore s) {
await s == 1, then s = 0 ; // must be atomic once s == 1 is detected
}
// Also known as V ()
signal(Semaphore s) {
s = 1 ; // must be atomic
}
Figure 5.2: Binary Semaphore
1, it sets the value of s to 0 atomically. A call to the procedure signal on a semaphore s sets the
value of s to 1 atomically; this signals any thread waiting on s.
We associate a binary semaphore with each thread at the time of its creation and initialize it
to 0. We use t.semaphore to denote the semaphore associated with the thread t.
The definition of the various thread controlling procedures introduced through instrumentation
is given in Figure 5.3. In an execution, before any access to a shared memory location, a thread,
say t, calls the procedure access event. This procedure first executes signal(schedulerThread .
semaphore) to signal the schedulerThread thread to continue its execution. Then the procedure
executes wait(thisThread . semaphore) to make t wait for a signal from the schedulerThread thread.
This way t releases the control to the schedulerThread thread and allows schedulerThread to sched-
ule an appropriate thread from the set of enabled threads. Note that, although, the thread trying
to access the shared memory location is waiting on its semaphore, it is enabled by definition.
A thread also starts waiting on its semaphore when it forks another thread. However, in this
case, the thread calling fork does not signal the thread schedulerThread . This is because after the
execution of fork the child thread starts its execution and we want that at any time during an
execution only one thread is executing.
The schedulerThread after receiving a signal from an executing thread starts it job of picking
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testing scheduler()
wait(schedulerThread . semaphore);
while there is an enabled thread
if i ≤ |events|
(tcurrent, , ) =event [i] ;
else
tcurrent = lowest indexed thread in the set of enabled threads;
signal(tcurrent . semaphore); // release control to the thread tcurrent
wait(schedulerThread . semaphore); // wait for the thread tcurrent to give back control
// end of the while loop
if there is an active thread
print ‘‘Error: found deadlock’’;
compute next input and schedule() ;
access event(m, label, access type) // access type can be r,w, l,u
signal(schedulerThread . semaphore); // release control to the testing scheduler
wait(thisThread . semaphore); // wait for the testing scheduler to give back control
event [i] = (thisThread , label, access type);
enabled [i] = set of enabled threads;
i = i+ 1 ;
fork event()
wait(thisThread . semaphore); // wait for the testing scheduler to give back control
end event()
signal(schedulerThread . semaphore); // release control to the testing scheduler
Figure 5.3: Definition of Various Thread Execution Controlling Procedures for the Simple Testing
Algorithm
the next thread to be scheduled for execution. Whenever schedulerThread receives a signal from
a thread, it knows that all the active threads in the execution are waiting to access a shared
memory location. Then it determines if there is at least one thread that is enabled among the
waiting threads, that is, if there is a thread that is not waiting to acquire a lock that is already
acquired by some other thread. If there is at least one enabled thread, then it picks the same
thread as the previous execution while i is less than the number of elements of event. This ensures
that the current execution follows the schedule computed in the previous execution while i is less
than or equal to the length of event. At the end of the previous execution, the sequence event
66
compute next input and schedule()
for (j = i− 1 ; j ≥ 0 ; j = j − 1)
if event [j] is defined
// compute a new schedule
if |enabled [j]| > |postponed [j]|+ 1
(t, , ) = event [j];
postponed [j] = postponed [j] ∪ {t};
t = smallest indexed thread in enabled [j]\ postponed [j];
event [j] = (t, , ) ;
branch hist = branch hist [0 . . . j];
event = event [0 . . . j];
postponed = postponed [0 . . . j];
return;
else
// compute a new input
if (branch hist [j].done == false)
branch hist [j].branch=¬branch hist [j].branch;
if (∃I ′ that satisfies neg last(path c[0 . . . j]))
branch hist = branch hist [0 . . . j];
event = event [0 . . . j];
postponed = postponed [0 . . . j];
return;
// end of the for loop
if (j < 0) completed = true;
Figure 5.4: Compute Next Schedule or Input for the Simple Testing Algorithm
is truncated appropriately and concatenated with an event to perform a depth-first search of the
feasible execution paths of P . Otherwise, if i is greater than the number of elements in event,
schedulerThread selects the smallest indexed thread that it is enabled. After selecting a thread,
schedulerThread signals the selected thread, and itself starts waiting again for a signal. If after
getting a signal schedulerThread determines that none of the threads are enabled and there is at
least one active thread in the execution, then it flags that there is a deadlock situation. Otherwise,
if there is no enabled or active thread in the execution, then the program execution terminates
and schedulerThread computes a schedule or an input for the next execution using the procedure
compute next input and schedule described next.
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5.2.3 Computing a Schedule and an Input
The procedure compute next input and schedule (see Figure 5.4) computes the schedule and the
input that will direct the next program execution along an alternative execution path. It loops over
the choice points in the current execution from the end. If the selected choice point j inside the loop
contains a scheduler choice and if not all scheduler choices at the choice point have been exercised,
then a new schedule is generated. Specifically, if the thread t executed at the execution point
denoted by the element event [j] and if t can be added to postponed [j] without making postponed [j]
equal to the set of enabled threads at that choice point, then t is added to the set postponed [j].
Moreover, the smallest indexed thread, which is in the set of enabled threads at the choice point
and which is not in the set postponed [j], is chosen and assigned to event [j]. This ensures that in
the next execution at the same choice point, the scheduler will pick a thread that is enabled and
that is not in postponed [j]. Thus in subsequent executions all the threads that are enabled at the
choice point will get scheduled one by one. Otherwise, if at the selected choice point path c[j] is
defined and if the constraint path c[j] has not been negated previously, then constraint solving is
invoked to generate a new input (see 4.1.5.)
5.3 Extending Concolic Testing with the Race-detection and
Flipping Algorithm
We next show how to extend concolic testing with the race-detection and flipping algorithm. We
call this combined algorithm the efficient algorithm. The efficient algorithm explores a much
smaller superset of the execution paths in REx(P ). The algorithm accomplishes this by computing
race conditions between different events in an execution. Based on these race conditions, the
algorithm generates other schedules that flip the race conditions, to provide a depth-first search
of all permutations of the race conditions in the execution path. More specifically, let e0e1e2 . . . en
be an execution path of a program and let ei and ej , where i < j, are related by the immediate
race relation (i.e. ei l ej). In our efficient testing algorithm, we mark the event ei (by setting
race[i] to true) to indicate that it has race with some future event and the thread of ei must be
postponed at that execution point in some future execution so that the race relation between ei
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and ej gets flipped. While computing the next input and schedule at the end of the execution,
if we choose to backtrack at the event ei, then we generate a schedule for the next execution
where we continue the execution up to the prefix e0 . . . ei−1; however, after that we postpone the
execution of the thread of ei as much as possible. This ensures that the race between ei and ej gets
flipped or permuted (i.e. ej l ei) in the next execution and we get an execution path of the form
e0 . . . ei−1ei+1 . . . eje
′
j+1 . . . ei . . . e
′
n′ . For example, if t1 : x = 1, t2 : x = 2 is an execution path, then
there is a race condition in the accesses of the shared variable x. We generate a schedule such that
the next execution is t2 : x = 2, t1 : x = 1, i.e., the accesses to x are permuted.
In the efficient algorithm, we modify the definition of the thread controlling procedures described
in Figure 5.3 by the one in Figure 5.5. (We label a statement with M: if the statement is modified or
added to the pseudo-codes given in Figure 5.3.) We assume that the scheduler maintains a dynamic
vector clock and a sequential vector clock with each thread and two dynamic vector clocks with
each shared memory location. The dynamic vector clocks and the sequential vector clocks are
updated using the procedure described in Section 3.2. These vector clocks are used to compute the
l relation in the procedure check and set race. We omit the vector clock update procedures in the
pseudo-code of the efficient algorithm to keep the description simple. The access event procedure
calls the procedure check and set race. The procedure check and set race determines if the current
event has a race with any past event, say event [j]. If such a race exists, then the race[j] is set
to true—assuming that the race condition was not already flipped in a previous execution. The
algorithm for selecting the next thread by the procedure testing scheduler is modified so that a
postponed thread’s execution gets delayed as much as possible. Note that if we postpone the
execution of thread as much as possible in the default schedule, then the proof of the Theorem 9
goes through, because the proof is independent of the default scheduling policy. The computation of
the next input and schedule is done using the modified procedure compute next input and schedule
(see Figure 5.6). In this procedure, a new schedule, which postpones the thread associated with an
event, is generated if the event has a race with a future event. Note that in the simple algorithm
(see Section 5.2), a thread is postponed at an execution point even if the corresponding event has
no race with any future event.
Soundness of our algorithm is trivial; a bug reported by our algorithm is an actual bug because
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testing scheduler()
wait(schedulerThread . semaphore);
tcurrent = NULL;
while there is an enabled thread
if i ≤ |event |
(tcurrent, , ) =event [i] ;
else
M: if tcurrent is not enabled
tcurrent = lowest indexed thread in the set of enabled threads;
// otherwise schedule the thread that was scheduled in the last iteration
signal(tcurrent . semaphore); // release control to the thread tcurrent
wait(schedulerThread . semaphore); // wait for the thread tcurrent to give back control
// end of the while loop
if there is an active thread
print ‘‘Error: found deadlock’’ ;
compute next input and schedule() ;
access event(m, label, access type) // access type can be r,w, l,u
signal(schedulerThread . semaphore); // release control to the testing scheduler
wait(thisThread . semaphore); // wait for the testing scheduler to give back control
event [i] = (thisThread , label, access type);
enabled [i] = set of enabled threads;
M: check and set race(m);
i = i+ 1 ;
fork event()
wait(thisThread . semaphore); // wait for the testing scheduler to give back control
end event()
signal(schedulerThread . semaphore); // release control to the testing scheduler
check and set race(m)
∀j ∈ [0, i) such that event [j] l event [i]
if t not in postponed [j]
if e is a read or write event
print ‘‘Warning: data race found’’;
race[j] = true;
Figure 5.5: Definition of Various Thread Execution Controlling Procedures for the Efficient Testing
Algorithm
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compute next input and schedule()
for (j = i− 1 ; j ≥ 0 ; j = j − 1)
if event [j] is defined
// compute a new schedule
if |enabled [j]| > |postponed [j]|+ 1
M: if race[j] == true
M: race[j] = false;
(t, , ) = event [j];
postponed [j] = postponed [j] ∪ {t};
t = smallest indexed thread in enabled [j]\ postponed [j];
event [j] = (t, , ) ;
branch hist = branch hist [0 . . . j];
event = event [0 . . . j];
postponed = postponed [0 . . . j];
return;
else
// compute a new input
if (branch hist [j].done == false)
branch hist [j].branch=¬branch hist [j].branch;
if (∃I ′ that satisfies neg last(path c[0 . . . j]))
branch hist = branch hist [0 . . . j];
event = event [0 . . . j];
postponed = postponed [0 . . . j];
return;
// end of the for loop
if (j < 0) completed = true;
Figure 5.6: Compute Next Schedule or Input for the Efficient Testing Algorithm
our algorithm provides a concrete input and schedule on which the program exhibits the bug.
Moreover, our algorithm can be complete in some cases.
Proposition 14. (Completeness) During testing a program with our efficient algorithm, if the
following conditions hold:
• The algorithm terminates.
• The algorithm makes no approximation during concolic execution and the algorithm is able
to solve any constraint which is satisfiable.
then our algorithm has executed all executions in REx and we have hit all reachable statements of
the program.
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testing scheduler()
wait(schedulerThread . semaphore);
while there is an enabled thread
M: if postponed [i] is defined
M: delayed = delayed ∪ postponed [i] ;
M: sleep = { nextEvent(t) | t ∈ delayed } ;
M: tcurrent = smallest indexed thread from set of enabled threads \ delayed ;
signal(tcurrent . semaphore); // release control to the thread tcurrent
wait(schedulerThread . semaphore); // wait for the thread tcurrent to give back control
M: ∀e ∈ sleep if el event [i− 1];
M: let (t, , ) = e in delayed = delayed \t ;
// end of the while loop
if there is an active thread
print ‘‘Error: found deadlock’’ ;
compute next input and schedule() ;
Figure 5.7: Definition of testing scheduler for the Further Optimized Algorithm
5.4 A Further Optimization
The efficient algorithm improves the simple algorithm by providing a systematic way to flip race
relations between various pairs of events. However, this may result in repeated flipping of race rela-
tions between the same pair of events, if the pair of events are not next to each other. As an instance,
for the example in the Section 5.3, if the next execution path is e0 . . . ei−1ei+1 . . . eje
′
j+1 . . . ei . . . e
′
n′ ,
then our efficient algorithm may detect that there is a race between ej and ei. As a result our
algorithm would try to flip this race once again. To avoid this, we use a technique similar to sleep
sets [38]. Specifically, in the execution path e0 . . . ei−1ei+1 . . . eje
′
j+1 . . . ei . . . e
′
n′ , we add the thread
t, where t is the thread of the event ei, to the set delayed of every event ei+1, . . . , ej . As a result,
even if we have detected that there is a race between ej and ei, we would not set to true the element
of race corresponding to the event ej (see the 2nd line of the procedure check and set race). This
ensures that we do not repeatedly flip race relation between the same pair of events. The pseudo-
code of the modified procedure testing scheduler is given in Figure 5.7. The procedure nextEvent
takes a thread t as an argument and returns the event that will happen if the thread t executes
next.
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5.5 Discussion
We presented an efficient algorithm for testing multi-threaded programs. An important aspect of
our algorithm is that we treat symbolic constraint solving and race-flipping uniformly in our algo-
rithm. In a given execution, we either do constraint solving or race-flipping. This helps us to test
concurrent programs in a single go. A pure symbolic execution based testing algorithm for con-
current programs may end up exploring redundant execution paths having the same partial order.
This is because optimal partial order reduction requires accurate knowledge of dependency rela-
tion; such knowledge may not be computable due to inaccuracies of alias analysis during symbolic
execution. On the other hand, a pure concrete execution based testing algorithm for concurrent
programs requires the exploration of all partial orders for all possible inputs. This may not scale up
if the domain of inputs is large. Our algorithm addresses the limitations of both these approaches
by combining symbolic and concrete execution. The concrete execution helps to resolve aliases
exactly at runtime. As a result we get the exact dependency or the causal relation between the
events. The symbolic execution helps to generate a small set of inputs from a large domain of
inputs through constraint solving. Therefore, we believe that concolic testing extended with the
race-detection and flipping algorithm is an attractive technique to test concurrent programs.
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Chapter 6
Predictive Monitoring of Concurrent
Programs
So far we described a new method of testing multi-threaded shared-memory programs. The key goal
of the method was to generate test inputs and schedules so that all the reachable statements of the
program are executed when the program is run on the generated inputs and schedules. As such, the
proposed method can find generic bugs that are based on statement reachability. Such bugs include
assertion violations, segmentation faults, uncaught exceptions, and so on. In addition, the proposed
method can discover data races and deadlocks in multi-threaded shared-memory programs.
Although statement reachability-based bugs are an important class of bugs in programs, there
may be bugs in a program because the program does not meet its specification. In particular, in
many instances, a program may be required to satisfy a formal specification given as a formula in
a suitable logic. For example, an operating system must satisfy the requirement that if there is
logout by user X, then in the past the user X must have logged in. In this dissertation, we will not
focus on how to determine these requirements. We will assume that in many situations a formal
specification may be available along with a program. This is, in particular, often true for programs
written for safety critical systems.
Given a program and its formal specification, a key research challenge is to develop scalable and
automated methods either to prove that the program meets its specification or that the program
has a bug with respect to the specification. A popular approach to address this problem is model
checking. In model checking the whole state space of a program is automatically explored and
checked against the formal specification. Although model checking can prove a program correct, it
does not scale for large programs because the state space of practical programs is often too large
to be handled by a model checker. This is called the state explosion problem.
Runtime verification, also called runtime monitoring, is an emerging approach which tries to
address the state explosion problem by checking at runtime the execution of a program against
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its formal specification. In particular, this approach combines testing and formal specification as
follows. Given a specification, a code fragment called a runtime monitor is generated from the
formal specification. The monitor is then weaved into the program through instrumentation so
that whenever the instrumented program is executed, the monitor can check at runtime whether
the specification is violated. The instrumented program is then executed on various test inputs to
check if the program meets its specification on those inputs. Since testing is not rigorous, runtime
monitoring can find violations of a specification a program, but it cannot prove that a program
meets its specification.
We can combine runtime monitoring with concolic testing to test a sequential program against
its formal specification. In the ideal case, if concolic testing manages to explore all feasible paths of
a program and runtime monitoring does not detect any violation of the specification in the explored
paths, then we can prove that the program meets its specification.
However, if our program is a shared-memory multi-threaded program, then a combination of
runtime monitoring and concolic testing extended with the race-detection and flipping algorithm
is not sufficient, that is, even if we find no violation of the specification by exploring one execution
path from each feasible partial order of the program, there may exist unexplored feasible execution
paths that may violate the property. This is because exploring only non-equivalent execution
paths is not sufficient for catching violations of temporal properties—a temporal property may
be simultaneously satisfied and violated by two different equivalent execution paths. This was
illustrated by an example in Section 2.3.
Next we present a technique to address the above problem. The technique is called predictive
monitoring.1 In predictive monitoring, from an observed execution path, we generate all the
equivalent execution paths and represent them compactly in an abstract model called computation
lattice. We show that runtime monitoring on this model can be done efficiently. Since this technique
enables us to predict violations of properties in non-observed execution paths without re-executing
the program, we call the technique predictive. Observe that predictive monitoring can predict and
monitor all execution paths equivalent to a given execution path; therefore, predictive monitoring is
not comprehensive like model checking. However, when combined with concolic testing, predictive
1This work is done partly in collaboration with Gul Agha and Grigore Ros¸u. Part of this work appeared in [90,
92, 80, 81, 94].
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monitoring makes the former more efficient because it does not re-execute the program along
equivalent paths, but relies only on the information that is already available from an execution.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we describe a simple form of
monitors for safety properties. In Section 6.2, we define relevant causality which is a refinement
of the notion of causality relation described in Section 3.2. We describe the predictive monitoring
algorithm in Section 6.3.
6.1 Monitors for Safety Properties
Safety properties are a very important, if not the most important, class of properties that one
should consider in monitoring. This is because once a system violates a safety property, there
is no way to continue its execution to satisfy the safety property later. Therefore, a monitor for
a safety property can precisely say at runtime when the property has been violated, so that an
external recovery action can be taken. From a monitoring perspective, what is needed from a safety
formula is a succinct representation of its bad prefixes which are finite sequences of states leading
to a violation of the property. Therefore, one can abstract away safety properties by languages
over finite words.
Automata are a standard means to succinctly represent languages over finite words. In what
follows we define a suitable version of automata, called monitor, with the property that it has a
“bad” state from which it never gets out:
Definition: Let S be a finite or infinite set, that can be thought of as the set of states of the
program to be monitored. Then an S-monitor or simply a monitor, is a tupleMon = 〈M,m0, b, ρ〉,
where
• M is the set of states of the monitor;
• m0 ∈M is the initial state of the monitor;
• b ∈M is the final state of the monitor, also called bad state; and
• ρ :M×S → 2M is a transition function with the property that ρ(b,Σ) = {b} for any Σ ∈ S.
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Sequences in S?, where  is the empty one, are called (execution) traces. A trace pi is said to be a bad
prefix inMon iff b ∈ ρ({m0}, pi), where ρ : 2M×S? → 2M is recursively defined as ρ(M, ) =M and
ρ(M,piΣ) = ρ(ρ(M,pi),Σ), where ρ : 2M×S → 2M is defined as ρ({m}∪M,Σ) = ρ(m,Σ)∪ρ(M,Σ)
and ρ(∅,Σ) = ∅, for all finite M ⊆M and Σ ∈ S.
M is not required to be finite in the above definition, but 2M represents the set of finite subsets
of M. In practical situations it is often the case that the monitor is not explicitly provided in a
mathematical form as above. For example, a monitor can be a specific type of program whose
execution is triggered by receiving events from the monitored program; its state can be given by
the values of its local variables, and the bad state is a fixed unique state which once reached cannot
be changed by any further events.
There are fortunate situations in which monitors can be automatically generated from formal
specifications, thus requiring the user to focus on system’s formal safety requirements rather than
on low level implementation details. In fact, this was the case in all the experiments that we have
performed so far. We have so far experimented with requirements expressed either in extended
regular expressions (ERE) or various variants of temporal logics, with both future and past time
operators. For example, [88, 89] show coinductive techniques to generate minimal static monitors
from EREs and from future time linear temporal logics, respectively, and [50, 13] show how to
generate dynamic monitors, i.e., monitors that generate their states on-the-fly, as they receive the
events, for the safety segment of temporal logic. Note, however, that there may be situations in
which the generation of a monitor may not be feasible, even for simple requirements languages. For
example, it is well-known that the equivalent automaton of an ERE may be non-elementary larger
than the ERE in the worst case [105]; therefore, there exist relatively small EREs whose monitors
cannot even be stored.
Example 15. Consider a reactive controller that maintains the water level of a reservoir within
safe bounds. It consists of a water level reader and a valve controller. The water level reader reads
the current level of the water, calculates the quantity of water in the reservoir and stores it in a
shared variable w. The valve controller controls the opening of a valve by looking at the current
quantity of water in the reservoir. A very simple and naive implementation of this system contains
two threads: T1, the valve controller, and T2, the water level reader. The code snippet is given in
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Thread T1: Thread T2:
while(true) { while(true) {
if(w > 18) delta = 10; l = readLevel();
else delta = -10; w = calcVolume(l);
for(i=0; i<2; i++) { sleep(100);
v = v + delta; }
setValveOpening(v);
sleep(100);
}
}
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Figure 6.1: Two Threads (T1 controls the valve and T2 reads the water level) and a Monitor.
Figure 6.1.
Here w is in some proper units such as mega gallons and v is in percentage. The implementation
is poorly synchronized and it relies on ideal thread scheduling.
A sample run of the system can be {w = 20, v = 40}, {w = 24}, {v = 50}, {w = 27}, {v =
60}, {w = 31}, {v = 70}. As we will see later in the paper, by a run we here mean a sequence
of relevant variable writes. Suppose we are interested in a safety property that says “If the water
quantity is more than 30 mega gallons, then it is the case that sometime in the past water quantity
exceeded 26 mega gallons and since then the valve is open by more than 55% and the water quantity
never went down below 26 mega gallon”. We can express this safety property in two different
formalisms: linear temporal logic (LTL) with both past-time and future-time operators, or extended
regular expressions (EREs) for bad prefixes. The atomic propositions that we will consider are
p : (w > 26), q : (w > 30), r : (v > 55). The properties can be written as follows:
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F1 = (q → ((r ∧ p)S ↑p))
F2 = {}∗{¬p}{p,¬q}+
({p,¬q,¬r}{p,¬q}∗{q}+ {q}∗{q,¬r}){}∗
The formula F1 in LTL (↑ p is a shorthand for “p and previously not p”) states that “It is
always the case that if (w > 30), then at some time in the past (w > 26) started to be true and
since then (r > 55) and (w > 26).” The formula F2 characterizes the prefixes that make F1 false.
In F2 we use {p,¬q} to denote a state where p and ¬q holds and r may or may not hold. Similarly,
{} represents any state of the system. The monitor automaton for F2 is given also in Figure 6.1.
6.2 Relevant Causality
Monitors for a multi-threaded program may refer to a small subset of the set of the variables of
the program. In our technique, we restrict such variables to a set called path-robust variables. A
variable is said to be path-robust if and only if its value remains the same along an execution path,
that is, its value is independent of the input along any execution path. However, the value of such
a variable may be different for different executions paths of the program. A path-robust variable
is said to be a relevant variable, if it is referred in a monitor of the program.
For example in the multi-threaded program in Figure 2.3, the set of path-robust variables is {x,
y }. Since the value of z may vary along a particular execution path depending on the input, z is
not a path-robust variable. If we consider a monitor for the property ‘‘Always x greater than
0,’’ then the monitor only refers to the path-robust variable x. All the other variables in the
program except x are essentially irrelevant for the monitor. Therefore, the set of relevant variables
is { x }.
To minimize the number of messages, like in [65] which suggests a similar technique but for
distributed systems in which reads and writes are not distinguished, we consider a subset R ⊆ E
of relevant events. We say that e ∈ E is a relevant event if and only if e writes a memory location
m, x is a relevant variable, and m is the address of x (i.e. m = &x). We define the R-relevant
causality on E as the relation 4R:=4 ∩(R × R), so that e 4R e′ iff e, e′ ∈ R and e 4 e′. It is
important to notice though that the other variables can also indirectly influence the relation 4R,
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because they can influence the relation 4. We next provide a technique based on dynamic vector
clocks that correctly implements the relevant causality relation.
6.2.1 Vector Clock Algorithm for Relevant Causality
We provide a variant of the dynamic vector clock algorithm (see Section 3.2), called the relevant
vector clock algorithm, that correctly and efficiently implements the relevant causality relation.
The relevant causality relation between the events in an execution can be tracked efficiently at
runtime using relevant vector clocks (RVC). A relevant vector clock VR : T → N, where T is the
set of threads that are present in the execution. We call such a map a relevant vector clock (RVC).
Such a map can be partial because threads are created dynamically at runtime. To simplify the
exposition and the implementation, we assume that each RVC VR is a total map, where VR(t) = 0
whenever VR is not defined on thread t.
We associate a RVC with every thread t and denote it by VRt. Moreover, we associate two RVCs
VRam and VR
w
m with every shared memory m; we call the former access RVC and the latter update
RVC. Whenever a thread t with current RVC VRt generates an event e, the following algorithm,
called the relevant vector clock algorithm, is executed:
1. If e is a relevant event, i.e., if e ∈ R, then
VRt(t)← VRt(t) + 1.
2. If e is a read of a shared memory location m, then
VRt ← max{VRt,VR
w
m}
VRam ← max{VR
a
m,VRt}
3. If e is a write, lock, or unlock of a shared memory location m, then
VRwm ← VR
a
m ← VRt ← max{VR
a
m,VRt}
4. If e is a fork event and if t′ is the newly created thread, then
VRt′ ← VRt
5. If e is a relevant event and if e writes the value v to the variable x, then
send message 〈t,VRt, x, v〉.
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We can associate a RVC with every event e, denoted by VR{e}, as follows. If e is executed by t and
if VRt is the vector clock of t just after the event e, then VR{e} = VRt. Given a multi-threaded
program, we instrument the program so that it runs the relevant vector clock algorithm for every
event and sends the messages to an observer which performs predictive monitoring.
Lemma 16. After the processing of the event ekt by thread t
(a) VRt(t
′) equals the number of relevant events of t that causally precede ekt .
(b) VRam(t
′) equals the number of relevant events of t that causally precede any event in E that
appears before or equals to ekt and accessed m.
(c) VRwm(t
′) equals the number of relevant events of t′ that causally precede the most recent write
event of m.
Theorem 17. For any two events e and e′, e 4R e
′ iff VR{e} ≤ VR{e′}.
The proof of the above two results can be done in a way similar to that of the Theorem 6.
6.3 Runtime Model Generation and Predictive Monitoring
In an execution of a multi-threaded program, the messages sent by the relevant vector clock algo-
rithm are received by an observer which performs the predictive monitoring. The observer receives
messages of the form 〈t,VRt, x, v〉. Each such message represents an event on thread t whose RVC
is VRt, and in that event the value v has been assigned to the relevant variable x. Because of
Theorem 17, the observer can infer the causal dependency between the relevant events emitted by
the execution of the multi-threaded program. We show how the observer can monitor all possible
interleavings of events that do not violate the observed causal dependency. Only one of these in-
terleavings corresponds to the real execution, the others being all potential executions. Hence, the
presented technique can predict safety violations from successful executions.
6.3.1 Multi-Threaded Computation Lattice
Inspired by related definitions in [9], we define the important notions of relevant multi-threaded
computation and run as follows. A relevant multi-threaded computation, simply called multi-
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threaded computation from now on, is the partial order on the relevant events that the observer
can infer, which is nothing but the relation 4R. A relevant multi-threaded run, also simply called
multi-threaded run from now on, is any permutation of the relevant events, which does not violate
the multi-threaded computation. Our goal is to check safety requirements against all (relevant)
multi-threaded runs of a multi-threaded computation.
A relevant event can change the state of the multi-threaded program as seen by the observer;
this is formalized next. A relevant program state, or simply a program state, is a map from relevant
variables to concrete values. Any permutation of relevant events generates a sequence of program
states in the obvious way, however, not all permutations of relevant events are valid multi-threaded
runs. A program state is called consistent if and only if there is a multi-threaded run containing
that state in its sequence of generated program states. We next formalize these concepts.
Definition: [Consistent Run] For a given permutation of events in R, say R = e1e2 . . . e|R|, we say
that R is a consistent run if for all pairs of events e and e′, e 4R e
′ implies that e appears before
e′ in R.
Let ekt be the k
th relevant event generated by the thread t since the start of its execution. A
cut C is a subset of R such that for all t ∈ T if ekt is present in C, then for all l < k, e
l
t is also
present in C. In what follows, we let T = {t1, . . . , tn} to be the set of all threads created during the
execution. A cut is denoted by a tuple (ek1t1 , e
k2
t2
, ..., ekntn ) where each entry in the tuple corresponds
to the last relevant event for each thread included in C. If a thread t has not seen a relevant event,
then the corresponding entry is denoted by e0t . A cut C corresponds to a relevant program state
that has been reached after all the events in C have been executed. Such a relevant program state
is called a relevant global multi-threaded state, or simply a relevant global state or even just state,
and is denoted by Σk1k2...kn .
Definition: [Consistent Cut] A cut is said to be consistent if for all events e and e′
(e ∈ C) ∧ (e′ 4R e)→ (e
′ ∈ C)
A consistent global state is the one that corresponds to a consistent cut. A relevant event elt is
said to be enabled in a consistent global state Σk1k2...kn if and only if C ∪ {elt} is a consistent cut,
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where C is the consistent cut corresponding to the state Σk1k2...kn . The following proposition holds
for an enabled event:
Proposition 18. A relevant event elti is enabled in a consistent global state Σ
k1k2...kn if and only
if l = ki + 1. Moreover, for all relevant events e, if e 6= elti and e 4R e
l
ti
, then e ∈ C, where C is
the consistent cut corresponding to the state Σk1k2...kn.
Proof. Since elti is enabled in the state Σ
k1k2...kn , C ∪{elti} is a cut. This implies that for all events
ekti , if k < l, then e
k
ti
∈ C ∪{elti} and hence e
k
ti
∈ C. In particular, all the events e1ti , e
2
ti
, . . . , el−1ti are
in C. However, el−1ti is the last relevant event from thread ti, which is included in C. Therefore,
ki = l − 1. The other way follows trivially because e
ki
ti
4R e
l
ti
and e 4R e
ki
ti
for all e ∈ C.
Since elti ∈ C ∪ {e
l
ti
}, e 4R elti , and C ∪ {e
l
ti
} is a consistent cut, e ∈ C ∪ {eli} (by the definition
of consistent cut). Since by assumption e 6= elti , we have e ∈ C.
An immediate consequence of the above proposition is the following corollary:
Corollary 19. If C is the consistent cut corresponding to the state Σk1k2...kn and if elti is enabled
in Σk1k2...kn, then the state corresponding to the consistent cut C ∪ {elti} is Σ
k1k2...ki−1lki+1...kn or
Σk1k2...ki−1(ki+1)ki+1...kn and we denote it by δ(Σk1k2...kn , elti).
Here the partial function δ maps a consistent state Σ and a relevant event e enabled in that
state to a consistent state δ(Σ, e) which is the result of executing e in Σ. Let ΣK0 be the initial
global state, Σ00...0, which is always consistent. The following result holds:
Lemma 20. If R = e1e2 . . . e|R| is a consistent multi-threaded run, then it generates a sequence of
global states ΣK0ΣK1 . . .ΣK|R| such that for all r ∈ [1, |R|], ΣKr−1 is consistent, er is enabled in
ΣKr−1, and δ(ΣKr−1 , er) = Σ
Kr .
Proof. The proof is by induction on r. By definition the initial state ΣK0 is consistent. Moreover,
e1 is enabled in Σ
K0 because the cut C corresponding to the state ΣK0 is empty and hence the
cut C ∪ {e1} = {e1} is consistent. Since ΣK0 is consistent and e1 is enabled in ΣK0 , δ(ΣK0 , e1) is
defined. Let ΣK1 = δ(ΣK0 , e1).
Let us assume that ΣKr−1 is consistent, er is enabled in Σ
Kr−1 , and δ(ΣKr−1 , er) = Σ
Kr .
Therefore, δ(ΣKr−1 , er) = Σ
Kr is also consistent. Let C be the cut corresponding to ΣKr . To prove
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that er+1 is enabled in Σ
Kr we have to prove that C ∪ {er+1} is a cut and it is consistent. Let
er+1 = e
l
t for some t and l i.e. er+1 is the l
th relevant event of thread t. For every event ekt such
that k < l, ekt 4R e
l
t. Therefore, by the definition of consistent run, e
k
t appears before e
l
t in R for all
0 < k < l. This implies that all ekt for 0 < k < l are included in C. This proves that C ∪ e
l
t is a cut.
Since C is a cut, for all events e and e′ if e 6= elt, then (e ∈ C ∪ {e
l
t}) ∧ (e
′ 4R e)→ e′ ∈ C ∪ {elt}.
Otherwise, if e = elt, then by the definition of consistent run, if e
′ 4R e
l
t, then e
′ appears before elt
in R. This implies that e′ is included in C ∪ {elt}. Therefore, C ∪ {e
l
t} is consistent, which proves
that er+1 = e
l
t is enabled in the state Σ
Kr . Since ΣKr is consistent and er+1 is enabled in Σ
Kr ,
δ(ΣKr , er+1) is defined. We let δ(Σ
Kr , er+1) = Σ
Kr+1 .
From now on, we identify the sequences of states ΣK0ΣK1 . . .ΣK|R| as above with multi-threaded
runs, and simply call them runs. We say that Σ leads-to Σ′, written Σ  Σ′, when there is some
run in which Σ and Σ′ are consecutive states. Let  ∗ be the reflexive transitive closure of the
relation . The set of all consistent global states together with the relation ∗ forms a lattice with
n mutually orthogonal axes representing each thread. For a state Σk1k2...kn , we call k1+ k1+ · · · kn
its level. A path in the lattice is a sequence of consistent global states on increasing level, where
the level increases by 1 between any two consecutive states in the path. Therefore, a run is just a
path starting with Σ00...0 and ending with Σr1r2...rn , where ri is the total number of relevant events
of thread ti.
Therefore, a multi-threaded computation can be seen as a lattice. This lattice, which is called
computation lattice and referred to as L, should be seen as an abstract model of the running multi-
threaded program, containing the relevant information needed in order to analyze the program.
Supposing that one is able to store the computation lattice of a multi-threaded program, which
is a non-trivial matter because it can have an exponential number of states in the length of the
execution, one can mechanically model-check it against the safety property.
Given a state Σk1k2...kn we can associate a RVC with the state (denoted by VR{Σk1k2...kn})
such that VR{Σk1k2...kn}(ti) = ki i.e. VR{Σk1k2...kn}(ti) is equal to the number of relevant events
of thread ti that has causally effected the state. With this definition the following results hold:
Lemma 21. If a relevant event e from a thread t is enabled in a state Σ and if δ(Σ, e) = Σ′, then
∀t′ 6= t : VR{Σ}(t′) = VR{Σ′}(t′) and VR{Σ}(t) + 1 = VR{Σ′}(t).
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Proof. This follows directly from the definition of RVC of a state and Corollary 19.
Lemma 22. If a relevant event e from thread t is enabled in a state Σ, then ∀t′ 6= t : VR{Σ}(t′) ≥
VR{e}(t′) and VR{Σ}(t) + 1 = VR{e}(t).
Proof. VR{Σ}(t) + 1 = VR{e}(t) follows from Lemma 21. Say k = VR{e}(t′) for some t′ 6= t.
Then by (a) of Lemma 16 we know that the kth relevant event from thread t′ causally precedes e
i.e. ekt′ 4R e. Then by proposition 18, e
k
t′ ∈ C, where C is the cut corresponding to Σ. This implies
that k ≤ VR{Σ}(t′) which proves that ∀t′ 6= t : VR{Σ}(t′) ≥ VR{e}(t′).
Lemma 23. If R = e1e2 . . . e|R| is a consistent multi-threaded run generating the sequence of global
states ΣK0ΣK1 . . .ΣK|R|, then VR{ΣKi} can be recursively defined as follows:
VR{ΣK0}(t) = 0 for all t ∈ T
VR{ΣKr}(t) = max (VR{ΣKr−1}(t),VR{er}(t)) for all t ∈ T and 0 < r ≤ |R|
Proof. ∀t ∈ T : VR{ΣK0}(t) = 0 holds by definition. Let er be from thread t′. By Lemma 20
er is enabled in Σ
Kr−1 . Therefore, by Lemma 22, ∀t 6= t′ : VR{ΣKr−1}(t) ≥ VR{er}(t). This
implies that ∀t 6= t′ : VR{ΣKr}(t) = VR{ΣKr−1}(t) = max (VR{ΣKr−1}(t),VR{er}(t)). Otherwise
if t = t′, by Lemma 22, VR{ΣKr−1}(t)+1 = VR{er}(t). Therefore, VR{ΣKr}(t) = VR{ΣKr−1}(t)+
1 = VR{er}(t) = max (VR{ΣKr−1}(t),VR{er}(t)). This proves that ∀j ∈ T : VR{ΣKr}(t) =
max (VR{ΣKr−1}(t),VR{er}(t)).
Corollary 24. If R = e1e2 . . . e|R| is a consistent multi-threaded run generating the sequence of
global states ΣK0ΣK1 . . .ΣK|R|, then
VR{ΣKr}(t) = max (VR{e1}(t),VR{e2}(t), . . . ,VR{er}(t)) for all t ∈ T and 0 < r ≤ |R|
Example 25. Figure 6.2 shows the causal partial order on relevant events extracted by the observer
from the multi-threaded execution in Example 15 together with the generated computation lattice.
The actual execution, Σ00Σ01Σ11Σ12Σ22Σ23Σ33, is marked with solid edges in the lattice. Besides
its RVC, each global state in the lattice stores its values for the relevant variables w and v. It
can be readily seen from Figure 2.3 that the LTL property F1 defined in Example 15 holds on the
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Figure 6.2: Computation Lattice
sample run of the system, and also that it is not in the language of bad prefixes, F2. However, F1
is violated on some other consistent runs, such as Σ00Σ01Σ02Σ12Σ13Σ23Σ33. On this particular run
↑p holds at Σ02; however, r does not hold at the next state Σ12. This makes the formula F1 false
at the state Σ13. The run can also be symbolically written as {}{}{p}{p}{p, q}{p, q, r}{p, q, r}. In
the automaton in Figure 6.1, this corresponds to a possible sequence of states 00123555. Hence,
this string is accepted by F2 as a bad prefix.
Therefore, by carefully analyzing the computation lattice extracted from a successful execution
one can infer safety violations in other possible consistent executions. In what follows we propose
effective techniques to analyze the computation lattice. A first important observation is that one
can generate it on-the-fly and analyze it on a level-by-level basis, discarding the previous levels.
However, even if one considers only one level, that can still contain an exponential number of states
in the length of the current execution. A second important observation is that the states in the
computation lattice are not all equiprobable in practice. By allowing an user configurable window
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of most likely states in the lattice centered around the observed execution trace, the presented
technique becomes quite scalable, requiring O(wm) space and O(twm) time, where w is the size of
the window, m is the size of the bad prefix monitor of the safety property, and t is the size of the
monitored execution trace.
6.3.2 Level by Level Analysis of the Computation Lattice
Given an execution path τ of a multi-threaded program, the relevant vector clock algorithm gen-
erates a message for each relevant event in τ . The purpose of the predictive monitoring is to check
all execution paths in [τ ]≡4 against a given monitor. The check is performed by an observer which
has access to the sequence of messages generated from τ .
A na¨ıve observer would just check the observed sequence of messages against the monitor for
the safety property, say Mon like in Definition 6.1, and would maintain at each moment a set
of states, say MonStates in M. Let Q be the sequence of messages received from the execution
τ . For each message in the sequence, it would create the next state Σ and replace MonStates by
ρ(MonStates,pgmState(Σ)), where pgmState(Σ) gives the mapping of all relevant program variables
to their values in the state Σ. If the bad state b will ever be in MonStates, then a property violation
error would be reported, meaning that the current execution trace led to a bad prefix of the safety
property. Here we assume that the messages are received in the order in which they are emitted, and
also that the monitor works over the global states of the multi-threaded programs. This assumption
is essential for the observer to deduce the actual execution path of the multi-threaded program. The
knowledge of the actual execution path is used by the observer to apply the causal cone heuristics
as described later. The assumption is not necessary if we do not want to use causal cone heuristics.
The work in [91] describes a technique for the level by level analysis of the computation lattice
without the above assumption.
The pseudo-code for the na¨ıve observer is given in Figure 6.3. pgmState(Σ)[x 7→ v] is same as
pgmState(Σ), except the value of the relevant variable x being v.
A smart observer, as said before, will analyze not only the observed execution trace, but also
all the other consistent runs of the multi-threaded system, thus being able to predict violations
from successful executions. The observer receives the messages from the running multi-threaded
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LetMon = 〈M,m0, b, ρ〉 be the given monitor;
pgmState(ΣK0) maps each relevant variable to its initial value;
MonStates(ΣK0) = ρ({m0},pgmState(ΣK0));
global var CurrentState = ΣK0 ;
// inputs: Q is the sequence of messages received from the program execution
runNa¨ıveObserver(Q)
for each msg ∈ Q
〈t,VR, x, v〉 = msg ;
NextState = pgmState(CurrentState)[x 7→ v];
MonStates(NextState) = ρ(MonStates(CurrentState), pgmState(NextState));
if b ∈ MonStates(NextState);
print “property violated”;
CurrentState = NextState;
Figure 6.3: Monitoring a Linear Trace
program and appends them to the message sequence Q. At the end of the execution, it traverses
the computation lattice level by level and checks whether the bad state of the monitor can be hit
by any of the runs up to the current level. We next provide the algorithm that the observer uses to
construct the lattice level by level from the sequence of messages Q it receives from the execution
path τ of an instrumented program.
The observer maintains a list of global states (CurrLevel), that are present in the current level of
the lattice. For each message msg in Q, it tries to construct a new global state from the set of states
in the current level and the message msg. If the global state is created successfully, then it is added
to the list of global states (NextLevel) for the next level of the lattice. The process continues until
certain condition, levelComplete?() holds. At that time the observer says that the level is complete
and starts constructing the next level by setting CurrLevel to NextLevel, NextLevel to empty set,
and reallocating the space previously occupied by CurrLevel. Here the predicate levelComplete?() is
crucial for generating only those states in the level that are most likely to occur in other executions,
namely those in the window, or the causality cone, that is described in the next subsection. The
levelComplete? predicate is also discussed and defined in the next subsection. The pseudo-code
for the level-by-level monitoring of the lattice is given in Figure 6.4.
Every global state Σ contains the value of all relevant shared variables in the program, a RVC
LetMon = 〈M,m0, b, ρ〉 be the given monitor;
pgmState(ΣK0) maps each relevant variable to its initial value;
MonStates(ΣK0) = ρ({m0},pgmState(ΣK0));
∀t ∈ T , VR{ΣK0}(t) = 0;
global var CurrLevel = {ΣK0};
global var NextLevel = ∅;
// inputs: Q is the sequence of messages received from the program execution
runObserver(Q)
while Q is not empty
Q = constructLevel(Q);
constructLevel(Q)
for each msg ∈ Q and Σ ∈ CurrLevel
if nextState? (Σ, msg)
NextLevel = NextLevel unionmulti createState(Σ, msg);
if levelComplete? (NextLevel, msg , Q)
Q = removeUselessMessages(CurrLevel , Q);
CurrLevel = NextLevel ;
NextLevel = ∅;
return Q;
nextState? (Σ, msg )
〈t,VR, x, v〉 = msg ;
if (∀t′ 6= t : VR{Σ}(t′) ≥ VR(t′) and VR{Σ}(t) + 1 == VR(t))
return true;
return false;
createState(Σ, msg )
〈t,VR, x, v〉 = msg ;
Σ′ = new copy of Σ;
VR{Σ′}(t) = VR{Σ}(t) + 1;
pgmState(Σ′)[x 7→ v];
MonStates(Σ′) = ρ(MonStates(Σ),pgmState(Σ′));
if b ∈ MonStates(Σ′);
print “property violated”;
return Σ′;
Figure 6.4: Level-by-level Monitoring of a Computation Lattice
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VR{Σ} to represent the latest events from each thread that resulted in that global state. Here
the predicate nextState? (Σ, msg), checks if the event corresponding to the message msg is enabled
in the state Σ. The correctness of the predicate is given by Lemma 22. It says that event e can
generate a consecutive state for a state Σ, if and only if Σ ‘knows’ everything e knows about the
current evolution of the multi-threaded system except for the event e itself. Note that e may know
less than Σ knows with respect to the evolution of other threads in the system, because Σ has
global information.
The procedure createState(Σ, msg), which implements the function δ described in Corollary 19,
creates a new global state Σ′, where Σ′ is a possible consistent global state that can result from
Σ after the relevant event e that generated the message msg. Together with each state Σ in the
lattice, a set of states of the monitor, MonStates(Σ), also needs to be maintained, which keeps
all the states of the monitor in which any of the partial runs ending in Σ can lead to. In the
procedure createState, we set the MonStates of Σ′ with the set of monitor states to which any of
the current states in MonStates(Σ) can transit when the state Σ′ is observed. pgmState(Σ′) returns
the value of all relevant program shared variables in state Σ′, and pgmState(Σ′)[x 7→ v] means that
in pgmState(Σ′) the relevant variable x is updated with the value v. Lemma 21 justifies that RVC
of the state Σ′ is updated properly.
The merging operation nextLevelunionmultiΣ adds the global state Σ to the set nextLevel. If Σ is already
present in nextLevel, it updates the existing state’s MonStates with the union of the existing state’s
MonStates and the Monstates of Σ. Two global states are same if their RVCs are equal.
The procedure removeUselessMessages(CurrLevel,Q) removes from Q all the message that can-
not contribute to the construction of any state at the next level. It creates a RVC VRmin whose
each component is the minimum of the corresponding component of the RVCs of all the global
states in the set CurrLevel. It then removes all the messages in Q whose RVCs are less than or
equal to Vmin . This procedure makes sure that we do not store any unnecessary message. The
correctness of the procedure is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 26. For a given relevant event e, if VR{e} ≤ VRmin , then ∀Σ ∈ CurrLevel , e is not
enabled in Σ.
Proof. If e is enabled in Σ, then by Lemma 22, VR{e}(t) = VC (Σ) + 1, where t is the thread that
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generated e. This implies that if e is enabled in Σ, then VR{e} 6≤ VR{Σ}. Since VR{e} ≤ VRmin
we have ∀Σ ∈ CurrLevel , VR{e} ≤ VR{Σ}. Therefore, e is not enabled in Σ.
The observer runs in a loop till Q is empty. In each iteration of the loop, the procedure
constructLevel is called. The pseudo-code for the observer is given in Figure 6.4.
6.3.3 Causality Cone Heuristic
The number of states on a level in the computation lattice can be exponential in the length of the
trace. Generating all the states in a level may not be feasible due to limited memory. However, note
that some states in a level can be considered more likely to occur in a consistent run than others.
For example, two independent events that can possibly permute may have a huge time difference.
Permuting these two events would give a consistent run, but that run may not be likely to take
place in a real execution of the multi-threaded program. So we can ignore such a permutation. We
formalize this concept as causality cone, or window, and exploit it in restricting our attention to a
small set of states in a given level.
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the messages are received in an order in which they
are generated in the execution. Note that this ordering corresponds to the real execution of the
program, and it respects the partial order associated with the computation. This execution will be
taken as a reference to compute the most probable consistent runs of the system.
If we consider all the messages generated by executing the program as a finite sequence of
messages, then a lattice formed by any prefix of this sequence is a sub-lattice of the computation
lattice L. This sub-lattice, say L′, has the following property: if Σ ∈ L′, then for any Σ′ ∈ L
if Σ′  ∗ Σ, then Σ′ ∈ L′. We can see this sub-lattice as a portion of the computation lattice L
enclosed by a cone. The height of this cone is determined by the length of the prefix of messages.
We call this causality cone. All the states in L that are outside this cone cannot be determined
from the prefix of messages. Therefore, they are outside the causal scope of the sequence of events
corresponding to the messages in the prefix. As we consider longer prefixes, this cone moves down.
If we compute a RVC Vmax , whose each component is the maximum of the corresponding
component of the RVCs of all the messages in the message sequence, then Vmax represents the RVC
of the global state appearing at the tip of the cone. The tip of the cone, by Corollary 24, traverses
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levelComplete? (NextLevel, msg , Q)
if size(NextLevel)≥ w
return true;
else if msg is the last message in Q
return true;
else
return false;
Figure 6.6: levelComplete? Predicate
the actual execution run of the program.
To avoid the generation of a possibly exponential number of states in a given level, we consider
a fixed number, say w, of most probable states in a given level. In a level construction, we say that
the level is complete once we have generated w states in that level. However, a level may contain
less than w states. Then the level construction algorithm gets stuck. To avoid this scenario, we say
that a level is complete if we have used all the messages in the message sequence for the construction
of the states in the current level . The pseudo-code for levelComplete? is given in Figure 6.6.
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Figure 6.7: Causality Cone Heuristics applied to Example 2
Example 27. Figure 6.7 shows the portion of the computation lattice constructed from the multi-
threaded execution in Example 15, when the causality cone heuristics is applied with parameters
w = 2 and l = 3. The possible consistent run Σ00Σ01Σ02Σ03Σ13Σ23Σ33, shown on the left side of
the Figure 6.7, is pruned out by the heuristics. In this particular run the two independent events
e2 and e5 that are permuted have long time difference in the actual execution. Therefore, we can
safely ignore this run among all other possible consistent runs.
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Chapter 7
Implementation and Case Studies
We first describe the details of two tools, which implement of the various testing methods described
so far. We then report several case studies using the tools; these case studies show the applicability
of the methods. In our case studies, we do not consider any formal specification. As such the case
studies do not provide any empirical evaluation of the predictive monitoring technique.
7.1 Implementation
We have developed two automated concolic testing tools: CUTE for testing C programs and jCUTE
for testing Java programs. CUTE only implements concolic testing and works for sequential C pro-
grams. jCUTE implements all three methods—concolic testing, race-detection and flipping, and
predictive monitoring. The tools, CUTE and jCUTE, consist of two main modules: an instrumen-
tation module and a library to perform symbolic execution, to solve constraints, to control thread
schedules, and to perform predictive monitoring. The instrumentation module inserts code in the
program under test so that the instrumented program calls the library at runtime for performing
symbolic execution. The library creates a symbolic heap to symbolically track the shared memory
locations. The library also maintains a symbolic stack for each thread to track the local variables
symbolically. To solve arithmetic inequalities, the constraint solver of both CUTE and jCUTE uses
lp solve [61], a library for integer programming. jCUTE comes with a graphical user interface (a
snapshot can be found in Figure 7.1).
7.1.1 Program Instrumentation
To instrument C code under test, CUTE uses CIL [68], a framework for parsing and transforming
C programs. CUTE saves all the generated inputs in the file-system. Users of CUTE can replay
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Figure 7.1: Snapshot of jCUTE
the program on these recorded inputs to reproduce the bugs. The replay can also be performed
with the aid of a debugger. To instrument Java code under test, jCUTE uses the SOOT compiler
framework [109]. jCUTE performs instrumentation at the bytecode level. For sequential programs,
jCUTE can generate JUnit test cases, which can be used by the user for regression testing as well
as for debugging. For concurrent programs, jCUTE records both the inputs and the schedules
for various execution paths. This enables the user to replay the executions and reproduce bugs.
jCUTE also allows the users to visualize graphically a multithreaded execution.
The instrumentation modules of both the tools first translate a program into the three-address
code that closely follows the syntax given in Figure 3.1. The difference is that an expression e can
also be a function call of the form fun name(v1, . . . , vn). After the simplification, the instrumen-
tation module inserts instrumentation code throughout the simplified code for concolic execution
at runtime. Figure 7.1 shows examples of the code that the instrumentation module adds during
instrumentation for function calls and function definitions. The procedure push(&v) pushes the
symbolic expression for the address &v to a symbolic stack used for passing symbolic arguments
during function calls. The reverse procedure pop(&v) pops a symbolic expression from the symbolic
95
Before Instrumentation After Instrumentation
// function call push(&v1); . . . ; push(&vn);
v = f(v1, . . . , vn); v = f(v1, . . . , vn);
pop(&v);
// function def Tf(T1 x1, . . . , Tn xn) {
Tf(T1 x1, . . . , Tn xn) { pop(&x1); . . . ; pop(&xn);
B; // body B;
return v; } push(&v);
return v; }
Table 7.1: Code that the Instrumentation Module Adds for Functions.
stack and assigns it to the address &v.
A difference between CUTE or jCUTE and traditional symbolic execution is that CUTE or
jCUTE does not require instrumentation of the whole program. Calls to uninstrumented functions
proceed only with the concrete execution, without symoblic execution. This allows CUTE or
jCUTE to handle programs that use binary and native libraries whose source code or bytecode are
not available.
7.1.2 Utility Functions
The CUTE toolkit provides two commands, cutec and cute, for code instrumentation and running
of the instrumented code. The toolkit also provides four macros that give the user additional control
over the instrumentation.
The command cutec expects a set of C files and a toplevel function; cutec instruments the C
files and compiles the instrumented files with a C compiler. cutec assumes that the program starts
by calling the toplevel function and that the input to the program consists of the memory graph
reachable from the arguments passed to the toplevel function. cutec generates a main function
that first initializes the input for the toplevel function and the symbolic state, and then calls the
instrumented toplevel function with the generated input. At the end of the execution of the toplevel
function, main calls the constraint solver to generate input for the next execution and stores the
input in a file.
The command cute takes the executable generated by cutec and executes it iteratively until
an error is found or full branch coverage is attained or a depth-first search completes. If an error
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is found, cute invokes a debugger for the user to replay the erroneous execution.
The CUTE library provides the following macros that the user can insert into the C code under
test:
1) CUTE input(x) allows the user to specify that the variable x (of any type, including a pointer) is
an input, besides the arguments of the toplevel function. This comes handy to replace any external
user input, e.g., scanf(‘‘%d’’,&v) by CUTE input(v) (which also assigns value to &v).
2) CUTE input array(p,size). This macro is similar to CUTE input except that it assumes that
p is a pointer and specifies that p points to an array of size size.
3) CUTE assume(pred), where pred is some C predicate. This macro allows the execution to
proceed if the pred holds. This way we can restrict the input, e.g., the predicate can be a repOk()
call for some data structure.
4) CUTE assert(pred). This macro specifies an assertion whose violation is considered an error.
Similar commands and functions are also provided by jCUTE.
7.2 Experimental Evaluation
We illustrate six case studies, which show how CUTE and jCUTE can detect errors. In the first
two case studies, we use CUTE for testing. In the rest of the case studies, we use jCUTE. The
tool and the code for each case study can be found at http://osl.cs.uiuc.edu/~ksen/cute/.
We ran the first two case studies on a Linux machine with a dual 1.7 GHz Intel Xeon processor.
The rest of the case studies were run on a 2.0 GHz Pentium M processor laptop with 1 GB RAM
running Windows XP.
7.2.1 Data Structures of CUTE
We applied CUTE to test its own data structures. CUTE uses a number of non-standard data
structures at runtime, such as cu linear to represent linear expressions, cu pointer to represent
pointer expressions, cu depend to represent dependency graphs for path constraints etc. Our goal
in this case study was to detect memory leaks in addition to standard errors such as segmentation
faults, assertion violation etc. To that end, we used CUTE in conjunction with valgrind [108]. We
discovered a few memory leaks and a couple of segmentation faults that did not show up in other
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uses of CUTE. This case study is interesting in that we applied CUTE to partly unit test itself and
discovered bugs. We briefly describe our experience with testing the cu linear data structure.
We tested the cu linear module of CUTE in the depth-first search mode of CUTE along with
valgrind. In 537 iterations, CUTE found a memory leak. The following is a snippet of the function
cu linear add relevant for the memory leak:
cu_linear *
cu_linear_add(cu_linear *c1, cu_linear *c2, int add) {
int i, j;
cu_linear* ret=(cu_linear*)malloc(sizeof(cu_linear));
. . . // skipped 18 lines of code
if(ret->count==0) return NULL;
If the sum of the two linear expressions passed as arguments becomes constant, the func-
tion returns NULL without freeing the memory allocated for the local variable ret. CUTE
constructed this scenario automatically at the time of testing. Specifically, CUTE con-
structed the sequence of function calls l1=cu linear create(0); l1=cu linear create(0);
l1=cu linear negate(l1); l1=cu linear add(l1,l2,1); that exposes the memory leak that
valgrind detects.
7.2.2 SGLIB Library
We also applied CUTE to unit test SGLIB [102] version 1.0.1, a popular, open-source C library
for generic data structures. The library has been extensively used to implement the commercial
tool Xrefactory. SGLIB consists of a single C header file, sglib.h, with about 2000 lines of code
consisting only of C macros. This file provides generic implementation of most common algorithms
for arrays, lists, sorted lists, doubly linked lists, hash tables, and red-black trees. Using the SGLIB
macros, a user can declare and define various operations on data structures of parametric types.
The library and its sample examples provide verifier functions (can be used as repOk) for each
data structure except for hash tables. We used these verifier functions to test the library using
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the technique of repOk mentioned in Section 4.2. For hash tables, we invoked a sequence of its
function. We used CUTE with bounded depth-first search strategy with bound 50. Figure 7.2
shows the results of our experiments.
We chose SGLIB as a case study primarily to measure the efficiency of CUTE. As SGLIB is
widely used, we did not expect to find bugs. Much to our surprise, we found two bugs in SGLIB
using CUTE.
The first bug is a segmentation fault that occurs in the doubly-linked-list library when a non-
zero length list is concatenated with another zero-length list. CUTE discovered the bug in 140
iterations (about 1 seconds) in the bounded depth-first search mode. This bug is easy to fix by
putting a check on the length of the second list in the concatenation function.
The second bug, which is a more serious one, was found by CUTE in the hash table library
in 193 iterations (in 1 second). Specifically, CUTE constructed the following valid sequence of
function calls which gets the library into an infinite loop:
typedef struct ilist { int i; struct ilist *next; } ilist;
ilist *htab[10];
main() {
struct ilist *e,*e1,*e2,*m;
sglib_hashed_ilist_init(htab);
e=(ilist *)malloc(sizeof(ilist)); e->next = 0; e->i=0;
sglib_hashed_ilist_add_if_not_member(htab,e,&m);
sglib_hashed_ilist_add(htab,e);
e2=(ilist *)malloc(sizeof(ilist)); e2->next = 0; e2->i=0;
sglib_hashed_ilist_is_member(htab,e2); }
where ilist is a struct representing an element of the hash table. We reported these bugs to the
SGLIB developers, who confirmed that these are indeed bugs.
Figure 7.2 shows the results for testing SGLIB 1.0.1 with the bounded depth-first strategy. For
each data structure and array sorting algorithm that SGLIB implements, we tabulate the time
that CUTE took to test the data structure, the number of runs that CUTE made, the number of
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Name Run time # of # of Branches % Branch # of Functions OPT 1 OPT 2 # of
in seconds Iterations Explored Coverage Tested in % & 3 in % Bugs
Array Quick Sort 2 732 43 97.73 2 67.80 49.13 0
Array Heap Sort 4 1764 36 100.00 2 71.10 46.38 0
Linked List 2 570 100 96.15 12 86.93 88.09 0
Sorted List 2 1020 110 96.49 11 88.86 80.85 0
Doubly Linked List 3 1317 224 99.12 17 86.95 79.38 1
Hash Table 1 193 46 85.19 8 97.01 52.94 1
Red Black Tree 2629 1,000,000 242 71.18 17 89.65 64.93 0
Table 7.2: Results for Testing SGLIB 1.0.1 with Bounded Depth-First Strategy with Depth 50
branches it executed, branch coverage obtained, the number of functions executed, the benefit of
optimizations, and the number of bugs found.
The branch coverage in most cases is less than 100%. After investigating the reason for this, we
found that the code contains a number of assert statements that were never violated and a number
of predicates that are redundant and can be removed from the conditionals.
The last two columns in Figure 7.2 show the benefit of the three optimizations from Section 4.1.5.
The column OPT 1 gives the average percentage of executions in which the fast unsatisfiability
check was successful. It is important to note that the saving in the number of satisfiability checks
translates into an even higher relative saving in the satisfiability-checking time because lp solve
takes much more time (exponential in number of constraints) to determine that a set of constraints
is unsatisfiable than to generate a solution when one exists. For example, for red-black trees and
depth-first search, OPT 1 was successful in almost 90% of executions, which means that OPT 1
reduces the number of calls to lp solve an order of magnitude. However, OPT 1 reduces the
solving time of lp solve more than two orders of magnitude in this case; in other words, it would
be infeasible to run CUTE without OPT 1. The column OPT 2 & 3 gives the average percentage of
constraints that CUTE eliminated in each execution due to common sub-expression elimination and
incremental solving optimizations. Yet again, this reduction in the size of constraint set translates
into a much higher relative reduction in the solving time.
7.2.3 Java 1.4 Collection Library
We used jCUTE to test the thread-safe Collection framework implemented as part of the java.util
package of the standard Java library provided by Sun Microsystems. A number of data structures
provided by the package java.util are claimed as thread-safe in the Java API documentation.
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This implies that the library should provide the ability to safely manipulate multiple objects of
these data structures simultaneously in multiple threads. No explicit locking of the objects should
be required to safely manipulate the objects. More specifically, multiple invocation of methods on
the objects of these data structures by multiple threads must be equivalent to a sequence of serial
invocation of the same methods on the same objects by a single thread.
We chose this library as a case study primarily to evaluate the effectiveness of our jCUTE tool.
As Sun Microsystems’ Java is widely used, we did not expect to find potential bugs. Much to our
surprise, we found several previously undocumented data races, deadlocks, uncaught exceptions,
and an infinite loop in the library. Note that, although the number of potential bugs is high, these
bugs are all caused by a couple of problematic design patterns used in the implementation.
Experimental Setup The java.util provides a set of classes implementing thread-safe Col-
lection data structures. A few of them are ArrayList, LinkedList, Vector, HashSet, LinkedHash-
Set, TreeSet, HashMap, TreeMap, etc. The Vector class is synchronized by implementation. For
the other classes, one needs to call the static functions such as Collections.synchronizedList,
Collections.synchronizedSet, etc., to get a synchronized or thread-safe object backed by a non-
synchronized object of the class. To setup the testing process we wrote a multithreaded test driver
for each such thread-safe class. The test driver starts by creating two empty objects of the class.
The test driver also creates and starts a set of threads, where each thread executes a different
method of either of the two objects concurrently. The invocation of the methods strictly follows
the contract provided in the Java API documentation. We created two objects because some of
the methods, such as containsAll, takes as an argument an object of the same type. For such
methods, we call the method on one object and pass the other object as an argument. Note that
more sophisticated test drivers can be written. A simplified skeleton of the test-driver that we used
is given below:
public class MTListTest extends Thread {
List s1,s2;
public MTListTest(List s1, List s2) {
this.s1 = s1; this.s2 = s2; }
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public void run() {
int c = Cute.input.Integer();
Object o1 = (Object)Cute.input.Object("java.lang.Object");
switch(c){
case 0: s1.add(o1); break;
case 1: s1.addAll(s2); break;
case 2: s1.clear(); break;
.
.} }
public static void main(String[] args) {
List s1 = Collections.synchronizedList(new LinkedList());
List s2 = Collections.synchronizedList(new LinkedList());
(new MTListTest(s1,s2)).start();
(new MTListTest(s2,s1)).start();
(new MTListTest(s1,s2)).start();
(new MTListTest(s2,s1)).start();}
}
The arguments to the different methods are provided as input to the program. If a class is
thread-safe, then there should be no error if the test-driver is executed with any possible interleav-
ing of the threads and any input. However, jCUTE discovered data races, deadlocks, uncaught
exceptions, and an infinite loop in these classes. Note that in each case jCUTE found no such error
if methods are invoked in a single thread. As such the bugs detected in the Java Collection library
are concurrency related.
The summary of the results is given in the Table 7.3. Here we briefly describe an infinite loop
and a data race leading to an exception that jCUTE discovered in the synchronized LinkedList
class and the synchronized ArrayList class, respectively.
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We present a simple scenario under which the infinite loop happens. The test driver first creates
two synchronized linked lists by calling
List l1 = Collections.synchronizedList(new LinkedList());
List l2 = Collections.synchronizedList(new LinkedList());
l1.add(null);
l2.add(null);
The test driver then concurrently allows a new thread to invoke l1.clear() and another new
thread to invoke l2.containsAll(l1). jCUTE discovered an interleaving of the two threads that
resulted in an infinite loop. However, the program never goes into infinite loop if the methods
are invoked in any order by a single thread. jCUTE also provided a trace of the buggy execution.
This helped us to detect the cause of the bug. The cause of the bug is as follows. The method
containsAll holds the lock on l2 throughout its execution. However, it acquires the lock on l1
whenever it calls a method of l1. The method clear always holds the lock on l1. In the trace,
we found that the first thread executes the statements
modCount++;
header.next = header.previous = header;
of the method l1.clear() and then there is a context switch before the execution of the statement
size=0; by the first thread. The other thread starts executing the method containsAll by
initializing an iterator on l1 without holding a lock on l1. Since the field size of l1 is not set
to 0, the iterator assumes that l1 still has one element. The iterator consumes the element and
increments the field nextIndex to 1. Then a context switch occurs and the first thread sets size of
l1 to 0 and completes its execution. Then the other thread starts looping over the iterator. In each
iteration nextIndex is incremented. The iteration continues if the method hasNext of the iterator
returns true. Unfortunately, the method hasNext performs the check nextIndex != size; rather
than checking nextIndex < size;. Since size is 0 and nextIndex is greater than 0, hasNext
always returns true and hence the loop never terminates. The bug can be avoided if containsAll
holds lock on both l1 and l2 throughout its execution. It can also be avoided if containsAll uses
the synchronized method toArray as in the Vector class, rather than using iterators. Moreover,
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Name Run time # of # of % Branch # of Functions # of Bugs Found
in seconds Paths Threads Coverage Tested data races/deadlocks/
infinite loops/exceptions
Vector 5519 20000 5 76.38 16 1/9/0/2
ArrayList 6811 20000 5 75 16 3/9/0/3
LinkedList 4401 11523 5 82.05 15 3/3/1/1
LinkedHashSet 7303 20000 5 67.39 20 3/9/0/2
TreeSet 7333 20000 5 54.93 26 4/9/0/2
HashSet 7449 20000 5 69.56 20 19/9/0/2
Table 7.3: Results for Testing Synchronized Collection Classes of JDK 1.4
the statement nextIndex != size; should be changed to nextIndex < size; in the method
hasNext. Note that this infinite loop should not be confused with the infinite loop in the following
wrongly coded sequential program commonly found in the literature.
List l = new LinkedList(); l.add(l); System.out.println(l);
We next present a simple scenario under which jCUTE found a data race leading to an uncaught
exception in the class ArrayList. The test driver first creates two synchronized array lists by calling
List l1 = Collections.synchronizedList(new ArrayList());
List l2 = Collections.synchronizedList(new ArrayList());
l1.add(new Object());
l2.add(new Object());
The test driver then concurrently allows a new thread to invoke l1.add(new Object())
and another new thread to invoke l2.containsAll(l1). During testing, jCUTE discov-
ered data races over the fields size and modCount of the class ArrayList. In a subse-
quent execution, jCUTE permuted the events involved in a data race and discovered an un-
caught ConcurrentModificationException exception. However, the program never throws the
ConcurrentModificationException exception if the methods are invoked in any order by a single
thread. Note that the Java API documentation claims that there should be no such data race or
uncaught ConcurrentModificationException exception when we use synchronized form of array
list. jCUTE also provided a trace of the buggy execution. This helped us to detect the cause of
the bug. It is worth mentioning that jCUTE not only detects actual races, but also flips to see if
the data race can be fatal, i.e., that it can lead to uncaught exceptions.
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7.2.4 NASA’s Java Pathfinder’s Case Studies
In [75], several case studies have been carried out using Java PathFinder and Bandera. These case
studies involve several small to medium-sized multithreaded Java programs; thus they provide a
good suite to evaluate jCUTE. The programs include RemoteAgent, a Java version of a component
of an embedded spacecraft-control application, Pipeline, a framework for implementing multi-
threaded staged calculations, RWVSN, Doug Lea’s framework for reader writer synchronization,
DEOS, a Java version of the scheduler from a real-time executive for avionics systems, Bound-
edBuffer, a Java implementation of multithreaded bounded buffer, NestedMonitor, a semaphore
based implementation of bounded buffer, and ReplicatedWorkers, a parameterizable job sched-
uler. Details about these programs can be found in [75]. We also considered a distributed sorting
implementation used in [53]. This implementation involves both concurrency and complex data
inputs.
We used jCUTE to test these programs. Since most of these programs are designed to run in
an infinite loop, we bounded our search to a finite depth. jCUTE discovered known concurrency
related errors in RemoteAgent, DEOS, BoundedBuffer, NestedMonitor, and the distributed sorting
implementation and seeded bugs in Pipeline, RWVSN, and ReplicatedWorkers. The summary of
the results is given in the Table 7.4. In each case, we stopped at the first error. Note the although
the running time of our experiments is many times smaller than that in [75, 53], we are also using
a much faster machine.
It is worth mentioning that we tested the un-abstracted version of these programs rather than
requiring a programmer to manually provide abstract interpretations as in [75]. This is possible
with jCUTE because jCUTE tries to explore distinct paths of a program rather than exploring
distinct states. Obviously, this means that we cannot prove a program correct if the program has
infinite length paths. Java PathFinder and Bandera can verify a program in such cases if the state
space of the abstracted program is finite.
7.2.5 Needham-Schroeder Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol [77] aims at providing mutual authen-
tication through message exchanges between two parties: an initiator and a responder ; details of
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Name Run time # of # of % Branch Lines # of Bugs Found
in seconds Paths Threads Coverage of Code data races/deadlocks/assertions/exceptions
BoundedBuffer 11.41 43 9 100.0 127 0/1/0/0
NestedMonitor 0.46 2 3 100.0 214 0/1/0/0
Pipeline 0.70 3 5 64.29 103 1/0/1/0
RemoteAgent 0.45 2 3 87.5 55 1/1/0/0
RWVSN 2.19 8 5 68.18 590 1/0/1/0
ReplicatedWorkers 0.34 1 5 25.93 954 0/0/1/0
DEOS 35.23 111 6 64.75 1443 0/0/1/0
Table 7.4: Java PathFinder’s Case Studies (un-abstracted)
the protocol can be found elsewhere [77]. Lowe reported an attack against the original protocol
and also proposed a fix, called Lowe’s fix [36].
We tested a concurrent implementation of the protocol using jCUTE. jCUTE found the attack
in 406 iterations or about 95 seconds of search.
We compare these results with the ones reported previously [40, 41] for the same protocol. The
explicit-state C model-checker VeriSoft [40] analyzed a concurrent implementation of the protocol
with finite input domain. Verisoft was unable to find the attack within 8 hours, evolutionary
testing (with manual tuning) found the attack after 50 minutes (on a somewhat slower machine).
DART [41] found the attack on a sequential implementation of the protocol with a somewhat
stronger intruder model1 in 18 minutes. In comparison, jCUTE found the attack on a concurrent
implementation of the protocol with a proper intruder model in only 95 seconds, which is an order
of magnitude faster than the fastest previous approach. This performance difference is due to
jCUTE’s efficient algorithm that only explores distinct causal structures.
7.2.6 TMN Protocol
The Tatebayashi, Matsuzaki, and Newman (TMN) Protocol [107] is a protocol for distribution of
a fresh symmetric key. In this protocol when an initiator wants to communicate with a responder,
it uses a trusted server to obtain a secret symmetric session key. The details of the protocol can
be found in [107].
In this protocol, an intruder can establish a parallel session through eavesdropping and obtain
the secret key [60]. We tested a concurrent implementation of the protocol using jCUTE. jCUTE
found the attack in 522 iterations or about 127 seconds of search.
1Note that a stronger intruder model makes it easier for the intruder to find an attack. This in turn makes the
search space smaller resulting in faster testing time.
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Chapter 8
Related Work
We briefly describe the related work and compare it to the work presented in this dissertation.
The body of related work may be loosely classified into three broad categories: testing sequential
programs, testing concurrent programs, and runtime verification.
8.1 Testing Sequential Programs
Automated testing is an active area of research. In the last five years, over a dozen of techniques
and tools have been proposed that automatically increase test coverage or generate test inputs.
The simplest, and yet often very effective, techniques use random generation of (concrete) test
inputs [15, 70, 35, 24, 72]. Some recent tools use bounded-exhaustive concrete execution [117, 42,
16]; such testing tries all values from user-provided domains. These tools can achieve high code
coverage, especially for testing data structure implementation. However, they require the user to
carefully choose the values in the domains to ensure the high coverage.
Tools based on symbolic execution use a variety of approaches; in our view, the most relevant of
these are abstraction-based model checking [10, 14], explicit-state model checking [115], symbolic-
sequence exploration [118, 73], and static analysis [25]—to detect (potential) bugs or generate test
inputs. These tools inherit the incompleteness of their underlying reasoning engines such as theorem
provers and constraint solvers. For example, tools using precise symbolic execution [115, 118] cannot
analyze any code that would build constraints out of pre-specified theories, e.g., any code with non-
linear arithmetic or array indexing with non-constant expressions. As another example, tools based
on predicate abstraction [10, 14] do not handle code that depends on complex data structures. In
these tools, the symbolic execution proceeds separately from the concrete execution (or constraint
solving).
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Cadar and Engler propose Execution Generated Testing (EGT) [18], an approach similar to
CUTE: EGT explores different execution paths using a combined symbolic and concrete execution.
However, EGT does not consider inputs that are memory graphs or code that has preconditions.
Also, EGT and CUTE differ in how they approximate symbolic expressions with concrete values.
EGT follows a more traditional approach to symbolic execution and proposes an interesting method
that lazily solves the path constraints: EGT starts with only symbolic inputs and tries to execute
the code fully symbolically, but if it cannot do so, EGT solves the current constraints to generate
a (partial) concrete input with which the execution proceeds.
CUTE is also related to some methods which use backtracking to generate a test input that
executes one given path (e.g., a path that may be known to contain a bug) [56, 46]. However,
in contrast to these methods, CUTE attempts to cover all feasible paths, in a style similar to
systematic testing. Moreover, the prior work did not address inputs that are memory graphs.
Visvanathan and Gupta [116] proposed a technique that generates memory graphs. They also use
a specialized symbolic execution (not the exact execution with symbolic arrays) and develop a
solver for their constraints. However, they consider one given path, do not consider unknown code
segments (e.g., library functions), and do not use a combined concrete execution to generate new
test inputs. Moreover, in our case the constraint solving is incremental.
8.2 Testing Concurrent Programs
Improving the reliability of concurrent programs is a challenging area of research. A major cause for
defects in multithreaded programs is race conditions. A large body of research focuses on dynamic
or static race detection [78, 69, 33, 82, 21, 26]. Race detection suffers from the problem of false
warnings. Moreover, the dynamic techniques can report all possible race conditions only if there
are good test inputs that can achieve high code coverage. Our algorithm not only detects races but
also permutes them systematically to search if the races can lead to some bug. Moreover, jCUTE
generates test inputs so that the number of races caught is maximized.
Bruening [17] first proposed a technique for dynamic partial order reduction, called ExitBlock-
RW algorithm, to systematically test multithreaded programs. These technique uses two sets,
delayed set and enabled set, similar to the sets postponed and Tenabled in our algorithm, to enumerate
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t1:
1: x = 1;
t2:
2: y = 4;
t3:
3: x = 2;
Figure 8.1: A Three-Threaded Program
meaningful schedules by re-ordering dependent atomic blocks. However, this assume that the
program under test follows a consistent mutual-exclusion discipline using locks. The dynamic
partial order reduction technique proposed by Carver and Lei [19] guarantees that exactly one
interleaving for each partial order is explored. However, their approach involves storing schedules
that have not been yet explored; this can become a memory bottleneck.
More recently, dynamic partial order reduction proposed by Flanagan and Godefroid [34] re-
moves the memory bottleneck in [19] at the cost of possibly exploring more than one interleav-
ing for each partial order. This technique uses dynamically constructed persistent sets and sleep
sets [38] to prune the search space. The key difference between the DPOR algorithm in [34]
and our race-detection and flipping algorithm is that,for every choice point, the DPOR algorithm
in [34] uses a persistent set and we use a postponed set. These two sets can be different at a
choice point. For example, for the 3-threaded program in Figure 8.1, if the first execution path is
(t1, 1,w)(t2, 2,w)(t3, 3,w), then at the first choice point denoting the initial state of the program,
the persistent set is {t1, t3}; whereas, at the same choice point, the postponed set is {t1}. (Apart
from scheduling the thread t1, the race-detection and flipping algorithm also schedules the thread t2
at the first choice point.) Note that the DPOR algorithm in [34] picks the elements of a persistent
set by using a complex forward lookup algorithm. In contrast, we simply put the current scheduled
thread to the postponed set at a choice point.
Moreover, the implementation in [34] considers two read accesses to the same memory location
by different threads to be dependent. Thus for the 3-threaded program in Figure 8.2, the imple-
mentation described in [34] would explore six interleavings. We remove the redundancy associated
with this assumption by using a more general notion of race and its detection using dynamic vector
clock algorithm. As such, for the above example, we will explore only one interleaving. Note that
none of the previous descriptions of the above dynamic partial order reduction techniques have
handled programs which have inputs.
In a similar independent work [103], Siegel et al. use a combination of symbolic execution and
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t1:
1: lv1 = x;
t2:
2: lv2 = x;
t3:
3: if (x > 0)
4: ERROR;
Figure 8.2: Another Three-Threaded Program
static partial order reduction to check if a parallel numerical program is equivalent to a simpler
sequential version of the program. Thus this work can also be seen as a way of combining symbolic
execution with partial order reduction based model checking techniques for the purpose of testing
parallel programs. However, their work deals with symbolic execution of numerical programs with
floating points, rather than programs with pointers and data-structures. Therefore, static partial
order reduction proves effective in their approach.
Model checking tools [106, 23, 29] based on static analysis have been developed. These tools
are useful in detecting bugs in concurrent programs. These tools also employ (static) partial order
reduction techniques to reduce search space. The partial order reduction depends on detection of
thread-local memory locations and patterns of lock acquisition and release. Because of the use
of static analysis, the methods can result in false warnings. However, despite encouraging recent
successes in software model checking for larger systems, there is little hope that one can actually
prove the correctness of large concurrent systems, and one must in those cases still rely on debugging
and testing.
8.3 Runtime Verification
There has been considerable interest in runtime verification techniques in recent years, as perhaps
best shown by the series of workshops [1]. Runtime verification can be simplistically viewed as a
rigorous approach to testing, in which the requirements specifications use some underlying logical,
typically temporal [62, 63], formalism. The same algorithms used to detect errors during testing can
be used to trigger recovery actions at runtime, so runtime verification techniques are frequently
applied in monitoring. Runtime verification has so far been concerned with analyzing software
systems, essentially as a complementary approach to model checking software systems [11, 39, 48,
114, 52, 23, 74, 106]. We briefly review some of the techniques for runtime verification below. Note
that these techniques may also possibly be combined with our method for predictive monitoring.
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NASA’s runtime verification system Java PathExplorer (JPaX) [49] and its sub-system Eagle [13]
has already been used to analyze the K9 Mars Rover [7]. Eagle has also been used to find security
attacks in DARPA logs [67]. Temporal Rover and DBRover [27, 28] are commercial runtime
verification tools. The MaC tool [59, 54] is a runtime monitoring tool with a specialized formal
monitoring specification language with the potential for steering the execution of programs at
runtime. A technique is proposed in [57] where the execution events are stored in an SQL database
at runtime and then analyzed by means of queries after the program terminates. The PET tool,
described in [45, 44, 43], uses a future time temporal logic formula to guide the execution of a
program for debugging purposes. POTA and Java MultiPathExplorer [83, 90, 92, 97] are tools
which check safety formulae against a partial order extracted online from an execution trace.
Efficient decentralized monitoring of message passing distributed systems is proposed in [95, 96].
Java-MoP [20] proposes the use of monitoring as a programming paradigm. Complexity results for
testing a finite trace against temporal formulae expressed in different logics are investigated in [64].
Algorithms using alternating automata to monitor temporal properties are proposed in [32], and
a specialized collecting statistics technique along the execution trace is described in [31]. Various
algorithms to generate testing automata from temporal logic formulae are discussed in [79, 71], and
[37] presents a Bu¨chi automata inspired algorithm.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
With the increasing use of software in society, we want software to be reliable, safe, secure, and
robust. Unfortunately, as experience in industry has shown, developing large reliable software is a
hard task. As such more than half of the total software development cost is spent in testing. Even
after such a huge investment, serious bugs and security flaws are common in widely-used software.
We believe this is because the most widely used method for improving software quality—testing—is
generally done manually and in ad hoc ways. Automated and rigorous methods are rarely used for
testing because such methods are hardly effective or scalable. In this dissertation, we developed
a family of methods of automated testing, which we believe can improve testing and make it
more systematic and scalable. Our methods use ideas from formal methods, constraint solving,
theory of concurrency, dynamic program analysis, and model checking and apply them to build
effective testing methods which exploit the full computational power of modern day computers in
the testing process. The net result is that we are able to make testing systematic and automated.
We summarize the contributions of this dissertation in the next section, and discuss issues and
open problems in the final section.
9.1 Summary
We presented concolic testing, a method to explore different paths in programs by coupling concrete
and symbolic executions in a cooperative way. Concrete execution enables symbolic execution to
mitigate the effects of the incompleteness of the underlying reasoning engines; for example, concrete
execution helps resolve the constraints that theorem provers cannot handle, resolve aliases for
pointers (using concrete values for pointers), handle arrays and pointers (our technique requires no
static alias analysis) etc. On the other hand, symbolic execution (along with constraint solving at
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the end of execution) helps generate concrete inputs that lead the program to a different concrete
execution, thus increasing coverage. We showed that constraint solving for concolic testing can be
done in an incremental way, which makes test input generation highly efficient. We described how
to efficiently generate dynamic data structures by incrementally adding or removing a node, or by
aliasing two pointers.
Concolic testing works only for sequential programs. Testing becomes notoriously hard for large
concurrent software due to the inherent non-determinism in the execution of such software. We
extended the concolic testing approach to develop a method for testing concurrent programs. The
extended method uses the concrete execution of concolic testing to determine an abstract relation,
called causality relation, between the events in a concurrent execution. This causality relation
naturally defines an equivalence relation between the execution paths of a concurrent program. We
provide a technique for exploring at least one candidate from each equivalence class of execution
paths of a concurrent program with complex data inputs; this improves the efficiency of testing con-
current programs considerably. In addition to common errors such as assertion violations, memory
leaks, uncaught exceptions, and segmentation faults, our testing approach can catch concurrency
related errors such as data races and deadlocks. Because our testing approach is designed to explore
execution paths of a concurrent program, we term our approach Explicit Path Model Checking.
In other research [84], we have developed a method that extend concolic testing to test message
passing distributed systems or actor systems [3, 5]. In this method, we assume that a program
consists of a number of asynchronously executing concurrent processes or actors, which may take
data inputs and communicate using asynchronous messages. Because of the large numbers of
possible data inputs as well as the asynchrony in the execution and communication, distributed
programs exhibit very large numbers of potential behaviors. As in the race-detection and flipping
algorithm, our method uses simultaneous concrete and symbolic execution, or concolic execution,
to explore all distinct behaviors that may result from a program’s execution given different data
inputs and schedules. The key idea is as follows. We use the symbolic execution to generate data
inputs that may lead to alternate behaviors. At the same time, we use the concrete execution to
determine, at runtime, the partial order of events in the program’s execution. This enables us to
improve the efficiency of our algorithm by avoiding many tests which would result in equivalent
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behaviors. We have implemented this method in jCUTE. In order to keep the dissertation concise
and coherent, we did not include a description this method.
Shared memory systems can be modeled as asynchronous message passing systems by associat-
ing a thread with every memory location. Reads and writes of a memory location can be modeled as
asynchronous messages to the thread associated with the memory location. However, this particular
model would treat both reads and writes similarly. Hence, the algorithm in [84] would explore many
redundant executions. For example, for the 2-threaded program t1 : x = 1;x = 2; t2 : y = 3;x = 4;,
the algorithm in [84] would explore six interleavings. Our race-detection and flipping algorithm,
which assumes that two reads are not in race, would explore only three interleavings of the program.
We observed that concolic testing can miss bugs if we test concurrent multi-threaded programs
against a formal specification. In particular we showed that exploring only one candidate execution
path from each equivalence class is not sufficient for catching violations of temporal properties; a
temporal property may be simultaneously satisfied and violated by two different causally equiv-
alent execution paths. To solve this problem, we proposed a testing method based on predictive
monitoring of concurrent programs. In this technique, from an observed execution path, we stati-
cally generate all the causally equivalent execution paths and represent such paths compactly in an
abstract model called computation lattice. We showed that monitoring of temporal properties can
be done efficiently using this model. Using this technique, we can predict violations of properties in
non-observed execution paths without re-executing the program; therefore, we call this technique
predictive monitoring. It is important to note that, although predictive monitoring can predict and
monitor all execution paths that are causally equivalent to an observed execution path, we still
need concolic testing along with race-detection and flipping to explore all non-equivalent execution
paths.
Based on these methods we have developed tools for testing C and Java programs. The binaries
of these tool have been made available to researchers. These tools serve as a core engine to effectively
explore non-equivalent execution paths of a programs. One application of this basic functionality
is unit testing, which is provided as a feature in these tools. However, the possibilities of applying
these tools are endless. The basic path exploration feature of these tools can also be used to
generate regression test suites, to detect likely program invariants, to carryout simulations, for
114
stress testing, and as a part of other dynamic analysis methods.
9.2 Discussion
We presented a set of methods to effectively test shared-memory multi-threaded programs. Al-
though the methods are quite effective in finding bugs in real-world programs, a number of ques-
tions are often raised about these methods. Next we try to address these questions. Our goal is to
clarify the applicability and the limitations of our methods, as well as to describe open problems.
9.2.1 Scalability
A question that is often asked is how scalable our methods are. First, let us discuss the scalability
of CUTE. Our experience shows that scalability in terms of memory usage is not a problem for
CUTE because we explore one path at a time. During a concolic execution along a path, extra
memory is consumed to maintain the symbolic state and the symbolic path constraint. It is often
the case that a small fraction of the concrete state of a program is data dependent on the inputs.
Therefore, the size of the symbolic state, which is almost proportional to the size of the part of the
concrete state that is data dependent on the inputs, usually remains small. Moreover, along an
execution path, the number of conditionals that are data dependent on the inputs are often small.
This results in low memory usage for the maintenance of path constraint. Note that in the case
of model checking, the tools tend to keep the entire state space in the memory and memory often
becomes a bottleneck.
Obviously, the number of paths of a large program can be huge. Exploration of huge number of
paths may take a lot of time. We call this the path explosion problem. If we put a time limit on the
process of testing for a program having a huge number of paths, a depth-first search strategy often
ends up in exploring a small subtree of the whole computation tree. As a result concolic testing
gets localized to a small part of the computation tree. A way to address this problem would be to
develop better search strategies. We describe a couple of candidate search strategies and discuss
their pros and cons.
One possible search strategy is random search where a constraint to be solved is picked randomly
from the set of constraints generated along a path. We believe that this strategy would tend
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to sample the paths in the computation tree uniformly—thus, preventing the search from being
localized to a small subtree. Obviously a limitation of the random search strategy is that concolic
testing may end up exploring same path more than once. Moreover, unlike a depth-first search
strategy, a random search strategy has no way to determine if it has explored the entire computation
tree. Therefore, even for a small program, for which we can solve any generated path constraint,
with random testing we have no way to prove that we have explored all the reachable statements
of the program.
Another possible search strategy that prevents the search from getting localized is a breadth-first
search strategy. Unfortunately, in the case of a breadth-first search strategy, for each depth of a
tree, we have to store an input for each execution path passing through all the nodes at the depth
in the tree. Since the number of nodes at a depth can be, in the worst case, equal to the number
of the feasible execution paths of a program, the amount of storage required for storing the inputs
for each path in a large programs may easily exhaust available persistent memory.
Developing interesting and efficient search strategies requires further investigation. Apart from
investigating new efficient search strategies, one can also think of combining static analyses with
concolic testing. Using static analyses, one can identify the subtrees in the whole computation tree
that are problematic; one can then use concolic testing to explore only those subtrees. We believe
that static analyses can help to prune the path space more aggressively.
Now let us turn to the scalability of jCUTE. In case of shared-memory multi-threaded programs
that jCUTE deals with, a large number of accesses to the shared memory by various threads may
result in a large number of non-equivalent execution paths. As a result jCUTE may not scale for
such programs in principle. However, in practice, we observed that for ‘well-written’ programs
(see [98]) an execution path often consists of large execution blocks that are atomic. The execution
of such atomic blocks by a thread does not interfere with the execution of the other threads. A
common way to ensure such atomicity is through the use of locks. During the process of testing such
well-written programs, jCUTE ends up exploring the execution paths that are the interleavings of
these large atomic blocks. As such jCUTE prunes a large portion of the path space. Obviously,
such kind of pruning is not possible for programs in which multiple threads often access the shared
memory without synchronization. Therefore, for the purpose of effective testing, one should avoid
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such bad programming styles.
Apart from the above mentioned issues, the need for solving constraints may also prevent
CUTE or jCUTE from scaling for large programs. When an execution path gets large, the size
of the path constraint increases; eventually constraint solvers may not be able to handle the path
constraint. However, constraint solving is very efficient in CUTE or jCUTE. This is because of
the approximations that concolic testing performs: it separates the arithmetic constraints and the
pointer constraints. If the last negated constraint is an arithmetic constraint, then only the set of
arithmetic constraints is solved; otherwise, the set of pointer constraints is solved. Note that this
way of decoupling the arithmetic constraints from the pointer constraints has some limitations (see
the discussion in Section 4.1.6). However, we believe that such decoupling is a good compromise
for the efficiency it provides.
Moreover, the solution in one execution path is often quite similar to the next execution as we
negate only a single constraint. To exploit this fact, we proposed an optimization in Section 4.1.5.
This optimization makes constraint solving incremental and highly efficient in case the negated
constraint is an arithmetic constraint. In case the negated constraint is a pointer constraint, this
becomes even more efficient as we simply add a node, delete a node, or make two pointers equal.
Overall, we observed that incremental constraint solving takes a small fraction of the total execution
time. Note that, although CUTE and jCUTE use a custom incremental solver, other solvers such
as CVC Lite [12] or Uclid [58] can also be used for generating new inputs.
For shared-memory multi-threaded programs, our race-detection and flipping algorithm’s effi-
ciency depends on the number of equivalence classes of a given program—the larger the number of
equivalence classes the lesser is the efficiency. A natural question to ask is whether the equivalence
relation defined in Section 3.2 is optimal for efficiency. Unfortunately, the relation is not optimal.
In [93], we showed that we can define a coarser equivalence relation that results in fewer number
of equivalence classes. The equivalence relation uses a weak happens-before relation which orders
a write of a shared variable with all its subsequent reads that occur before the next write to the
variable. However, we do not know how to adapt this coarser equivalence relation in testing to
obtain further reduction in the path space. This remains a topic for future research. Moreover, it
would be useful to investigate the optimal equivalence relation for which we can develop a testing
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method that would explore one candidate from each equivalence class.
9.2.2 Program Verification
A report of a bug by CUTE or jCUTE represents an actual bug because the bug is found by
executing a program on a concrete input and schedule. However, CUTE and jCUTE can verify a
program only in some limited cases: namely, if the following three conditions are satisfied. First,
the testing process using CUTE (resp. jCUTE) terminates. Second, CUTE (resp. jCUTE) makes
no approximation during concolic execution. Third, CUTE (resp. jCUTE) is able to solve any
constraint which is satisfiable. These conditions guarantee that the tool has executed all feasible
execution paths of a program and has hit all the reachable statements of the program. For most
practical programs, CUTE and jCUTE can only find bugs; they cannot verify the programs. This
can be seen as a limitation of our testing methods.
To partially address the above problem we have proposed two approaches: statistical model
checking [99, 100, 101, 6, 4] and learning to verify [112, 111, 113]. Statistical model checking
aims to bound the confidence with which we can say that a system is correct; in this approach,
we check if a system whose behavior can be modeled probabilistically meets its formal reliability
specification. Specifically, we assume that the specification is given in some probabilistic temporal
logic such as the probabilistic computation tree logic (PCTL) [47] or the continuous stochastic
logic (CSL) [2, 8]. Model checking is performed by automatically translating the specification into
a series of inter-dependent statistical hypothesis testing experiments. The experiments are then
conducted through discrete event simulation of the system. The number of simulation runs that
need to be performed depends on the degree of confidence that we want in our decision.
Statistical model checking works for any system for which the inputs come from a fixed proba-
bility distribution. Unfortunately, for general software systems, one cannot assume there is a fixed
probability distribution over the inputs. Therefore, we cannot directly apply statistical model
checking to a general software system. We believe that by observing the actual behaviors exhibited
by a system in the field, one can try to check if the inputs come from a fixed probability distribu-
tion; if this is the case, we can apply statistical model checking to verify quantitative properties of
the system.
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Another approach to verify infinite state systems is the learning to verify paradigm. The key
idea behind this approach is based on the observation that often the state-space of infinite state
systems is highly structured. For example, for a number of practical systems, such as parameterized
systems, or systems with unbounded integers and message queues, the reachable state-space is
regular and can be represented by a deterministic finite automaton. Traditional model checking
techniques typically verify such a system by iteratively ‘traversing’ the entire state space of the
system, but such traversal may take a long time to terminate, or it may never terminate. By using
language inference and learning techniques, we have shown that it is often possible to find the
reachable states of a system by either collecting its samples or by answering certain membership
and equivalence queries. We have implemented this technique in a tool called LEVER and used it
to analyze various systems with integers, message queues, stacks and parameterized systems. The
systems that we analyzed using LEVER are quite small in size. A future research challenge would
be make learning to verify work for large software systems where the reachable state space may
not be regular—for example, by using concolic testing to obtain samples.
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